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THE    PHILOSOPHY    OF   THE 
PRESENT   IN   GERMANY 


3      *  ■>  9      3 


,08  >   »   >  J 


THE  PHILOSOPHY  OF 

THE   PRESENT   IN 

GERMANY 


BY 

OSWALD    KULPE 

PROFESSOR  OF  PHILOSOPHY  IN  THE  UNIVERSITY  OF  BONN 


TRANSLATED    FROM    THE    FIFTH    GERMAN    EDITION    BY 

MAUD    LYALL    PATRICK 

AND 

G.  T.  W.   PATRICK 

Authorized  Translation 


LONDON 
GEORGE  ALLEN  &  COMPANY,  LTD. 

44  &  45    RATHBONE   PLACE 
1913 

[All  rights  reserved] 


17722 


Printed  by  Ballanttnk,  Hanson  &*  Co. 
At  the  Ballantyne  Press,  Edinburgh 


\<"'5  9E- 


PREFACE 

This  little  book  has  met  with  a  great  success 
in  Germany.  In  England  and  America  the 
perennial  desire  to  follow  closely  the  move- 
ments of  German  thought  will,  we  believe, 
insure  a  welcome  for  the  translation.  Profes- 
sor Kulpe  is  well  known  in  English-speaking 
countries  through  his  other  works,  particularly 
his  Introduction  to  Philosophy  and  his  Outlines 
of  Psychology,  both  standard  works  on  these 
subjects,  and  both  in  English  translations. 

It  has  been  objected  that  the  present  book  is 
not  precisely  what  its  name  implies — an  account 
of  the  philosophy  of  the  present  in  Germany, 
Die  Philoso])hie  cler  Gegenwart  in  Deutschland. 
This  is  true  if  by  the  philosophy  of  the  pre- 
sent we  mean  the  philosophy  of  the  moment 
— the  very  last  and  latest  philosophical  fads, 
fancies,  and  effusions ;  but  it  is  not  true  if 
by  the  philosophy  of  the  present  we  mean  the 
great    representative    movements    which    mark 


vi     PHILOSOPHY   OF  THE   PRESENT 

the  present  advance  in  this  sphere  of  thought. 
Professor  Kulpe's  book  gives  a  clear  picture 
of  four  of  the  typical  philosophical  movements 
of  the  present  time  in  Germany — Positivism, 
Materialism,  Naturalism,  and  Idealism;  and 
he  sets  them  before  us  in  the  form  presented 
by  the  leading  representatives  of  these  move- 
ments—men like  Mach,  Haeckel,  Nietzsche, 
and  Wundt. 

The  unique  feature  of  this  book  is  not  so 
much  Professor  Kulpe's  clear  and  concise  state- 
ment of  the  characteristics  of  the  four  schools 
and  their  representatives,  as  it  is  his  criticism 
of  them.  Following  the  detailed  exposition 
of  each  philosopher,  there  is  a  concise  and 
penetrating  critique.  Especial  attention  may 
be  called  to  the  instructive  critiques  of  Mach, 
Nietzsche,  and  Wundt. 

Particularly  illuminating  will  be  found  the 
author's  summary  relegation  of  epistemological 
idealism,  phenomenalism,  and  other  forms  of 
subjective  idealism  to  the  school  of  Positivism, 
where  they  belong  ;  his  reservation  of  the  name 
"  Idealism  "  for  what  has  sometimes  been  called 
objective  idealism— that  is,  to  actual  constructive 
attempts  to  solve  the  problem  of  objective  reality, 


PREFACE  vii 

after  the  manner  of  Plato,  Leibniz,  Fechner,  or 
Wiindt,  by  means  of  induction  and  analogy ; 
and,  finally,  his  suggestive  remarks  about  neo- 
rationalism  and  inductive  metaphysics. 

It  is  believed  that  the  book  may  be  found 
useful  as  a  text  for  the  use  of  college  classes  in 
modern  German  philosophy. 

The  translators  wish  to  acknowledge  their 
indebtedness  to  Mr.  Edward  Henry  Lauer  and 
to  Professor  Edward  L.  Schaub  for  valuable 
suggestions  in  the  work  of  translation. 


THE  TRANSLATORS. 


The  State  University  of  Iowa, 
Iowa  City,  Iowa, 
April  1913. 


CONTENTS 


I.  Introduction 

1.  The  Problem 

2.  The  Relation   of   Philosophy   to  the 

Special  Sciences 

3.  General  Characteristics  of  the  Four 

Schools       .... 

II.  Positivism 

1.  Ernst  Mach  .... 

2.  Eugen  Duhring     . 

III.  Materialism    ..... 

Ernst  Haeckel  .... 

IV.  Naturalism 

Friedrich  Nietzsche 

V.  Idealism  ...... 

1.  GusTAv  Theodor  Fechner     . 

2.  Hermann  Lotze     . 

3.  Eduard  von  Hartmann 

4.  Wilhelm  Wundt  .         .         . 

5.  General  Critique  of  Idealism 

VI.  Conclusion      .         .         . 

Index      


PAQB 
1 

1 

8 

18 

26 
35 
59 

78 
83 

107 
114 

135 

147 
160 
174 
193 
222 

236 

253 


THE  PHILOSOPHY  OF  THE 
PRESENT  IN  GERMANY 


INTRODUCTION 

1.   THE   PROBLEM 

There  have  been  times  when  philosophy  stood 
in  the  foreground  of  general  interest.  Tran- 
scending the  bounds  of  its  legitimate  field,  it 
became  a  kind  of  public  power  to  which  every- 
one who  laid  any  claim  to  culture  was  accus- 
tomed to  seek  as  close  a  relation  as  possible. 
The  impulse  toward  knowledge  and  science, 
the  longing  for  happiness  and  peace,  the  hope 
for  immortality  and  blessedness,  the  need  of 
rules  and  regulations  for  conduct  and  action, 
all  turned  to  philosophy,  and  were  satisfied. 
Thus,  far  and  wide,  phiiubophy  determined 
the  broad  orbits  of  the  spiritual  life,  and  was 

A 


2     PHILOSOPHY   OF   THE   PRESENT 

regarded  as  unquestionably  the  most  substantial 
fruit  of  all  ideal  endeavour.  It  was  to  philo- 
sophy that  the  arts  and  sciences  crowded  for 
inspiration,  while  culture  and  civilisation  seemed 
almost  to  flow  from  it,  or  at  least  to  be  en- 
nobled and  consecrated  through  its  influence. 
Such  a  period  there  was  in  Germany  in 
the  eighteenth  and  in  the  beginning  of  the 
nineteenth  centuries. 

At  the  present  time  philosophy  holds  a  very 
diff'erent  position.  It  has  become  merely  one 
among  many  pursuits,  and  ranks  in  no  wise 
above  the  others.  Although  no  one  would  go 
so  far  as  to  regard  philosophy  simply  as  an 
inheritance  of  past  ages,  nevertheless  it  must 
now  renounce  its  claim  to  the  leading  role  in 
intellectual  life.  TreitschJce  could  well  say  of 
the  time  succeeding  the  War  of  Liberation  that 
a  new  philosophy  aroused  far  deeper  interest 
than  a  political  event.  Of  the  present  times 
no  historian  could  make  such  a  statement. 

Certainly  the  cause  of  this  lessened  interest 
in  philosophy  is  not  found  altogether  in  the 
changed  interests  of  the  people.  Nor  is  it  true 
that  a  race  of  thinkers  and  poets  (dubbed 
abstractionists  by  the  first  Napoleon)  has  been 


INTRODUCTION  3 

supplanted  by  a  race  of  politicians.  The  change 
is  due  rather  to  the  fact  that  we  have  to-day 
no  philosophy  which  commands  such  profound 
regard.  That  there  is  a  real  and  genuine  de- 
mand in  our  times  for  philosophical  reading 
and  philosophical  knowledge,  is  shown  by  the 
wide  interest  that  has  been  taken  in  the  works 
of  Schojjjenhaaer  and  Nietzsche. 

The  reproach  may  be  made  against  modem 
philosophy,  that  it  has  itself  parted  with  its 
proud  title  to  the  leading  role  in  spiritual  life  ; 
that  it  has  descended  to  the  lower  region  of 
investigation  in  the  special  sciences,  and  re- 
nounced altogether  the  development  of  a  com- 
prehensive theory  of  the  universe  and  of  life. 
But  when  there  appears  such  a  book  as  HaeckeVs 
World  Riddles,  which  with  sui'e  and  expert 
hand  offers  a  new  standpoint  for  new  times,  its 
brilliant  success  shows  that  the  love  of  philo- 
sophy is  by  no  means  extinct,  but  that  now  as 
ever  it  inspires  a  multitude  of  minds. 

The  situation  in  philosophy  seems  upon 
closer  examination  to  be  somewhat  as  follows  : 
Formerly  philosophical  interest  was  directed  to 
the  more  profound  and  difficult  problems,  while 
less  attention  was  given  to  subjects  of  popular 


4     PHILOSOPHY   OF  THE   PRESENT 

interest  and  less  merit  was  attributed  to  mere 
embellishment  of  form.  It  was  not  Gottsched 
and  Gellert,  hut  Christiayi  ]^W/' (1679-1754), 
the  systematiser  of  all  knowledge,  who  was  the 
philosophical  hero  in  the  first  decades  of  the 
eighteenth  century,  while  Schelling  and  Hegel 
practised  but  slightly  the  art  of  a  Scliopen- 
hauer — the  art  of  captivating  and  inspiring 
one's  readers  by  means  of  popular  language  and 
impressive  eloquence.  Schopenhauefs  World 
as  Will  and  Idea,  which  appeared  in  1819, 
although  it  was  the  chief  work  of  the  Frankfort 
philosopher,  remained  unnoticed  for  many  de- 
cades, while  the  philosophically  interested  laity 
delighted  to  delve  in  the  misty  dialectic  of 
Hegel  and  his  school. 

Now,  however,  in  our  own  times,  we  discover 
a  radically  different  attitude  toward  philosophy, 
well  illustrated  in  the  writings  of  HaecJcel  and 
Nietzsche.  The  happy  methods  of  expression 
which  make  strenuous  thought  unnecessary, 
the  dazzling  fancies,  the  witty  paradoxes,  the 
artistic  dress  of  thought,  the  immediate  applica- 
tion to  life  and  belief,  and  finally  the  close 
connection  with  scientific  knowledge  and  hypo- 
theses,— these  are  the  factors  which  nowadavs 


INTRODUCTION  5 

give  a  philosopher  access  to  the  reading  pubHc. 
Philosophy  is  now  rather  a  recreation,  a  pleasant 
diversion  for  an  idle  horn*,  than  a  serious 
pursuit  for  a  wide-reading  public.  It  is  not 
the  worth  of  the  ideas,  nor  the  methods  used 
in  working  them  out,  but  rather  a  pleasing 
outward  form,  which  determines  in  our  day 
the  choice  of  philosophical  reading. 

So  it  has  come  about  that  the  philosophical 
movement  of  the  present,  in  so  far  as  it  is 
strictly  scientific,  is  not  widely  known  nor  fully 
appreciated.  From  this  fact  only  can  we  under- 
stand the  judgment  that  the  philosophy  of  the 
present  day  deserves  no  better  fate  than  it  has 
received. 

The  first  task  of  the  modern  philosopher  is, 
therefore,  as  it  seems  to  me,  to  determine  care- 
fully the  present  condition  of  this  science,  its 
meaning,  its  methods,  and  its  goal.  In  the 
following  chapters,  I  have  sought  to  present  very 
briefly  the  chief  tendencies  of  modern  philosophy, 
with  the  hope  that  we  may  see  that  it  has 
not  renounced  its  task  of  constructing  a  com- 
prehensive view  of  the  world  and  of  life ;  and 
that  in  spite  of  its  thoroughness  and  its  care- 
fulness, in  spite  of  its  methodological  investi- 


6     PHILOSOPHY   OF   THE   PRESENT 

gallons  and  its  scientific  caution,  it  rises  to 
its  own  peculiar  metaphysical  views.  Perhaps 
if  I  may  be  able  to  show  that  philosophy  is 
at  the  present  time  pursuing  its  own  special 
problems  with  unparalleled  energy,  a  somewhat 
widely  extended  prejudice  may  in  this  way  be 
removed.  Perhaps  also  encouragement  may 
thus  be  given  to  the  study  of  new  philosophical 
works,  which  may  lay  claim  to  a  typical  signi- 
ficance in  illustrating  the  present  achievements 
and  the  present  tendencies  of  this  science. 

An  essential  limitation  of  material  is  of  course 
necessary  in  this  short  sketch  of  the  philosophy 
of  the  present.  In  the  first  place,  I  can  scarcely 
go  outside  the  limits  of  German  philosophy. 
Even  in  Germany  it  wiU  be  impossible  to  review 
all  the  present  active  philosophical  tendencies 
and  their  representatives.  Only  the  principal 
schools  and  a  few  typical  representatives  can  be 
considered.  I  shall  be  obliged,  therefore,  to 
omit  any  review  of  the  great  and  fruitful  work 
in  the  field  of  the  special  philosophical  disci- 
plines. To  be  sure,  it  was  precisely  this  special 
work  which  was  characteristic  of  the  close  of 
the  nineteenth  century;  but  what  I  have  in 
mind    in  this  short   discussion  is  the   general 


INTRODUCTION  7 

tendency  of  thought,  the  general  world-view, 
and  the  attitude  of  the  several  thinkers  on  the 
problem  of  knowledge ;  and  on  these  broad 
questions  we  should  gain  little  light  from  a 
detailed  study  of  sesthetical,  logical,  ethical,  or 
psychological  problems. 

While  my  work  must  necessarily  be  limited 
in  the  above-mentioned  ways,  there  is  one  way 
in  which  it  will  be  amplified.  In  speaking  of 
the  characteristics  of  the  chief  philosophical 
schools  of  the  present,  I  shall  use  the  word 
"  characteristic "  not  simply  in  the  sense  of  a 
description  or  an  exposition,  but  also,  although 
within  very  moderate  limits,  of  a  critique  of 
the  schools  in  question.  In  this  way,  although 
the  difficulty  of  our  task  is  increased,  we  shall 
approach  it  perhaps  with  greater  interest.  It  is 
not  enough  merely  to  become  acquainted  with 
a  number  of  philosophical  movements ;  we  wish 
also  to  be  able  to  criticise  them,  and  to  gain  an 
unprejudiced  insight  into  their  good  and  bad 
points. 


8     PHILOSOPHY   OF  THE   PRESENT 


2.   THE   RELATION   OF   PHILOSOPHY  TO  THE 
SPECIAL   SCIENCES 

It  is  to  some  extent  doubtful  just  what  is 
to  be  regarded  as  the  chief  trend  of  philosophy 
at  the  present.  We  stand  too  close  to  the 
events  and  persons,  as  well  as  to  the  general 
tendencies  of  our  age,  to  be  able  either  to  com- 
prehend them  as  a  whole  or  to  portray  them 
adequately.  In  the  following  account,  there- 
fore, of  the  leading  tendencies  of  the  period, 
I  should  like  from  the  first  to  claim  the  right 
of  personal  opinion,  and  thereby  avoid  all  con- 
troversy over  possible  interpretations. 

I  believe  four  such  general  tendencies  or 
schools  may  be  distinguished :  Positivism, 
Materialism,  Naturalism,  and  Idealism.  My 
task,  then,  will  be  to  characterise  these  four 
schools  of  philosophy  as  to  the  particular  form 
which  they  have  at  present  assumed.  In  so 
doing  I  shall  try  to  avoid  giving  a  trite  exposition 
of  these  theories  in  the  usual  stock  phrases, 
treating  as  secondary  their  individual  represen- 
tatives. What  I  shall  attempt,  rather,  will  be 
to  set  forth   the  teaching  of  a  few  prominent 


INTRODUCTION  9 

representatives  of  the  several  schools  under  the 
form  of  a  more  thorough  exposition  and  evalua- 
tion. In  attempting  in  a  very  limited  space 
to  give  a  comprehensive  review  of  the  philo- 
sophical tendencies  of  a  period,  it  is  necessary 
to  neglect  the  numerous  individual  differences 
and  grasp  the  general  standpoint,  placing  the 
main  stress  upon  its  characteristics.  The  in- 
dividual philosophers  who  will  receive  detailed 
treatment  win  thereby  the  significance  of  types, 
chosen,  according  to  the  measure  of  their  success 
and  the  respect  and  authority  which  they  enjoy, 
to  illustrate  and  supplement  the  more  general 
exposition. 

All  four  of  the  schools  which  we  have  named 
stand  directly  under  the  determining  influence 
which  the  marvellous  development  of  the 
special  sciences,  especially  the  natural  sciences, 
exerted  upon  the  thought  of  the  nineteenth 
century.  It  was  during  this  century  that  a 
final  separation  between  philosophy  and  the 
special  sciences  first  gained  general  recognition. 
In  the  great  system  of  Christian  Wolff,  the 
natural  sciences  are  still  reckoned  as  empirical 
disciplines  in  philosophy.  Kaiit  also  takes  the 
same  standpoint  in  so  far  as  he  opposes  to  each 


10     PHILOSOPHY   OF  THE   PRESENT 

other  a  knowledge  from  pure  reason  and  a 
rational  knowledge  from  empirical  principles, 
and  the  latter  he  designates  as  applied  philo- 
sophy. Only  the  former  of  course  is  to  be 
counted  as  philosophy  in  the  true  sense.  But 
in  reality  both  philosophy  and  the  special 
sciences,  both  the  rational  and  the  empirical 
disciplines,  are  distinguished  only  by  their 
method.  The  former  reaches  its  judgments 
by  way  simply  of  logical  operations,  through 
analysis  of  concepts,  through  conclusions  and 
proofs,  through  deductive  process.  The  latter, 
on  the  contrary,  beginning  with  facts  of  per- 
ception, seeks  by  observation  and  comparison, 
by  experimental  methods  and  by  the  elaboration 
of  judgments  of  experience,  by  induction  and 
analogy,  to  arrive  at  scientific  conclusions. 
The  very  same  knowledge  can,  therefore,  be 
gained  in  two  ways :  through  observation  or 
through  intellectual  affirmation ;  through  in- 
vestigation of  empirical  material  or  through  an 
independent  development  of  ideas  ;  through  the 
use  of  the  senses  or  through  the  spontaneous 
activity  of  the  understanding.  From  this  it 
followed  as  a  natural  presupposition  that  the 
second,  the  rational  method,  was  worth  more 


INTRODUCTION  11 

and  ranked  higher  than  the  empirical.  The 
dominance  of  this  view  finds  its  expression  in 
Goethe's  Faust,  in  the  second  part  of  which 
the  Baccalaureus  says : 

Eifahrungswesen  !  Schaum  und  Duft ! 
Und  mit  dem  Geist  nicht  ebenbiirtig  ! 

Although  Kant  had  contributed  greatly  to 
subdue  this  arrogance  of  pure  reason,  and 
caused  the  value  of  empirical  research  to  be 
more  clearly  recognised,  nevertheless  after  his 
time  the  old  view  remained  in  favour — namely, 
that  knowledge  of  a  given  fact  could  be  arrived 
at  by  two  different  paths,  the  rational  and  the 
empirical,  and  that  the  former  method  was 
superior.  In  this  spirit,  Hegel  (a  Christian  Wolff 
redivivits)  made  his  great  attempt  to  derive  all 
knowledge  of  reality  from  pure  reason  by  the 
rational  method.  Over  experience  he  threw  a 
carefully  woven  net  of  ideas.  But  the  meshes 
of  the  net  soon  showed  themselves  to  be  here 
too  narrow,  there  too  wide.  Philosophy  made 
the  claim  that  science  is  produced,  like  a 
homimcidics,  out  of  the  simple  ingredients  of 
pure  thought,  but  it  produced  no  result  capable 
of  life  and  development.  The  dialectic  method, 
which   Hegel  had  used   with   wonderful   force 


12     PHILOSOPHY   OF   THE   PRESENT 

and  nimble  mind,  turned  itself  against  him  and 
destroyed  his  system.  Reality  showed  itself 
unruly,  and  philosophy  and  the  special  sciences 
became  involved  in  a  violent  war  with  each 
other.  In  this  struggle,  speculative  philosophy, 
relying  upon  her  own  peculiar  methods,  finally 
succumbed.  The  sober,  cautious,  and  exact 
work  of  the  special  sciences  proved  far  superior 
and  won  a  far  more  universal  recognition  than 
the  abstract  dialectics  of  the  speculative  philo- 
sophers, and  so  HegeVs  whole  structure,  and 
the  foundation  upon  which  it  was  built,  fell; 
and  great  was  the  fall  thereof. 

From  this  serious  reverse,  which  philo- 
sophy suffered  in  the  first  half  of  the  nine- 
teenth century,  it  could  recover  only  by  giving 
up  the  unequal  battle,  the  hopeless  compe- 
tition with  the  special  sciences.  It  had  to 
admit  that  its  claim  to  an  independent  know- 
ledge of  reality  through  pure  reason  was  a 
delusion  ;  that  no  speculation  could  be  tolerated 
which  should  take  the  place  of  research ;  that 
no  encroachment  would  be  permitted  upon 
provinces  which  could  not  be  subdued  by  the 
weapons  of  empirical  investigation,  nor  any 
criticism  of  opinions  whose  empirical  foundation 


INTRODUCTION  13 

one  was  not  in  position  to  test.  Philosophy 
had  to  give  up  her  fooHsh  and  groundless  habit 
of  disparaging  and  patronising  the  several 
sciences,  which  rested  upon  the  fancy  that  she 
had  at  her  service  a  special,  quicker,  and  surer 
way  by  which  to  enter  into  knowledge  of  the 
whole  of  reality. 

Originally  philosophy  and  science  coincided. 
So  it  was  actually  in  antiquity ;  so  it  was 
nominally  in  the  eighteenth  century.  When 
the  special  sciences  began  to  be  independent, 
philosophy  assumed  that  she  must  still  guide 
them  and  control  them.  But  they  shook  off 
this  biu'densome  and  harmful  yoke  of  arrogant 
speculation,  and  were  quite  able,  unassisted,  to 
find  their  own  way  and  piu'sue  it.  The  result 
was  that  a  radical  change  took  place  in  the 
relation  of  philosophy  to  science — a  change 
which  may  be  called  characteristic  of  our  time. 
Modern  philosophy  supplements  the  special 
sciences  by  a  fundamental  and  comprehensive 
logic  and  theory  of  knowledge,  by  an  amplifying 
and  perfecting  metaphysics,  and,  finally,  by  the 
undertaking  of  new  investigations  carried  out 
in  the  spu'it  and  by  the  methods  of  the  special 
sciences.     In   this  threefold    sense  philosophy 


14     PHILOSOPHY   OF   THE   PRESENT 

and   science  now  join  in   the  pursuit  of   one 
common  end,  and  that  end  is  knowledge. 

AH  sciences  rest  upon  certain  presuppositions, 
which  require  uniform  exposition  and  examina- 
tion, as  well  as  systematic  co-ordination  and 
confirmation.  But,  in  the  nature  of  things, 
these  presuppositions  cannot  be  found  within 
the  compass  of  the  special  disciplines,  for  the 
reason  that  the  range  of  the  combined  sciences 
extends  far  beyond  any  one  of  them.  Space 
and  time,  being  and  becoming,  cause  and  effect 
are  among  these  presuppositions,  as  well  as 
the  general  methods  of  research  and  exposition 
which  are  followed  by  the  special  sciences. 
Thus,  for  instance,  we  are  accustomed  to  dis- 
tinguish between  an  inductive  method,  which 
from  particular  facts  derives  uniform  relations 
and  laws,  and  a  deductive  method  advancing 
from  general  conceptions  and  propositions  to 
special  instances.  Such  presuppositions  we  call 
the  fundamental  principles  of  all  science,  and  a 
philosophy  which  is  devoted  to  them  we  call 
a  science  of  principles.  Epistemology  and  logic 
are  the  two  branches  of  this  part  of  philosophy, 
which  together  have  been  named  the  science  of 
knowledge. 


INTRODUCTION  15 

But  the  goal  of  every  science,  which  is  the 
complete  knowledge  of  all  the  facts  within  its 
sphere,  lies  always  in  infinity,  and  demands  an 
unending  progress.  The  problems  increase 
instead  of  decreasing,  and  every  vantage-point 
reveals  new  outlooks  into  regions  before  un- 
known. Over  against  this  infinite  task  of  the 
special  sciences  stands  the  finite  circumscribed 
life  of  the  inquiring  man.  He  cannot  wait 
until  science  has  attained  its  goal  and  can  give 
him  information  on  all  these  interesting  ques- 
tions. It  is  true  that  every  man,  unless  the 
desire  has  in  some  way  been  artificially  sup- 
pressed, feels  the  need  of  some  unifying  theory 
of  the  world,  some  insight  into  the  meaning, 
the  purpose,  and  the  worth  of  life  and  of  the 
gi'eat  mechanism  of  which  he  feels  himself  to 
be  one  single  infinitesimal  wheel :  to  the  end 
that  he  may  order  his  conduct  in  a  fitting 
manner,  that  in  his  hopes  and  his  aspirations 
he  may  be  pmsuing  no  deceptive  fancies,  and 
that  in  his  willing  and  acting  he  may  rest 
assured  of  a  fixed  order  of  values.  But  if  he 
finds  the  answer  which  positive  religion  ofi'ers 
to  all  these  questions  concerning  his  fate  and 
his    destiny   unsatisfying   or    insufficient,    then 


16     PHILOSOPHY   OF  THE   PRESENT 

metaphysics  reveals  itself  as  a  way  to  the 
desired  goal.  Thus  the  metaphysics  of  the 
present  day  joins  on  to  the  special  sciences 
where  they  end,  or  where  they  fail  the  ques- 
tioning human  mind.  Such  an  inductive  meta- 
physics— that  is,  a  metaphysics  which  connects 
itself  methodologically  with  the  positive  know- 
ledge of  our  time — is  the  new  form  in  which 
modern  philosophy  establishes  a  theory  of  life 
and  the  world. 

If  we  think  of  the  special  sciences  as  diverg- 
ing rays  of  light,  which  stream  out  in  their 
several  directions  into  the  infinite  realm  of 
objects  of  knowledge,  then  we  may  regard  logic 
and  epistemology  as  the  disciplines  which  have 
to  do  with  the  starting-point  and  focus  of  all 
these  rays ;  while,  on  the  other  hand,  meta- 
physics is  an  attempt,  changing  naturally  with 
the  progress  of  time,  to  cause  this  light-force 
to  penetrate  to  those  distant  regions  hitherto 
inaccessible  to  the  natural  sciences,  and  thereby 
to  illumine  those  great  fields  of  thought  which 
are  of  such  supreme  interest  to  mankind  in 
their  relation  to  knowledge  and  to  conduct. 

Finally,  the  philosophy  of  the  present  aims 
to  take  an  immediate  and  active  part  in  the 


INTRODUCTION  17 

work  of  the  special  sciences  themselves,  or,  to 
continue  our  illustration,  it  seeks  to  send  forth 
new  light-rays  or  cause  the  old  ones  to  penetrate 
into  further  regions.  Philosophy  was  indeed 
the  original  central  fire  which  kindled  the 
separate,  relatively  independent,  lights ;  and  it 
is  still  in  like  manner  creative,  for  it  opens  new 
fields  of  research  or  gives  new  life  to  those 
already  existing. 

In  this  way  philosophy  has  come  into  peace- 
ful and  harmonious  relations  with  the  special 
sciences.  Not  to  pass  them  by,  but  to  work  in 
and  through  them,  is  its  new  watchword.  It  is 
true  that  the  facts  gained  through  the  special 
sciences  are  only  fragments ;  but  it  is  equally 
true  that  they  are  at  the  same  time  the  neces- 
sary building  stones  for  the  construction  of  a 
comprehensive  and  satisfactory  theory  of  life 
and  the  world,  if  such  a  structure  is  to  offer  a 
safe  dwelling,  secure  in  times  of  need  and 
danger.  So  philosophy  has  given  up  the  specu- 
lative method  and  gone  to  school  to  the  special 
sciences ;  while  the  latter,  for  their  part,  seem 
now  to  be  ready  and  eager  to  recognise  in  philo- 
sophy a  necessary  and  helpful  supplement  to 
their  activities.     Thus  it  has  come  about  that 

B 


18     PHILOSOPHY   OF  THE   PEESENT 

the  sciences  are  animated  by  the  principle  of 
the  equal  rights  of  all;  and  it  is  undoubtedly 
true  that  such  a  principle  will  be  able  to  satisfy 
their  inherent  striving  after  knowledge  far 
better  than  the  old  hierarchy. 


3.   GENERAL   CHARACTERISTICS   OF   THE 
FOUR   SCHOOLS 

Although  the  whole  philosophical  movement 
of  the  present  is  dominated  by  the  need  of  a 
working  partnership  with  the  several  sciences, 
nevertheless  this  relationship  shapes  itself  in 
a  special  manner  in  each  of  the  four  different 
schools.  In  the  first  place,  Positivism  stands, 
in  this  respect,  in  opposition  to  the  other  three 
schools.  It  renounces  absolutely  any  system  of 
metaphysics  supplementing  the  special  sciences, 
and  cultivates  philosophy  only  from  the  stand- 
point of  its  other  two  divisions — that  is,  logic 
and  epistemology.  On  the  contrary,  the  other 
three  schools  hold  it  as  an  especially  important 
part  of  their  work  to  arrive  at  some  compre- 
hensive theory  of  life  and  the  world.  Again, 
Idealism  may  be  contrasted  with  the  other  three 
schools.     It    does   not   regard   reality  and  the 


INTRODUCTION  19 

science  of  reality  as  the  final  end  of  wisdom, 
but  seeks  and  finds  an  ideal  meaning  in  all 
knowledge.  As  opposed  to  this  view,  Posi- 
tivism, Materialism,  and  Naturalism  unite  in 
the  opinion  that  such  an  ideal  interpretation,  or 
any  philosophy  of  life  and  the  world  connect- 
ing itself  with  our  religious  needs,  is  neither 
possible  nor  necessary.  All  our  theories  of 
the  universe,  all  our  practical  work  and  aims 
should  not,  as  they  think,  depart  from  the 
simple  foundation  of  experience  and  empirical 
science,  but  should  be  determined  strictly  and 
exclusively  by  them. 

These  three  schools,  again,  are  closely  allied 
in  another  way.  Materialism,  Naturalism,  and 
Positivism  are  accustomed  to  make  their  ap- 
pearance regularly  whenever  a  speculative  period 
in  philosophy  ends  and  a  new  one  has  not  yet 
dawned.  For  instance,  at  the  close  of  the  first 
speculative  period  of  Greek  philosophy,  we  find 
the  Materialism  of  Deinoct^itus,  the  Positivism 
of  the  Sophists,  and  the  Naturalism  of  the 
Cynics  united  in  opposing  the  rational  cosmo- 
logical  tendencies  of  the  first  philosophers  and 
in  bringing  them  to  a  speedy  end.  When, 
however,  in  Plato  and  Aristotle,  a  new  compre- 


20     PHILOSOPHY   OF  THE   PRESENT 

hensive  theory  of  life  and  the  world  appeared, 
then  again  the  Materialism  and  Naturalism  of 
the  Stoics  and  Epicureans  and  the  Positivism  of 
the  Skeptics  marked  the  decline  of  the  brilliant 
period  of  Greek  philosophy.  Quite  analogous 
tendencies  are  found  in  the  eighteenth  century, 
when  the  age  of  the  great  systems  had  outlived 
itself.  We  are  met  in  England  by  the  Posi- 
tivism oilliime,  in  France  by  the  Materialism  of 
Lamettrie  and  the  Systeme  de  la  tiature,  and  by 
the  Natm'alism  of  Rousseau.  Thus,  generally, 
the  high  tide  of  a  philosophical  movement, 
which  flows  beyond  experience  and  the  sciences 
of  reality,  is  followed  by  an  ebb,  in  which  these 
sciences  set  a  limit  to  the  waves  of  philosophical 
thought.  At  such  times,  positive  scientific 
knowledge  serves  as  a  norm  by  which  we  must 
govern  our  thinking  and  willing.  All  assertions 
which  pass  beyond  these  bounds  are  forbidden, 
or  are  represented  as  superfluous  or  untenable, 
and  conduct  is  made  dependent  upon  real 
knowledge — that  is,  upon  knowledge  empiri- 
cally determined,  and  all  that  we  need  to  know 
is  what  is  of  immediate  worth  for  our  conduct. 
The  Materialism,  Naturalism,  and  Positivism 
of  to-day  all  strive  to  be  pure  philosophy  of 


INTRODUCTION  21 

reality.  They  are  the  outcome  of  that  dis- 
tinction between  science  and  speculation,  be- 
tween certainty  and  personal  conviction,  which 
has  come  about  from  the  powerful  uprising 
of  the  special  sciences.  They  are  radically 
opposed  to  any  system  of  metaphysics  which 
attempts  to  supplement  or  enlarge  the  sciences 
or  to  discover  the  nature  of  things-in-themselves. 
Their  object  is  merely  to  fix  and  to  generalise 
what  the  natural  sciences  have  achieved,  to  de- 
termine its  range,  and  make  it  as  fruitful  as  pos- 
sible. But  they  define  reality  difi"erently  among 
themselves.  By  reality,  Materialism  and  Natu- 
ralism understand  natural  reality,  the  sensuous, 
that  which  may  be  apprehended  by  the  senses. 
According  to  Materialism,  everything  which  is 
an  object  of  knowledge  must  be  conceived  and 
interpreted  as  it  is  apprehended  by  the  natural 
sciences.  Man  himself,  according  to  Naturalism, 
is  and  remains  just  a  part  of  nature,  an  ob- 
ject of  sensuous  knowledge ;  even  the  highest 
and  most  ideal  thoughts  and  aspirations  of 
which  he  is  capable  are  only  signs  of  his  natural 
constitution,  only  forms  of  his  mortal  earthly 
destiny.  Materialism  and  Naturalism  stand  to 
each  other  in  the  relation  of  a  theory  and  its 


22     PHILOSOPHY   OF   THE   PRESENT 

practical  application.  The  former  rests  entirely 
upon  natural  science,  and  allows  natui*al  science 
to  prescribe  all  that  shall  be  thought  or  said 
with  reference  to  either  the  material  or  the 
mental  world.  The  latter  likewise  accepts  this 
view,  but  regards  it  more  particularly  as  a  norm 
determining  all  practical  endeavour,  especially 
the  moral  living  and  striving  of  mankind. 
Naturalism  thus  gives  us  directions  how  to 
order  our  being  and  development,  if  we  would 
conform  to  the  teachings  of  natural  science. 

Positivism,  on  the  contrary,  refrains  from 
this  one-sided  recognition  and  superlative  re- 
gard for  natural  science  and  for  outward  ex- 
perience and  reality.  All  experience  and  all 
the  special  sciences,  the  totality  of  reality  and 
of  knowledge,  are  its  foundations.  But  what- 
ever goes  beyond  this,  whatever  leaves  the  safe 
path  of  inductive  research  to  the  end  of  adding 
provisional  assumptions  and  opinions  to  what 
is  actually  known,  is,  according  to  the  harsh 
and  rigorous  teaching  of  Positivism,  simply 
poetry.  Thus  Positivism  labours  to  maintain 
a  kind  of  status  integer,  to  establish,  as  it  were, 
a  base  of  information,  from  which  the  way  to 
new  philosophical   movements  may  be  paved. 


INTRODUCTION  23 

It  is  the  quiet  before  the  storm  and  struggle 
of  opinions,  the  critical  revision  of  what  has 
already  been  gained,  the  purposeful  and  neces- 
sary preparation  for  new  speculative  attempts 
appropriate  to  the  age.  Philosophy  becomes  in 
Positivism  a  kind  of  servant  to  the  special 
sciences,  losing  almost  wholly  its  independent 
worth.  Thus  we  see,  under  the  rule  of  the 
Positive  school,  a  complete  reversal  of  the 
former  relation  between  philosophy  and  the 
special  sciences.  The  latter  were  at  one  time 
dependent  upon  philosophy,  whose  high  destiny 
they  unhesitatingly  recognised  ;  now,  according 
to  Positivism,  it  becomes  the  only  task  of  philo- 
sophy to  support  and  further  the  researches 
of  the  sciences.  The  reserve,  which  this  school 
preaches,  is  of  course  only  for  those  easily 
satisfied  people  who  make  no  claim  to  a  view 
of  life  and  the  world  scientifically  expressed,  or 
for  those  who,  rendered  shrewd  by  experience 
and  instructed  by  the  constant  fluctuations  and 
uncertainty  of  speculative  knowledge,  prefer  to 
renounce  it  altogether  than  to  follow  its  de- 
ceptive allurements.  While  Materialism  and 
Natui'alism  proclaim  the  glory  of  our  achieve- 
ments  when   we    give    all   honour   to   natui'al 


24     PHILOSOPHY   OF  THE   PRESENT 

reality,  Positivism  points  out  that  all  specula- 
tion is  vain,  an  idle  play  of  words  and  images, 
harmless  at  the  best,  but  in  any  case  unbecoming 
to  the  disciples  of  science. 

In  opposition  to  these  three  schools,  Idealism 
proposes  to  apply  new  methods  to  the  old  efforts 
of  speculative  philosophy.  It  proposes  to  call 
to  its  aid  the  special  sciences  themselves,  and 
through  these  to  attain  to  a  comprehensive  and 
reliable  idealistic  view  of  life  and  the  world.  It 
differs  from  the  former  idealistic  schools  not  so 
much  in  tendency  as  in  method.  It  rises,  to  be 
sure,  beyond  the  knowledge  of  reality ;  it  seeks 
to  penetrate  into  the  realm  of  things-in-them- 
selves ;  but  in  this  overstepping  of  the  bounds 
fixed  by  experience,  it  still  observes  the  critical 
precaution  and  circumspection  of  Positivism, 
and  preserves  that  regard  for  the  natural  sciences 
which  characterises  Materialism  and  Naturalism. 
It  avoids  the  one-sidedness  of  these  schools, 
limiting  themselves  as  they  do  to  outward  ex- 
perience and  the  knowledge  of  nature,  and 
turns  toward  the  totality  of  empirical  inter- 
pretation and  research.  But  it  does  not  con- 
sider it  necessary  to  stop  where  these  have 
paused  for  the  time,  but  regards  it  as  the  per- 


INTRODUCTION  25 

feet  right  of  philosophy  to  complete  their  work, 
although  it  may  be  only  provisionally  and  within 
definite  bounds.  Just  as  in  the  plastic  arts  and 
in  the  poetry  of  our  day,  naturalistic  and  ideal- 
istic tendencies  alternate  as  we  begin  again  to 
trust  to  the  guidance  of  the  imagination,  so  also 
in  philosophy,  the  new  Idealism,  which  in  this 
respect  has  learned  something  from  Positivism, 
finds  itself  again  called  to  take  up  the  old 
problems  of  philosophy.  Thus  there  has  dawned 
a  new  era  of  ideas  and  systems. 


II 

POSITIVISM 

The  Absolute  Philosophy  of  a  Schelling  and 
Hegel  succumbed,  as  we  have  seen,  to  the 
assaults  of  the  special  sciences.  Their  dazzling 
success  was  followed  by  a  downfall  most  com- 
plete. To  make  a  virtue  of  this  necessity  seemed 
to  Materialism  and  Positivism  to  be  just  their 
mission — that  is,  to  make  philosophy  primarily 
dependent  upon  the  special  sciences ;  the  former 
by  cultivating  certain  of  the  sciences,  and, 
without  more  ado,  turning  their  results  to 
account  to  form  a  theory  of  the  world ;  the 
latter  by  subordinating  philosophy  outright  to 
the  special  sciences.  It  was  from  Positivism, 
however,  that  there  came  the  most  effective 
opposition  to  Hegel.  This  was  because  it  did 
not  dispute  in  particular  any  Hegelian  conclu- 
sion, nor  attempt  to  replace  the  whole  system 
by  another,  nor  even  to  transfer  the  struggle 
to  a  practical  field,  but  simply  because  it  cast 

26 


POSITIVISM  27 

effective  doubt  upon  the  methods  and  pre- 
suppositions of  the  whole  Absolute  Philosophy. 
According  to  Positivism,  there  are  in  philosophy 
no  other  methods  of  research  and  exposition 
than  the  methods  practised  and  approved  by 
the  special  sciences ;  and  the  limits  of  know- 
ledge which  exist  for  these  disciplines  are  also 
the  limits  of  philosophy.  In  these  two  pro- 
positions we  have  the  whole  creed  of  Positivism. 
But  the  limits  of  the  special  sciences,  in  so  far 
as  they  are  not  merely  of  a  formal  nature,  are 
determined  by  experience,  and  by  all  that  is 
necessary  to  make  experience  intelligible  and 
clear.  Therefore,  according  to  Positivism,  philo- 
sophy, in  so  far  as  it  wishes  to  be  a  science, 
must  be  limited  by  experience — that  is,  it  must 
be  an  einjnrical  science  like  the  others,  or  else 
it  must  be  a  theory  of  etnjnrical  science. 

Positivism  originated  in  France  and  England. 
The  noted  mathematician  and  philosopher, 
d'Alemhert  (1717-1783),  as  well  as  the  states- 
man and  economist,  Turgot  (1727-1781),  may 
be  regarded  as  the  founders  of  this  school.  In 
the  mathematical  sciences,  ever  since  Newton's 
proud  declaration,  '' Hyjjotheses  non  jingo,'''  it 
had  been  thought  necessary  to  do  away  with  all 


28     PHILOSOPHY   OF  THE   PRESENT 

metaphysical  obscurities  in  order  to  be  able  to 
give  an  exact  description  of  natural  phenomena. 
Only  the  perceptual  matter-of-fact  is  accessible 
to  us ;  the  forces  working  in  it  remain  con- 
cealed. According  to  cV Alembert,  the  universe 
resembles  an  unexplored  ocean,  on  whose 
surface  we  discern  separate  islands  without 
connection  with  the  mainland,  A\\  speculation 
concerning  metaphysical  realities  are  entangled 
in  difficulties  and  contradictions.  Philosophy 
must  be  simply  a  science  of  facts.  It  must 
give  unity  and  connection  to  all  isolated  know- 
ledge, because  facts  everywhere  form  a  connected 
unity.  In  the  development  which  the  exact 
sciences  have  undergone,  Turgot  discovers  a 
universal  law  of  three  stages  of  knowledge. 
The  first  stage  in  the  explanation  of  natural 
phenomena  is  religion,  where  the  gods,  con- 
ceived as  mighty  men,  bring  about  the  changes 
which  we  see  in  nature.  Then  follows  the 
metaphysical  stage,  which  speaks  of  essences 
and  faculties  and  finds  nature  grounded  in 
abstract  ideas.  The  last  stage  is  that  of  mathe- 
matical science,  which  simply  describes  phe- 
nomena and  unfolds  their  laws.  This  is  the 
Positive  method,  the  method  of  science. 


POSITIVISM  29 

Nominally  Positivism  goes  back  to  the  nine- 
teenth century,  to  Augusts  Comte  (1798-1857), 
whose  principal  work,  Cours  de  philosophie 
positive,^  appeared  in  six  volumes  between  the 
years  1830  and  1842.  In  this  celebrated  source 
of  Positivism,  Comte  distinguishes  more  care- 
fully than  Turgot  the  three  stages  in  the  develop- 
ment of  the  human  mind — the  Theological,  the 
Metaphysical,  and  the  Positive  (the  law  of 
the  three  stages).  The  mythological  explana- 
tion by  means  of  divine  powers,  together  with 
the  hypothesis  of  universal  forces,  yield  gi'adu- 
ally  and  of  necessity  to  a  Positive  conception 
and  treatment  of  all  the  problems  of  our 
knowledge.  In  this  stage  we  perceive  the 
impossibility  of  arriving  at  absolute  knowledge  ; 
we  give  up,  therefore,  the  attempt  to  discover 
the  origin  and  destiny  of  the  universe  and  to 
discern  the  inner  causes  of  phenomena.  Instead, 
we  hope  by  means  of  observation  and  reason  to 
find  out  the  laws  of  things — that  is,  to  discover 
the  relations  which  exist  between  them  in  their 
temporal  and  qualitative  reference.  The  ex- 
planation   of  facts   consists   here   only    in   the 

^  The  Positive  Philosophy  of  A^^guste  Comte,  translated  by 
Hariiet  Martineau.  London,  1896  :  G.  Bell  and  Sonnenschein. 
(Tr.) 


30     PHILOSOPHY   OF  THE   PRESENT 

connection  of  separate  phenomena  with  certain 
universal  laws,  whose  number  the  progress  of 
science  seeks  steadily  to  lessen.  The  com- 
pletion of  the  Positive  system  would  be  attained, 
if  it  should  succeed  in  proving  all  phenomena 
to  be  particular  cases  of  one  general  law,  such, 
for  instance,  as  the  law  of  gravitation.  This 
Positive  method,  which  renounces  theological 
and  metaphysical  explanations  of  phenomena, 
is  the  method  used  in  the  special  sciences, 
although,  to  be  sure,  it  cannot  yet  be  completely 
carried  out  in  every  case.  It  alone  makes 
possible  an  anticipation  of  coming  events  and 
in  this  way  gains  a  mastery  over  nature.  The 
purpose  of  science  is  thus  the  discovery  of 
nature's  laws,  and  their  reduction  to  the  simplest 
possible  form.  The  task  of  a  Positive  philo- 
sophy is,  therefore,  simply  to  advance  and 
enlarge  these  positive  sciences.  A  real  enlarge- 
ment, indeed,  was  oifered  by  Comte  through 
his  project  of  a  sociology,  a  science  of  human 
society.  Thereby,  according  to  his  view,  a 
systematic  conclusion  of  scientific  knowledge 
was  reached  in  principle.  In  exhibiting  the 
general  organisation  of  the  sciences,  in  out- 
lining  the    uniform    connection    and    purpose 


POSITIVISM  31 

which  exists  for  all  of  them,  Comte  beHeved 
that  he  could  show  the  serviceable  activity  of 
philosophy  in  the  interest  of  the  special  sciences. 
So  here  we  find  united  the  two  distinctive 
features  of  the  Positive  school  of  thought :  on 
the  one  hand,  philosophy  is  a  theory  of  science  ; 
on  the  other  hand,  it  is  itself  a  science. 

In  England,  Positivism  has  existed  in  its 
beginnings  since  the  time  of  Francis  Bacon 
(1561-1626).  As  early  as  Bacons  time,  the 
attempt  was  made,  by  developing  appropriate 
methods  and  by  planning  a  complete  system  of 
the  sciences,  to  place  philosophy  at  the  service 
of  scientific  activity.  Certain  distinguishing 
features  of  this  school  are  clearly  illustrated 
in  the  case  of  Hume  (1711-1776),  inasmuch 
as  we  find  in  him  a  perfect  expression  of  the 
anti-metaphysical  tendency  of  Positivism.  With 
respect  to  single  metaphysical  ideas,  such  as 
substance  and  causality,  Hume  sought  to  carry 
out  a  Positive  conception,  which,  abstracting 
entirely  from  inner  forces  and  real  relations, 
took  for  its  starting-point  the  phenomena  of 
the  knowing  mind  and  reduced  these  concepts 
to  psychological  laws.  A  more  definite  form 
of  Positivism  appeared  in  England  in  the  nine- 


32     PHILOSOPHY   OF  THE   PRESENT 

teenth  century.  John  Stuart  Mill  (1806-1873), 
the  friend  and  admirer  of  Comte,  became,  par- 
ticularly through  his  Logic  (first  edition,  1843), 
the  English  representative  of  the  Positive  school 
of  thought.  This  logic  is  essentially  a  doctrine 
of  method,  and  has  rendered  distinguished 
service  to  the  theory  of  induction,  the  method 
of  research  commonly  used  in  the  empirical 
sciences.  In  the  following  quotation  Mill  sets 
forth  with  remarkable  clearness  the  fundamental 
doctrines  of  the  Positive  philosophy : — "  We 
have  no  knowledge  of  anything  but  phenomena ; 
and  our  knowledge  of  phenomena  is  relative, 
not  absolute.  We  know  not  the  essence,  nor 
the  real  mode  of  production  of  any  fact,  but 
only  its  relations  to  other  facts  in  the  way  of 
succession  or  of  similitude.  These  relations 
are  constant ;  that  is,  always  the  same  in  the 
same  circumstances.  The  constant  resem- 
blances which  link  phenomena  together,  and 
the  constant  sequences  which  unite  them  as 
antecedent  and  consequent,  are  termed  their 
laws.  The  laws  of  phenomena  are  all  we  know 
respecting  them.  Their  essential  nature,  and 
their  ultimate  causes,  either  efficient  or  final, 
are  unknown  and  inscrutable  to  us." 


POSITIVISM  33 

A  little  later  Herbert  Spencer  (1820-1903), 
from  the  standpoint  of  evolution,  founded  a 
comprehensive  system,  dominated  in  all  its  parts 
by  the  development  theory.  Since,  however, 
he  admits  the  existence  of  an  Absolute  as  a 
limiting  idea  but  denies  that  this  is  knowable, 
and  inasmuch  as  he  limits  all  our  knowledge 
to  ideas  and  their  association,  his  philosophy 
has  been  called  Agnosticism,  following  Huxley, 
the  distinguished  naturalist.  Spencer's  con- 
ception of  philosophy  is  fundamentally  very 
similar  to  Comte's.  Like  the  latter,  he  entrusts 
philosophy  with  the  task  of  uniting  the  separate 
facts  of  knowledge,  of  presenting  the  general 
truths  of  the  different  branches  of  science  in 
their  relation  to  each  other,  and  of  deriving 
them,  if  possible,  from  a  single  comprehensive 
truth.  Matter,  motion,  and  force  are  the  ulti- 
mate notions  by  which  we  must  abide ;  but 
they  are  only  symbols  of  an  absolute  unknow- 
able reality.  "  The  utmost  possibility  for  us 
is  an  interpretation  of  the  process  of  things  as 
it  presents  itself  to  our  limited  consciousness ; 
but  how  this  process  is  related  to  the  actual 
process,  we  are  unable  to  conceive,  much  less 

to  know." 

c 


34     PHILOSOPHY   OF  THE   PRESENT 

In  Germany,  the  philosophy  of  the  present 
bears  largely  the  character  of  Positivism. 
During  the  decline  of  philosophy  in  the  second 
half  of  the  nineteenth  century  there  was  a 
return  to  Kmit,  particularly  to  his  theory  of 
knowledge  ;  and  in  connection  with  this  there 
arose  the  so-called  neo-Kantianism,  whose  chief 
representatives  are  Friedrich  Albert  Lange 
(1828-1875),  Hermann  Cohen,  Otto  Liehmann, 
Alois  Eiehl,  Paul  Natorp,  and  others. 

That  our  knowledge,  in  so  far  as  it  deserves 
the  name,  is  limited  to  the  sphere  of  possible 
experience ;  that  we  cannot  make  any  scientific 
affirmations  concerning  the  transcendent,  con- 
cerning   the     things-in-themselves     which     lie 
beyond    the  bounds   of  possible   experience, — 
this   view    of    Kanfs   was   taken    up    by   neo- 
Kantianism     and     connected     with     another, 
namely,  that  the  chief  task  of  philosophy  con- 
sists   in    developing   a    critique  and   theory  of 
knowledge,  and  that  it  is  concerned  primarily 
with  the  presuppositions  of  science.     To  this 
was    added    later   the   Immanent   Philosophy, 
resting  not  only  upon  Kant  but  upon  Hume,  in 
which  philosophy  was  entrusted  with  the  task 
of  carrying  out   an  analysis  of  that  which  is 


POSITIVISM  35 

given  in  consciousness.  In  this  way,  Wilhelm 
Schuppe,  Max  Kauffmann,  Bichard  von  Schuhert- 
Soldern,  and  others  have  taken  a  position 
opposed  to  metaphysics  as  the  philosophy  of 
the  transcendent.  Here  belongs  likewise  the 
Empirio-criticism  of  Bichard  Avenarius  (1843- 
1896),  which  starts  from  the  presupposition 
that  we  find  ourselves  in  a  certain  environment 
and  make  certain  affirmations  concerning  it  and 
its  relation  to  us.  To  analyse  the  relations  of 
dependence  between  the  ego  and  its  environ- 
ment, between  the  affirmations  and  the  environ- 
ment as  related  to  the  ego,  is  the  scientific  task 
of  philosophy.  In  another  way,  finally.  Posi- 
tivism is  represented  by  those  who,  like  Franz 
Brentano  and  Anton  Marty,  conceive  of  philo- 
sophy as  a  science  of  pure  experience,  namely, 
as  psychology,  and  place  it  as  such  in  opposition 
to  the  science  of  nature. 

1.  ERNST   MACH.     {Born  1838) 

In  order  to  lend  to  this  general  survey  of 
the  meaning  of  Positivism  in  the  philosophy  of 
the  present  a  concrete  colouring,  I  pass  now  to 
a   characterisation    of  the  philosophical  views 


36     PHILOSOPHY   OF   THE   PRESENT 

of  two  modern  representatives  of  tliis  school. 
For  this  piu'pose  I  choose  first  the  physicist 
and  philosopher,  Ernst  Mach,  who  through  his 
able  critical  researches,  has  won  for  himself 
wide  recognition  in  the  sphere  of  exact  science. 
His  Positive  views  are  expressed  most  fully  in 
his  very  inspiring  and  significant  work,  Beitrdge 
ziir  Analyse  der  Emjjjindungen^  (1886,  oth  ed. 
1906),  the  first  section  of  which  is  devoted  to 
"anti-metaphysical  prolegomena."  "We  shall 
attempt  to  give  fii'st  of  all  a  free  reproduction  of 
Mack's  views,  and  add  thereto  a  critique,  which 
wiU  deal  particularly  with  his  anti-metaphysical, 
that  is,  his  specifically  Positive,  tendency.^ 

All  science  is,  according  to  Mach,  a  portrayal 
of  facts  in  thought.  By  facts  he  understands 
states  of  consciousness.  Take,  for  instance, 
the  proposition :  The  oscillations  of  a  pen- 
dulum are  isochronous ;  this  is  a  mental  por- 
trayal of  the  fact,  that  is,  of  the  perception, 
that  the  oscillations  of  one  and  the  same  pen- 

^  Contributions  to  the  Analysis  of  the  Sensations.  By  Ertist 
Mach.     Translated  by  C.  M.  Williams.     Chicago,  1897.— (Tfi.) 

'  Richard  Honigswald,  in  his  helpful  book  entitled  Zur  Kritik 
der  Machschen  Philosophie,  has  made  a  critical  examination  of 
Mach's  epistemological  standpoint,  corresponding  in  many  re- 
spacts  to  ours.  Compare  also  B.  Hell :  Ernst  Machs  Philosophie 
(1907).. 


POSITnaSM  37 

dulum  have  the  same  duration  for  different 
elongations.  Plainly  we  have  condensed  in 
that  proposition  a  great  many  states  of  con- 
sciousness, namely,  the  so-called  observations. 
It  is  not  only  a  portrayal  but  a  union  of  many 
similar  facts,  and  at  the  same  time  affords  the 
mind  a  sense  of  relief  and  frugality,  sers'ing  the 
principle  repeatedly  set  forth  by  Mach,  of  the 
economy  of  thought.  As  he  himself  has  said, 
science  is  after  all  nothing  but  a  business  pro- 
position :  "  The  scientist  sets  himself  the  task 
of  gaining  the  greatest  possible  amount  of 
eternal,  infinite  truth  with  the  least  possible 
labour,  in  the  shortest  possible  time,  and  with 
the  least  possible  thought."  In  another  place 
he  says  :  "  When  thought  with  its  limited  means 
tries  to  reflect  the  rich  life  of  the  world  of 
which  it  is  just  a  small  part  and  which  it  can 
never  hope  to  exhaust,  it  has  every  reason  to 
be  sparing  of  its  forces." 

As  a  generalisation  of  observations,  the  pro- 
position of  the  pendulum  embraces,  furthermore, 
present  as  well  as  earlier  or  later  experiences, 
thus  furnishing  a  reference  a  priori  for  all 
future  observations  of  the  same  kind.  If  the 
proposition  is  once  established,  it  does  not  need 


-/  -  ^ 


177:^2 


38     PHILOSOPHY   OF  THE   PRESENT 

to  be  continually  proved.  It  can  be  trans- 
mitted to  future  generations,  and  in  this  way 
shared  with  other  individuals,  in  order  to 
lighten  for  them  also  the  survey  of  facts.  But 
the  proposition  contains  no  recognition  either 
of  a  pendulum,  of  its  oscillations,  or  of  their 
duration,  as  realities  or  independent  existences ; 
it  gains  its  content  and  its  significance  wholly 
through  its  relation  to  the  facts  which  it  por- 
trays, through  its  relation  to  experience  or  to 
the  sensations  from  which  it  is  abstracted. 
This  dependence  upon  experience  is  furthermore 
shown  in  the  fact  that  new  observations  are 
able  to  modify  or  wholly  invalidate  the  proposi- 
tion, so  that  it  must  adapt  itself  to  these  at 
all  times. 

Science,  now,  is  built  up  from  just  such 
propositions.  Since  our  experience  may  be 
analysed  into  purely  homogeneous  elements,  into 
sensations  of  colours,  tones,  pressure,  &c.,  the 
task  of  philosophy  consists  wholly  in  the  ex- 
position of  these  elements  and  their  mutual  re- 
lations. An  apple,  for  instance,  is  a  thing  that 
looks,  smells,  tastes,  feels  so  and  so;  that  is, 
it  is  an  approximately  constant  combination  of 
sensations  of  sight,  smell,  taste,  and  touch.     If 


POSITIVISM  39 

we  distinguish  between  the  apple  as  an  object 
of  natural  science,  say  of  botany,  and  the  apple 
as  an  object  of  psychology,  in  the  former  case 
we  take  into  consideration  only  the  reciprocal 
dependence  of  the  sensuous  contents  upon  each 
other,  let  us  say,  the  relation  of  the  apple  to 
the  tree,  to  the  earth,  &c. ;  in  the  latter  case, 
on  the  contrary,  we  take  into  consideration  its 
dependence  upon  a  perceiving  subject,  upon  his 
sense-organs  and  mental  states,  such  as  atten- 
tion, emotional  life,  and  the  like.  But  here  we 
should  observe  that  the  tree  and  earth,  just  as 
the  ego  and  its  states,  are  themselves  again 
only  relatively  constant  combinations  of  like 
elements.  It  is  self-evident,  therefore,  that 
matter  itself  can  be  nothing  else  than  a  cer- 
tain uniform  connection  of  sensations.  Science 
suffers  no  loss,  according  to  Mach,  if  the 
stiff,  sterile,  unchanging,  and  unknown  some- 
thing which  in  the  popular  opinion  of  natural 
scientists  passes  as  matter,  shall  be  replaced 
by  a  constant  law,  by  a  relatively  constant 
combination. 

It  is  just  such  constancy  of  connection  that 
is  expressed  by  all  the  declarations  of  natural 
science,   and  to    this   constancy  of  connection 


40     PHILOSOPHY   OF  THE   PRESENT 

there  corresponds  that  constancy  of  thought 
upon  which  is  based  the  impulse  to  transcend 
individual  facts.  The  more  constant  a  thought- 
connection,  or  a  law,  is  and  remains,  the  greater 
is  our  confidence  therein.  Therefore,  we  en- 
deavour to  support  ideas  of  lesser  constancy, 
those  not  yet  fully  confirmed,  by  associating 
them  with  those  of  greater  constancy,  which 
have  been  established  by  repeated  proof.  Herein 
lies  the  mainspring  of  all  scientific  explanation. 
We  shall  fail  to  understand  this  if,  after  the 
manner  of  a  naive,  fetich-like  metaphysics,  we 
connect  the  facts  themselves  in  a  necessary 
relation  to  each  other,  as  if  one  fact  proceeds 
from  another  or  is  caused  by  it.  Where  our 
concepts  and  judgments  are  sufficiently  in  har- 
mony with  nature  to  furnish  a  thought- inference 
that  corresponds  with  observed  facts,  there  arises 
the  belief  in  an  inner  necessary  connection 
between  the  phenomena  apprehended.  But 
here  we  know  nothing  but  the  necessity  in  the 
connection  and  agreement  of  our  ideas,  and  this 
is  a  logical  necessity. 

In  these  views  of  Mach,  we  really  discern 
two  diff'erent  lines  of  thought:  first,  a  theory 
of    scientific    method,    and    second,    an    anti- 


POSITIVISM  41 

metaiyhysical  tendency.  In  the  following  critical 
remarks,  we  shall  limit  ourselves  to  the  latter, 
and  consider  the  former  only  in  so  far  as  it 
serves  as  a  foundation  and  support  for  Posi- 
tivism. It  is,  therefore,  not  necessaiy  for  us  to 
emphasise  the  relative  correctness  of  Mack's 
views.  No  doubt  his  principle  of  economy,  his 
critique  of  naive  metaphysical  assumptions,  his 
theory  of  the  adaptation  of  thoughts  to  obser- 
vation, and  other  points,  have  within  certain 
limits  gi-eat  significance.  His  mistake  is  only 
that  these  points  of  view,  correct  in  themselves, 
are  elevated  to  ultimate  principles  and  are  there- 
by over-estimated  with  respect  to  their  worth. 

In  reference  to  Mack's  anti-metaphysical 
tendency,  let  us  say  first,  that  it  does  not 
correctly  define  the  relation  of  our  thought  to 
experience.  If  his  view  were  correct,  then 
thoughts  would  have  neither  an  independent 
significance  nor  an  independent  validity.  With- 
out doubt,  however,  they  have  both  in  lai'ge 
measure.  Very  often  science  is  for  us  a 
supplementing  of  experience,  not  merely  a  por- 
trayal or  a  generalisation  of  it.  When  we 
reconstruct  a  lost  period  of  history,  or  trace 
the  outlines  of  the  development  of  the  earth's 


42     PHILOSOPHY   OF  THE   PRESENT 

surface ;  when  we  connect  the  tides  with  the 
action  of  the  moon  upon  the  earth,  or  consider 
the  sun  as  a  fiery,  molten  body  ;  when,  on  the 
basis  of  historical  evidence,  we  paint  a  picture 
of  times  long  past,  or  speak  of  the  conservation 
of  energy  in  a  closed  system, — in  all  these  ways 
we  have  something  more  than  a  mere  portrayal 
of  facts  ;  we  enlarge  experience  in  thought  and 
by  its  means.  We  even  correct  experience 
when  we  sharpen  and  refine  our  means  of 
observation.  According  to  Mach,  a  visual 
phenomenon,  like  sense-phenomena  in  general, 
is  a  fact  like  any  other.  But  to  apparent  size, 
form,  and  duration  we  oppose  the  "  real,"  that 
is,  the  measured  and  objectified  size,  form, 
and  duration.  When  we  discover  mistakes  of 
observation  and  eliminate  them  ;  when  we  dis- 
tinguish the  empirical  rule  from  the  theoretical 
law ;  when  from  a  number  of  observations  we 
strike  an  average,  and  declare  this  to  be  the 
most  probable  expression  of  the  facts;  and 
when  from  signs  of  all  kinds  we  reason  to  new 
events  or  uniformities, — in  all  these  cases  we 
proceed  on  the  assumption  of  a  sovereign 
mastery  over  experience,  not  in  the  spirit  of 
slavish  dependence  upon  it. 


POSITIVISM  43 

None  the  less  important  is  it  to  emphasise, 
that  thoughts  have  an  independent  validity  and 
by  no  means  find  their  only  norm  in  the  facts 
which  they  are  supposed  to  represent.  This 
independent  validity  reveals  itself  not  only  in 
the  particular  logical  principles  which  place  our 
concepts  and  judgments  in  a  definite  relation  to 
each  other,  but  also  in  this,  that  by  research 
and  description  we  develop  a  great  spontaneity. 
Without  the  guidance  of  thought  and  intelligent 
preparation,  every  experiment  would  be  mean- 
ingless. Reflection  and  calculation  often  lead 
to  new  paths  in  knowledge.  The  facts  them- 
selves do  not  tell  us  in  what  relation  they 
should  be  placed,  or  how  they  should  be  ex- 
hibited. The  "portrayal"  theory,  if  it  were 
taken  seriously,  would  reduce  knowledge  to  an 
absurd  and  puerile  affair.  The  very  fact  that 
we  actively  approach  the  empirical  facts,  master 
them  and  complete  them  ;  that  we  systematically 
elaborate  the  contents  of  consciousness  with 
methodical  aim — in  one  word,  that  we  create 
knowledge — allows  us  to  think  of  science  as  a 
work  full  of  charm,  worthy  the  sweat  of  nobles. 

The  "portrayal"  theory  does  not  at  all  do 
justice  to   the  content  of  knowledge,  when  it 


44     PHILOSOPHY   OF   THE    PRESENT 

limits  us  to  the  mere  facts  of  reality — that  is, 
to  the  occasional  sensations  given  in  conscious- 
ness and  their  interconnections.  For  these  are 
full  of  gaps,  fragmentary  and  narrowly  limited, 
without  well-marked  time  and  space  connection. 
Even  according  to  Mach,  science  does  not  have 
for  its  task  to  describe  this  kind  of  experience, 
that  is  to  say,  the  observation  which  is  possible 
within  an  act  of  consciousness.  Even  he  does 
not  scruple  to  make  earlier  experiences  of  equal 
importance  with  those  of  the  present ;  and  the 
observations  of  others,  of  equal  value  with  our 
own.  Indeed,  he  speaks  of  physical  objects 
just  as  the  realistic  scientist  does,  to  whom 
mass  and  motion  are  by  no  means  expressions 
for  sensations  and  their  changes.  So  that 
even  here  it  is  evident  that  there  has  been  an 
essential  enlargement  of  the  "facts"  by  means 
of  thought. 

In  truth,  there  is  no  avoidance  of  this  supple- 
mentary activity  of  thought,  because  the  colours, 
tones,  and  pressures  which  we  perceive,  the 
contents  of  consciousness  dependent  upon  us, 
cannot  be  the  vehicles  of  those  changes  in  our 
experience  which  we  know  to  be  independent  of 
us.     That  the  pendulum  of  my   clock  moves. 


POSITIVISM  45 

that  some  of  the  stars  twinkle,  that  over  there 
in  the  church  the  organ-tones  are  sounding, 
and  that  the  voice  of  a  visitor  strikes  upon  my 
ear ;  for  these  things  I  can  make  neither  myself  \ 
nor  my  visual  and  auditory  perceptions  respon- 
sible. Since  natural  science  assumes  bodies  to 
be  vehicles  of  such  phenomena,  it  seeks  to 
connect  those  clianges  which  are  independent 
of  us,  who  experience  them,  with  a  changing 
something  independent  of  us,  which  is  equipped 
with  the  necessary  properties  to  make  those 
changes  cognisable.  It  would  be  contrary  to  all 
logic,  if,  instead  of  real  bodies  and  forces,  we 
should  allow  the  sensations  to  be  responsible 
for  those  sensuously  apprehended  changes  which 
are  demonstrably  independent  of  them  and  of  us. 
Sense-experience  is  without  doubt  a  basis  for 
scientific  investigation,  but  scientific  research 
does  not  attempt  to  provide  us  with  a  phenome- 
nological  description  of  sense-impressions  nor 
to  set  forth  their  empirical  properties  or  their 
relations  as  given  in  consciousness.  It  seeks 
rather,  first  of  all,  to  eliminate  that  which  is 
dependent  in  experience  upon  the  experi- 
encing subject ;  and  this  includes  not  only 
feelings,  ideas,  thoughts,  after-images,  contrast- 


46     PHILOSOPHY   OF   THE   PRESENT 

phenomena,  fusions,  and  the  like,  but  also  the 
peculiar  qualities  of  colours,  tones,  pressures, 
&c. ;  that  is,  it  tries  to  separate  by  analysis 
phenomena  which  are  abstract  and  only  think- 
able, from  concrete  sense-perception.  There- 
upon it  attempts  to  arrange  these  phenomena  in 
an  independent  system  or  to  conceive  some  plan 
of  nature  in  which  such  phenomena  occur. 
The  goal  of  natural  science  is  therefore  not 
sense-experience,  but  the  real  system  of  nature 
which  is  built  up  bjm^ing  the  given  data.  The 
laws  of  nature  are  relations  between  factors  in 
this  system,  not  between  the  sensations,  all  of 
which  reveal  subjective  influences.     The  magni- 

E 
tudes  of  Ohm's  law,  I  =  p,   are  not  sensations, 

nor  are  sensations  in  any  way  contained  in  any 
other  formulated  laws  of  physics,  chemistry,  or 
physiology,  although  they  may  have  furnished 
indispensable  aid  in  establishing  them.  This  is 
apparent  even  from  the  fact  that  the  laws  of 
nature  take  account  neither  of  the  individual 
manifoldness  of  sense-impressions  nor  of  their 
temporary  validity.  Mach  speaks  of  phenomeno- 
logical  laws  into  which  the  whole  science  of 
physics  will  sometime  be  resolved.     Up  to  this 


POSITIVISM  47 

time  he  has  not  found  them,  and  in  the  nature  of 
things  it  is  not  to  be  expected  that  he  ever  will 
find  them.  An  economy  which  is  engaged  in 
such  elimination  of  indispensable  thought-matter 
would  be  the  bankruptcy  of  science/ 

Mach  has  indeed  another  ground  for  his 
anti-metaphysical  tendency.  This  consists  in 
our  natural  trust  in  the  certainty  of  sensations 
— a  trust  which  in  itself  is  perfectly  reasonable. 
Sensations  are  as  they  are ;  we  cannot  twist 
or  trifle  with  them.  We  have  them,  or  we  do 
not  have  them ;  and  if  we  have  them,  we  have 
them  in  a  definite,  incontrovertible  form,  by 
virtue  of  which  they  are  as  they  are.  The  white 
which  I  see  here,  no  one  can  argue  away.  It 
is  simply  given  with  unanswerable  certainty. 
But  if  I  speak  of  atoms  of  oxygen  or  vibrations 
of  ether,  these  are  objects  just  conceptually 
apprehended,  whose  significance  and  necessity 
may  be  questioned ;  they  are  only  of  indirect 
vaHdity,  assumed  merely  on  the  ground  of 
observations  and  mental  operations.  Therefore 
it  seems  that  they  cannot  at  all  be  placed  on 

'  Compare  the  similar  and  illuminating  views  of  Max  Planck : 
Die  Einheit  des  physikalischen  Weltbildes  (1909),  and  my  work, 
Erkenntnistheorie  und  Natunoissenschaft  (1910). 


48     PHILOSOPHY   OF  THE   PRESENT 

the  same  plane  with  the  incontrovertible  facts 
of  sense-perception. 

But  now  let  us  inquire  more  carefully  into 
the  meaning  of  this  "certainty."  Examined 
closely,  it  consists  simply  in  having  sensations. 
For  just  as  soon  as  I  go  beyond  them  and 
attempt  to  describe  them,  picture  them,  com- 
municate them,  or  assert  that  I  have  them, 
there  enters  at  once  a  new  factor  into  the 
game,  namely,  a  relation  of  words,  or  modes  of 
thinking,  to  the  sensations,  which,  as  psycho- 
logical experience  teaches,  has  absolutely  in  no 
way  the  character  of  evidence,  but  which  may 
be  deceptive,  erroneous,  or  doubtful,  as  may 
be  proved.  If  this  relation  also  is  regarded  as 
merely  given,  then  we  abolish  the  difference 
between  fact  and  assertion,  and  in  general  lose 
sight  of  the  logical  character  of  relation,  and 
take  our  stand  on  the  merely  actual,  without 
proof,  demonstration,  or  critique.  Thus  we 
could  speak  of  certainty  only  where  we  renounce 
all  verification,  evaluation,  or  intellectual  ac- 
tivity, and  content  ourselves  with  simply  having 
states,  processes,  and  facts.  This  kind  of  cer- 
tainty comes  in  precisely  the  same  manner  to 
the    snail,   which    creeps   laboriously   over   the 


POSITIVISM  49 

ground  and  moves  his  feelers  in  all  directions, 
or  to  the  fly,  which,  by  reason  of  the  warmth  of 
the  room,  awakes  from  its  winter  sleep  and 
seeks  lazily  and  uncertainly  for  food.  Indeed 
it  is  characteristic  of  the  whole  sense  of  reality 
of  our  age,  an  age  averse  to  all  speculation,  to 
lay  great  stress  on  this  kind  of  certainty  and 
to  hold  it  as  a  pattern  and  aim  for  all  scientific 
research.  Certainty  of  this  kind  is,  of  course, 
unshakable;  but  this  is  not  because  it  stands 
the  test  in  conflict,  not  because  it  holds  its 
ground  in  the  face  of  contradiction,  but  merely 
because  no  conflict  or  contradiction  is  here 
possible.  True  and  false,  right  and  wrong, 
contradiction  and  agreement,  pertain  only  to 
thoughts,  judgments,  assertions — never  to  mere 
facts.  A  precisely  similar  limitation  of  the  ap- 
plicability of  the  category  of  certainty  is  to  be 
recommended.  For  that  reason  the  bare  fact  of 
having  sensations  has  as  little  value  in  determin- 
ing the  certain  and  the  uncertain  as  it  has  in 
determining  the  true  and  the  false.  The  sensa- 
tions as  such  are  a  7'udis  indigestaque  moles,  out 
of  which  everything  or  nothing  can  spring,  but 
which  are  in  themselves  neither  a  final  absolutely 
reliable  ground  nor  a  deceptive  mockery  of  sense. 

D 


50     PHILOSOPHY   OF  THE   PRESENT 

So,  then,  we  must  consider  that  this  so-called 
certainty  only  applies  to  the  individual  who  by 
chance  has  such  a  conscious  content.  Beyond 
this  sphere  it  does  not  extend.  As  the  basis  of 
a  universally  valid  science,  which  should  be  in- 
dependent of  the  experiences  of  the  individual, 
it  is  wholly  inadequate.  Only  that  which 
exists  for  everyone  could  serve  as  universal, 
but  sensations  are  only  for  him  who  has  them. 
Since,  now,  all  science  strives  to  present  uni- 
versally valid  propositions,  science  cannot  be 
based  upon  the  certainty  in  question. 

Finally,  the  question  may  still  be  raised :  What, 
then,  really  forms  the  content  or  object  of  this 
certainty  ?  To  this  it  is  answered :  The  sensa- 
tions. But  modern  psychology  teaches  that  the 
sensations  are  products  of  scientific  analysis. 
Elementary  contents,  like  simple  colours  or 
brightness,  tones  or  noises,  in  fact  elements  in 
general,  we  do  not  find  at  all  in  our  investiga- 
tion of  what  is  given  in  consciousness ;  nor  do 
we  obtain  them  at  all  apart  from  the  processes 
of  isolation  and  comparison.  Not  sensations, 
nor  complexes  of  them,  are  immediately  given 
to  the  mind  which  has  passed  through  the 
school  of  experience,  but  contents  of  conscious- 


POSITIVISM  51 

ness,  of  perception  and  memory,  of  feeling, 
imagination,  and  understanding,  together  with 
the  processes,  actions,  and  functions  which  ad- 
just themselves  to  these  contents  or  determine 
them.  Both  are  found  in  manifold  intricacies 
and  complications,  from  which  the  elementary 
contents  and  functions  are  separated  only 
with  great  difficulty.  As  a  rule,  howevei*  we 
find  definite  attitudes,  theoretical  or  pra^ical, 
aesthetic  or  religious,  &c.,  in  which  certain 
points  of  view  predominate  and  certain  ends  are 
to  be  fulfilled.  Our  mental  organisation  is  not 
planned  primarily  for  the  pursuit  of  science  nor 
to  conform  to  the  severe  demands  of  scientific 
knowledge,  but  to  satisfy  the  needs  of  life. 
No  single  component  part  of  experience  is  in 
itself  adapted  to  be  forthwith  incorporated  into 
science,  nor  to  become  a  vehicle  of  unconditional 
certainty.  Again,  nothing  would  be  gained  by 
designating  sense-perception,  instead  of  sensa- 
tion, as  the  content  of  this  certainty.  For  sense- 
perception,  according  to  the  teaching  of  scientific 
psychology,  is  a  kind  of  resultant,  in  which  the 
manifold  experiences  of  a  longer  or  shorter  de- 
velopment and  history  of  the  individual  unite 
with  the   momentary  excitation   of  our  sense- 


52     PHILOSOPHY   OF   THE   PRESENT 

organs  to  produce  a  definite  result.  How  can 
we  separate  the  primal  material  which  is  prior 
to  all  empirical  connections  from  the  additions 
which  the  individual  on  account  of  his  own 
peculiar  development  has  unintentionally  made  ? 
Does  this  perceptual  product,  like  the  originally 
given  material,  belong  to  the  "  facts  "  which  are 
invoked  to  carry  certainty  in  themselves  ?  If 
*  we  exclude  it,  then  there  must  be  some  kind  of 
preparation  of  the  sense-material  before  we  can 
speak  of  immediately  given  facts,  and  in  that  case 
we  deny  the  immediacy  of  what  is  merely  given. 
If  we  do  not  exclude  it,  then  we  embrace  in 
what  is  given  a  fullness  of  relations  which 
demands,  and  possibly  does  not  admit  of,  logical 
scrutiny.  In  either  case,  in  the  determination  of 
the  bases  for  such  an  affirmed  certainty,  investi- 
gation and  knowledge  are  already  presupposed. 
Recently  Mach  has  published  a  more  compre- 
hensive work  :  Erkenntnis  unci  Irrthum  (1905, 
2nd  ed.  1906).  In  this  new  work  his  earlier 
point  of  view,  of  which  we  have  here  been  speak- 
ing, is  modified  by  many  important  changes 
and  supplemented  by  certain  additions.  From 
his  new  standpoint  the  goal  of  scientific  thought 
is  seen  to  be  the  supplementing  of  a  pm^tially 


POSITIVISM  53 

observed  fact,  and  this  is  held  to  be  attainable 
not  only  through  adaptation  of  thoughts  to 
facts,  but  also  through  their  adaptation  to  each 
other.  Furthermore,  a  new  criterion  is  proposed 
for  distinguishing  the  physical  and  psychical. 
The  physical  is  the  totality  of  that  which  is 
present  in  space  for  all.  The  psychical,  in  the 
sense  of  the  narrower  ego,  excluding  one's  own 
body  and  the  contents  of  sensation,  is  what  is 
immediately  given  to  only  one,  but  is  accessible 
to  all  others  only  by  analogy.  So,  then,  the 
elements  from  which  the  contents  of  experience 
arise — the  pressures,  tones,  colours,  &c. — are 
classed  as  at  present  not  cajpahle  of  farther  ana- 
lysis, and  are  reduced  to  abstractions  provision- 
ally established,  awaiting  the  progress  of  science. 
Finally,  in  his  new  book  there  is  developed  a 
much  more  penetrating  psychology  and  biology 
of  knowledge,  since  sensation  is  regarded  as  the 
foundation  of  aU  mental  life,  and  the  attempt 
is  made  to  deduce  truth  and  error,  concepts  and 
judgments,  from  the  sensations  and  their  memory 
traces,  as  well  as  from  the  laws  of  reproduction 
and  association ;  and  at  the  same  time  the 
biological  purposiveness  of  all  knowledge  and 
knowing  functions  is  emphasised. 


54     PHILOSOPHY   OF  THE   PRESENT 

Owing  to  these  changes  the  criticism  which 
we  have  directed  against  the  position  taken  in 
the  Analysis  of  the  Sensations  (the  new  edition 
of  which  maintains  essentially  the  old  stand- 
point) is  in  part  no  longer  applicable.  That 
is  to  say,  if  now  he  expressly  attributes  to 
scientific  thinking  the  function  of  supplement- 
ing observation,  although,  to  be  sure,  he  does  not 
clearly  formulate  thereby  either  a  necessary  or 
sufficient  condition  of  scientific  work,  still  he 
at  least  recognises  that  his  former  theory  of 
"  portrayal  "  is  insufficient.  And  his  emphasis 
of  the  special  significance  which  belongs  to  the 
adaptation  of  thoughts  to  each  other  shows  that 
Mach  does  not  deny  the  independent  character 
of  thought  which  we  have  maintained  in  oppo- 
sition to  him.  More  than  this,  when  he  looks 
forward  to  a  further  analysis  of  the  elements, 
and  holds  concerning  sensations  as  well  as 
concerning  concepts  that  they  come  about 
through  a  process  of  abstraction,  then  that 
immediate  and  unconditional  certainty  of  facts 
as  simply  given,  which  they  formerly  seemed  to 
enjoy  and  deserve  at  Mack's  hands,  is  denied  to 
them. 

On  the  other  hand,  the  distinction  which  he 


POSITIVISM  55 

now  prefers  between  the  physical  and  psychical 
is  less  clear-cut  and  positive  than  the  previous 
one,^  and  does  not  at  all  yield  the  same  distinc- 
tion between  the  two  concepts.  For  that  which 
is  immediately  given  only  to  one  subject,  while 
to  all  others  it  is  inferable  only  by  analogy,  em- 
braces the  totality  of  experience,  namely,  all  con- 
tents of  consciousness,  certainly  not  simply  the 
narrower  ego  ;  and  what  is  immediately  present 
in  space  for  all  exists  only  under  the  presupposi- 
tion of  a  real  outw  ard  world,  which  Mach,  now 
as  before,  rejects  as  a  metaphysical  speculation. 
The  standpoint  of  his  new  book,  so  distinctly 
based  on  historical  development,  deserves  full 
recognition,  and  lends  a  great  charm  to  his 
views  on  scientific  method.  Here  Mach  dis- 
penses rich  treasures  from  his  abundant  histori- 
cal knowledge.  But  genetic  description  and 
theories  must  not  lay  claim  in  matters  of  know- 
ledge to  give  the  only  judgment,  or  the  decisive 
one.  We  must  guard  against  allowing  pure 
construction  to  take  the  place  of  empirical 
research.  He  who  shows  how  the  formation  of 
concepts,  the  determination  of  the  laws  of 
nature,  the  genesis  of  scientific  opinions,  have 

'  Compare  p.  39  f. 


56     PHILOSOPHY   OF  THE   PRESENT 

arisen,  has  thereby  determined  nothing  with 
reference  to  their  value  or  authority.  And  he 
who  says  that  a  correct  judgment  is  always 
something  which  either  directly  or  indirectly  is 
of  service  to  us,  or  that  the  laws  of  nature  are 
limitations  of  expected  possibilities,  has  empha- 
sised, even  if  these  assertions  should  prove 
correct,  only  a  special  and  by  no  means  an 
essential  side  of  these  subjects.  Science  has 
become  an  independent  power  ("  absolute  spirit," 
according  to  Hegel),  which  no  longer  simply 
takes  the  standpoint  of  biological  advantage  or 
disadvantage  to  the  individual  and  the  species, 
but  makes  and  fulfils  its  own  peculiar  demands. 
It  is  not,  therefore,  a  happy  description  to  desig- 
nate the  inner  connection  of  knoAvledge — that 
is,  truth — as  an  adaj}tation  of  thoughts  to  each 
other,  nor  to  designate  the  appropriate  repre- 
sentation of  objects — that  is,  scientific  accuracy 
— as  the  adaptation  of  thoughts  to  facts. 

But  apart  from  this,  the  axiom  should  hold 
good  here  that  in  empirical  matters  reliable 
results  can  be  gained  only  by  empirical  methods/) 
The  way  in  which  Mach,  for  example,  traces 
back  concepts  to  sensations  and  representations, 
or  builds  up  the  ego  from  simple  elements,  shows 


POSITIVISM  57 

that  he  has  entirely  lost  sight  of  this  axiom.  He 
has  had  as  little  success  in  deducing  the  pecu- 
liar quality  of  thought  and  the  spontaneity  of 
the  subject  from  sensations  as  in  reducing  the 
objects  of  natural  science  to  pressures,  tones, 
colours,  and  their  reciprocal  relations.  Critical 
caution  in  transcending  actual  facts  of  conscious- 
ness and  in  the  assumption  and  determination 
of  realities  is,  within  certain  limits,  surely 
wholesome  and  necessary ;  but  in  this  case  it 
has  degenerated  into  a  radical  anti-metaphysical 
attitude  fatal  to  the  proper  interpretation  of 
facts. 

We  conclude,  then,  that  Mach's  philosophy 
rests  upon  an  entirely  unsafe  and  insecure 
foundation,  in  so  far  as  it  finds  its  support  solely 
in  sense-data,  in  immediate  experience,  and  in 
that  which  is  given  in  consciousness.  The 
certainty  of  scientific  knowledge — in  particular, 
the  certainty  of  the  uniform  relations  prevailing 
therein — can  in  this  way  neither  be  understood 
nor  established.  Such  a  limitation  of  science 
to  sensations,  to  conscious  elements,  such  a 
renunciation  of  realities,  delivers  science  over 
to  accident  and  caprice.  Phenomenological 
descriptions  take  the  place  of  exactly  formu- 


58     PHILOSOPHY   OF  THE   PRESENT 

lated  laws  among  objective  events.  Even 
psychology  is  not  feasible  as  a  pure  science  of 
consciousness  (compare  the  general  criticism 
upon  Idealism  below) ;  how,  then,  as  such 
should  natural  science  be  possible  ?  Instead 
of  following  impartially  the  spirit  of  scientific 
knowledge,  and  showing  its  necessary  factors, 
Positivism  has  preferred  to  construe  itself  as 
an  ideal  of  science  and  to  measure  real  science 
thereby.  Instead  of  lopping  off  speculative  ex- 
crescences and  seeking  sound  criteria  for  the 
determination  of  realities,  Positivism  has  poured 
the  baby  out  with  the  bath,  and  in  its  simpli- 
fied procedure  brought  upon  all  reality  the 
reproach  of  illegitimacy.  Instead  of  recognising 
experience  as  an  indispensable  point  of  de- 
parture, and  as  a  control  which  no  real  scientific 
research  could  neglect,  it  is  here  represented  as 
the  only  object  and  the  real  goal  of  investigation 
and  description,  and  is  thereby  elevated  to  a 
throne  never  intended  for  it.  In  the  presence 
of  much  prevalent  obscurity  concerning  the 
difference  between  speculative  additions  and 
real  scientific  results ;  between  purposive  but 
doubtful  assumptions  and  necessary  presup- 
positions ;  between   metaphysical    fancies    and 


POSITIVISM  59 

scientific  insight, — we  can  both  understand  and 
appreciate  the  bearings  of  Mack's  labours.  But, 
on  the  other  hand,  it  is  just  as  true  that  this 
critic  of  modern  science  has  not  succeeded 
either  in  discovering  or  exhibiting  the  real 
limits  between  the  two. 


2.  EUGEN  DUHRING.     (Bom  1833) 

The  Positivism  of  Eiigen  DUhnng  is  of  a  dif- 
ferent character  from  that  of  Mack.  Dulirings 
NatilrUche  Dialektik  (1865)  contains  important 
epistemological  investigations  on  the  principle 
of  identity,  the  principle  of  sufficient  reason, 
infinity,  continuity,  &c.  He  has  given  a  com- 
prehensive exposition  of  his  standpoint  in  his 
Kursus  der  Philosophie  als  streng  wissenschaft- 
licher  Weltanschauung  und  Lehensgestaltung 
(1875).  This  book  was  fully  revised  in  1895, 
and  published  under  the  title  Wirklichkeits- 
philoso_phie.  But  since  in  the  new  edition  a 
large  number  of  theoretical  scientific  discussions 
have  been  omitted,  it  is  necessary',  for  a  correct 
knowledge  of  Diihring's  views,  to  go  back  to 
the  earlier  work.  With  him  the  conviction 
became  more  and  more  firmly  established  that 


60     PHILOSOPHY   OF   THE   PRESENT 

the  thing  which  is  of  primary  importance  is  to 
pave  the  way  for  a  kind  of  mental  guidance  or 
mental  economy,  in  which  we  must  take  our 
start  from  comparatively  easily  communicable 
fundamental  views.  This  conviction  greatly 
restricts  the  purely  scientific  part  of  his  work. 
Among  the  other  philosophical  writings  of 
Duhring,  we  would  emphasise  his  ]Vert  des 
Lehens,  published  in  1865  (6th  ed.   1902). 

Philosophy,  according  to  Bilhring,  is  the 
development  of  the  highest  form  of  our  know- 
ledge of  the  world  and  of  life.  It  aspires, 
hence,  to  be  a  coherent  world-theory  and  at 
the  same  time  the  groundwork  for  the  most 
noble  and  perfect  conduct  of  life.  While  the 
understanding  rules  supreme  in  the  building  up 
of  a  theoretical  view  of  the  world,  in  the  sphere 
of  ethics,  on  the  contrary,  feeling  holds  a  domi- 
nant place.  The  method  which  should  be 
followed  in  philosophy  is  a  positively  dogmatic 
and  categorical  one,  finally  also  a  dialectic 
method,  which  proceeds  according  to  the  uni- 
versal laws  of  our  thinking.  As  the  organ  of 
philosophy  he  brings  forward  the  ''rational 
imagination,"  a  kind  of  constructive  fancy  used 
also   in    the   natural    sciences,    particularly   in 


POSITIVISM  61 

mathematics,  in  carrying  out  operations  and 
making  combinations.  This  works  in  intimate 
connection  with  the  understanding  and  is  guided 
by  it,  while  limited  to  the  sphere  of  possible 
reality.  As  the  philosophical  impulse,  DUhring 
designates  universal  passion,  the  feeling  of  the 
individual  as  opposed  to  the  totality  of  his  ex- 
perience, by  virtue  of  which  he  is  aroused  to  a 
knowledge  of  what  is  empirically  given  and  to 
the  practical  transformation  of  the  same. 

The  starting-point  of  all  philosophy  is  reality 
and  the  science  of  reality,  i.e.  natural  science. 
JDUhring  therefore  calls  his  system  a  philo- 
sophy of  reality,  or  a  natural  system.  As 
predecessors  in  his  school  of  thought,  he  praises 
Schopenhauer  and  Feuerbach  and  also  Comte. 
Concerning  reality,  the  problem  of  philosophy 
is  to  comprehend  it  as  it  is,  not  the  impossible 
goal  of  explaining  it  and  deriving  it  from 
something  which  is  not  real.  If  w^e  limit  our- 
selves to  such  a  schematic  exposition  of  what 
is  given  in  reality,  then  complete  knowledge 
is  possible  and  spasmodic  periods  of  skepticism 
or  criticism  are  unnecessary. 

Now,  in  our  thinking  there  are  certain  prin- 
ciples which   are  valid  quite  independently  of 


62     PHILOSOPHY   OF   THE    PRESENT 

the  question  whether  they  apply  to  objects 
which  are  real  or  only  represented.  In  this 
sense  we  can  speak  of  a  coincidence  between 
thinking  and  being,  and  it  is  quite  possible  for 
us  on  the  basis  of  our  concepts  and  judgments 
to  arrive  at  a  definite  form  of  the  world,  of 
nature,  and  of  being.  From  this  standpoint, 
dialectic  has  the  problem  of  establishing  beyond 
all  doubt  the  powers  of  the  understanding  and 
of  schooling  it  in  its  task  of  apprehending 
reality.  Bilhring  believes  also  that  sense- 
perception  is  in  general  reliable  and  fit  to  gain 
objective  knowledge.  The  outer  world  in  space 
and  time  exists  as  we  represent  it  to  ourselves, 
even  although  allowance  must  be  made  for  the 
qualities  of  sense. 

The  fundamental  law,  which,  according  to 
Diihring,  is  to  guide  our  apprehension  of  reality 
along  safe  and  viable  paths,  is  the  law  of 
determinate  number.  According  to  this  law, 
any  number  which  is  thought  of  as  in  any  way 
complete,  is  determined ;  that  is,  it  excludes 
the  notion  of  infinity.  To  speak  of  a  countless 
number  that  has  been  counted,  or  of  an  infinity 
of  units,  Diihring  calls  a  most  impossible  con- 
tradiction.    According  to  this  law,  the  number 


POSITIVISM  63 

of  events  in  time  which  have  taken  place  up  to 
the  present,  in  spite  of  an  eternity  lying  behind 
us,  must  be  closed  and  limited.  Likewise,  the 
number  of  heavenly  bodies  in  space  must  at 
any  moment  be  finite  and  perfectly  definite, 
even  although  continuous  space  may  extend 
outward  boundlessly.  Thus,  it  further  follows 
that  the  world-process  must  have  had  an  ab- 
solute beginning  in  time,  and  that  all  divisibility 
of  a  material  body  is  finite,  and  that  a  body  can 
be  reduced  to  a  definite  number  of  parts. 

If,  now,  we  desire  to  go  beyond  that  first 
event  in  which  the  cosmic  process  had  its 
beginning,  we  arrive,  according  to  Bilhring,  at 
a  changeless  being  in  which  no  longer  any 
succession  of  single  occurrences  takes  place. 
This  primordial  being,  since  we  should  be  able 
to  determine  it  only  by  the  negation  of  the 
properties  appropriate  to  the  existing  world,  is 
and  remains  like  itself.  In  this  we  must  seek 
the  roots  of  everything  that  we  designate  as  an 
event,  or  apprehend  as  determinate  existence. 
This  is  not  to  say  that  every  form  of  distinc- 
tion must  have  ceased  in  it.  It  is  true  that  we 
cannot  suppose  that  there  was  in  this  primordial 
being  a  succession  of  separate  events,  but  this 


64     PHILOSOPHY   OF  THE   PRESENT 

is  not  to  say  that  simultaneous  differences  in 
space,  which  require  no  origination,  may  not 
well  be  assumed.  Approximations  to  this 
primordial  condition  are  revealed  to  us  in 
astronomical  cosmogony  and  in  the  historical 
development  of  the  earth  and  of  living  beings, 
in  so  far  as  we  trace  them  back  in  time  to  ever 
simpler  and  less  evolved  forms  and  processes. 
All  consciousness,  all  vital  movements  must 
'indeed  have  had  a  beginning,  and  what  lies 
further  back  in  time  must  without  these 
important  distinctions  have  formed  a  more 
homogeneous  condition.  We  may,  therefore, 
conceive  of  nature  as  a  quite  definite  totality 
of  existences  and  processes,  which,  so  to  speak, 
empty  backward  into  a  primordial  being,  while 
at  the  same  time  they  flow  forward  and  expand 
into  the  unlimited. 

Now  the  actual  is  always  the  present.  What 
has  been,  what  is  past  can  no  longer  be  con- 
ceived as  reality.  It  follows  that  the  primordial 
state  is  no  longer  existing,  since  we  live  and 
stand  within  the  world-process.  But  it  may 
have  left  traces  in  the  sphere  of  reality ;  so  that 
in  its  transformations  into  the  actual,  moving, 
self-developing  nature,  certain   persistent  and 


POSITIVISM  65 

immutable  factors,  eluding  the  changing  play 
of  events,  have  penetrated  the  real.  Matter 
and  atoms,  as  well  as  those  uniformities  which 
we  regard  as  the  laws  of  nature,  may  be  looked 
upon  as  a  kind  of  dowry  from  the  primordial 
state.  But  if  the  transition  from  this  to  the 
world-movement  is  something  new,  an  abso- 
lutely first  beginning,  then  it  is  possible  that 
further  acts  of  nature  may  be  initiated,  and  still 
again  other  new  beginnings.  This  assumption 
of  absolutely  first  appearances,  events,  exist- 
ences, which,  within  the  causal  series  beginning 
with  them,  we  may  designate  as  last  (relatively 
as  first)  causes,  is  especially  characteristic  of 
Duhring's  world- scheme.  To  these  new  begin- 
nings belong,  not  only  the  appearance  of 
motion,  but  also  the  phenomena  of  life  and  of 
consciousness. 

The  ground-form  of  all  change  is  the  cease- 
less replacing  and  substitution  of  one  process 
by  another.  In  this,  the  unity  of  nature  is  as 
little  annulled  as  it  is  in  the  fundamental  differ- 
ence between  nature  and  the  primordial  being. 
But  we  must  think  of  it  as  a  unity  in  multi- 
plicity, or  a  uniform  coherence,  which  must  not 
be    hypostatised   nor   regarded    as   a    kind   of 

E 


66     PHILOSOPHY   OF   THE   PRESENT 

personal  being.  Among  changes,  only  that 
which  constantly  recurs,  which  is  constantly 
repeated,  can  be  formulated  as  a  law.  But  the 
establishing  of  laws  does  not  interfere  with  the 
appearance  of  new  phenomena.  As  Diihring 
says:  "It  would  be  a  denial  of  productive  and 
creative  activity,  if  we  should  think  of  the 
ground  and  consequence  of  events  as  if  nothing 
more  than  a  combination  of  all  known  causes 
contributed  to  their  production."  Much  more 
is  the  self-development  of  natm'e  revealed  in 
new  processes  and  new  existences.  All  we  can 
say,  therefore,  is  that  if  certain  types  or  forms 
are  already  present  in  nature,  then  certain  uni- 
formities will  be  found  present  in  them ;  but 
that  these  types  shall  themselves  appear  is  not 
included  in  the  necessity  of  events,  nor  in  the 
repetition  determined  by  uniformity.  Thus  the 
laws  of  nature  do  not  stand  in  opposition  to 
the  assumption  of  absolute  beginnings. 

Our  knowledge  fails,  therefore,  wherever  we 
have  to  do  with  the  appearance  of  new  pheno- 
mena. Here  the  best  we  can  do  is  the  concise 
formulation  of  our  ignorance,  as  Buhring  thinks. 
He  attaches  no  importance  to  fantastic  attempts 
to  formulate  a  complete  system  of  cosmic  re- 


POSITIVISM  67 

lations.  In  spite  of  this  he  busies  himself  with 
the  problem  of  the  future  of  the  world,  and 
finds  here  two  possibilities :  either  the  mechan- 
ism of  nature  goes  on  without  end,  or  else  it 
changes  into  a  form  of  being  known  to  us  from 
the  primordial  being  as  a  limiting  concept. 
According  to  all  previous  analogies,  as  Buhring 
believes,  the  continuation  of  a  definite  world- 
form  is  improbable.  For  difi"erentiation  is  a 
fundamental  law  of  nature,  and  radical  changes 
must  continually  follow.  Since  now  the  number 
of  these  changes,  according  to  the  law  of  de- 
terminate number,  will  sometime  be  exhausted, 
there  must  be  either  an  endless  exact  recur- 
rence of  events  {Nietzsche's  theory  of  the  eternal 
cycles),  or  else  a  cessation  of  all  repetition. 
Apparently  the  conditions  of  nature,  as  Buhring 
thinks,  are  becoming  gradually  quieter,  the 
changes  less  violent  and  radical,  and  the  dif- 
ferences more  moderate,  and  therefore  more 
favourable  to  life. 

Of  Duhring's  further  views,  only  a  few 
characteristic  ones  may  be  noticed.  Between 
the  conscious  and  the  unconscious  there  exists, 
as  he  explains,  complete  dissimilarity.  Never- 
theless,  the    antagonism    of  mechanical   forces 


68     PHILOSOPHY   OF  THE   PRESENT 

results  in  the  production  of  consciousness  and 
sensation.  The  elementary  scheme  of  all  reality 
demands  also  a  single  elementary  form  of  sub- 
jectivity, an  absolutely  elementary  sensation. 
This  is  the  sensation  of  resistance,  belonging  to 
the  sense  of  touch,  which  reveals  most  plainly 
its  origin  in  the  antagonism  of  mechanical 
forces.  It  is  the  ultimate  element  of  all  sense- 
perception,  and  finds  itself  repeated  everywhere, 
even  beyond  the  earth.  The  difference  between 
plants  and  animals  is  marked  by  the  rise  of 
sensation,  a  difference  which  can  as  little  be 
glossed  over  by  hazy  transitions,  as  the  transition 
from  an  ellipse  to  a  circle  can  in  mathematics. 
Animal  kinds  are  generalisations  or  dormant 
species,  in  which  the  higher  types  are  developed 
through  composition  of  the  simplest  specific 
elements,  but  not  through  metamorphosis  from 
the  lower  kinds. 

Biihring's  philosophy  of  reality,  the  theoretical 
foundation  of  which  we  have  explained,  is 
distinguished  from  the  Positivism  of  the  imma- 
nent philosophy  or  from  Mack's,  particularly  in 
this,  that  it  does  not  regard  conscious  reality  as 
the  only  basis  and  object  of  our  knowledge. 
On  the   contrary,   it  includes  in  the   "given" 


POSITIVISM  69 

reality  an  outer  world  with  matter  and  forces, 
after  the  manner  of  natural  science,  although,  to 
be  sure,  it  does  not  give  a  very  exact  account  of 
such  a  world.  His  philosophy  recognises,  it  is 
true,  "  no  ghostly  soul,"  but  takes  the  principles 
of  motion  and  of  life  seriously  as  forces. 
Diihring,  therefore,  declares  that  we  are  on  the 
wrong  track  when  we  renounce  the  concepts 
of  cause  and  force,  and  speak  only  of  pheno- 
mena;  he  calls  it  "a  morbid  and  skeptical 
aberration."  "  As  soon  as  one  thinks  keenly 
and  rightly,  he  gets  beyond  effects  and  pheno- 
mena." Between  our  sense-perception  and  our 
thinking  on  the  one  hand,  and  physical  reality 
on  the  other,  there  is  a  parallelism,  by  reason  of 
which  we  are  able  to  know  the  world  as  it  really 
is.  Dilhriiig's  philosophy,  however,  approaches 
Positivism  in  its  sharp  emphasis  upon  what  is 
not  known,  upon  the  limits  which  are  set  to 
our  knowledge.  All  metaphysical  assumptions 
are  condemned  as  phantasms,  and  Materialism 
and  Spirituahsm  in  like  manner  are  rejected. 
To  be  sure,  there  cannot  be  wanting  a  final  and 
comprehensive  system  of  our  highest  and  most 
universal  cognitions,  in  order  that  we  may  win 
a  final  vantage-ground  for  a  theoiy  of  the  world 


70     PHILOSOPHY   OF  THE   PRESENT 

and  for  the  conduct  of  life.  "  In  a  distinctive 
system,  there  must  be  no  point  that  does  not 
have  a  clear  and  firm  value  of  unquestionable 
significance."  But  it  is  only  the  special  sciences 
on  whose  account  such  a  work  of  thought  is 
to  be  executed.  An  independent  philosophical 
knowledge,  so  far  as  it  is  not  concerned  with 
the  reality  of  nature  and  its  scientific  treatment, 
is  not  demanded  by  Bilhrmg,  the  Positivist,  nor 
does  he  take  it  into  consideration. 

An  original  colouring  is  given  to  his  Positive 
tendency  in  this,  that  knowledge  is  brought 
into  closer  relation  with  life  and  conduct,  and 
thereby  placed  in  the  service  of  practical  prob- 
lenis.  The  interest  which  we,  as  living,  striving, 
perfectible  individuals,  take  in  the  course  of  the 
world,  has  become  with  Dilhring,  especially  in 
the  final  presentation  of  his  system,  a  ruling 
point  of  view.  With  this  practical  tendency, 
which,  by  the  way,  is  expressly  treated  in  a 
special  periodical  called  Personalist  und  Eman- 
zipator,  there  is  connected  the  idea  that  all 
present  ruling  conditions  in  the  realm  of  mind 
are  demoralised  through  and  through,  and  are 
in  need  of  reform  from  the  ground  up.  Religion 
is  rejected  as  "  a  cradle  of  delusions,"  and  the 


POSITIVISM  71 

whole  of  modern  philosophy  is  rebuked  as 
"philosophical  twaddle  bound  up  with  deceit." 
Emancipation  from  this  philosophy  is  a  neces- 
sary precondition  of  all  better  conduct  of  life 
and  mind.  The  same  is  true  of  art  in  its 
traditional  form.  Only  an  art  which  expresses 
"natural  feelings"  and  ideas  which  conform  to 
reality  has  any  claim  to  lasting  recognition  or 
any  prospect  of  it.  Finally,  natural  science  has 
to-day  become  "  for  the  most  part  an  idol." 
"As  it  is  commonly  served  up,  science  is  one 
of  the  most  contemptible  idols.  It  is  a  hodge- 
podge of  superstition,  learned  ignorance,  vanity, 
emptiness,  skeptical  instability,  apathy,  and 
good-for-nothingness  of  every  kind."  "The 
universal  verdict  concerning  the  beclouded, 
badly  learned,  and  badly  taught  science  of  the 
nineteenth  century,"  he  said,  "  will  in  the  end  be 
like  that  passed  upon  the  Scholasticism  of  the 
Middle  Ages.  As  it  was  with  logic  then,  so  it 
is  with  mathematics  now."  The  remedy  which 
Duhring  seeks  will  not  be  found  in  theology  or 
philosophy.  "  It  is  not  worth  while  to  stretch 
out  a  hand  to  save  them.  They  will  gradually 
suffocate  from  contempt  and  neglect."  "  On 
the  contrary,  physics  has  still  some  solid  ground 


72     PHILOSOPHY   OF  THE   PRESENT 

under  it,  and  we  may  cleanse  the  stables  here 
with  some  hope.  The  philosophical  twaddle 
can  be  driven  out  of  mathematics  and  physics  ; 
there  is  still  some  appeal  here  to  sense  and 
reason."  These  intemperate  judgments,  in  which 
Diihring  indulges  in  the  second  edition  of  his 
autobiographical  book,  Sache,  Lehen,  und  Feinde 
(1903),  are  but  an  eloquent  testimony  to  the 
embitterment  of  the  solitary  thinker  and  to  his 
incapacity  for  objective  estimates  of  relations. 

The  researches,  able  and  useful  in  themselves, 
concerning  the  relation  of  logical  thought  to 
given  reality,  lead  with  Bilhring  in  general  to 
the  result  that  the  antinomies,  contradictions, 
and  difficulties  in  which  reason  finds  itself 
when  it  seeks  to  establish  any  fixed  principles 
beyond  the  bounds  of  possible  experience,  can 
be  settled  in  a  simple  manner.  For  this  purpose 
the  law  of  fixed,  determinate  number  serves  in 
the  first  rank,  as  well  as  the  admission  of  new 
beginnings,  first  causes,  and  the  like.  It  is 
nevertheless  plainly  manifest  that  this  law  is 
only  valid  when  it  deals,  in  the  first  place,  with 
something  which  can  be  counted — that  is,  with 
objects  which  are  discrete,  mutually  bounded,  and 
interdistinguishable ;    and,  in  the  second  place, 


POSITIVISM  73 

when  the  totality  of  these  objects  is  thought  of 
as  something  in  some  way  complete — that  is,  as 
something,  for  the  present  at  least,  closed  and 
finished.  Whether  these  presuppositions  prove 
true  for  the  divisibility  of  matter,  for  the  course 
of  events  in  time,  &c.,  concerning  this  the  law 
says  nothing  at  all.  For  this  reason  it  loses,  of 
course,  the  significance  of  a  world-constituting 
principle,  and  can  assure  us  no  insight  into  the 
inner  connection  of  things.  Its  value  consists 
in  its  reference  to  the  fact  that  a  distinction  must 
be  drawn  between  the  statement,  designation, 
determination  of  a  number,  and  the  number 
itself  as  a  formal  property  of  real  things  and 
events.  "Countless,"  "innumerable,"  "infi- 
nitely many,"  &c.,  are,  according  to  JDUhring,  not 
predicates  of  reality,  but  only  expressions  for 
our  conceptions,  for  our  counting  and  reckon- 
ing. Whether  every  real  event  is  composed  of 
a  number  of  phases,  we  cannot  in  this  way 
determine. 

In  the  same  way,  also,  the  demand  for  com- 
pleteness of  the  causal  series,  and  the  hypo- 
thesis of  absolutely  new  beginnings  within  the 
evolution  of  world-phenomena,  lose  their  binding 
force.     It  might  indeed  be,  as  Kant  teaches,  that 


74     PHILOSOPHY   OF  THE   PRESENT 

the  distinction  of  cause  and  effect  rests  upon  a 
primary  concept  of  the  understanding,  and  that 
it  would  have  no  meaning  to  suppose  that 
processes  are  themselves  divided  into  causal 
members  with  fixed  limits.  It  happens  thus 
that  the  law  of  determinate  number,  so  zealously 
pushed  to  the  front  in  Duhring's  world-scheme, 
is  at  bottom  a  tautology,  in  so  far  as  under  the 
presupposition  of  numerableness,  he  declares  a 
determinate  number  as  a  self-evident  conse- 
quence. If  all  continuity  of  events  is  thus 
denied,  the  law  is  not  a  law  of  reality.  We 
shall,  therefore,  not  feel  bound  to  set  sudden 
limits  to  the  unlimitedness  demanded  by  the 
causal  principle,  nor  to  the  demands  for  causes 
lying  even  farther  back.  Indeed,  the  assump- 
tion of  absolutely  new  beginnings  within  the 
world  of  events  seems  to  us  purely  dogmatic, 
dispensing  quite  too  readily  with  any  scientific 
proof.  Since  there  was  a  time  when  the  con- 
ditions upon  the  earth  were  such  that  life  could 
not  be  sustained,  it  is  evident  that  the  question 
concerning  the  origin  of  life,  or  of  the  origin 
of  the  organic  from  the  inorganic,  will  never 
be  without  meaning  and  purpose.  And  when 
idealistic  metaphysics  comes  to  the  conclusion 


POSITIVISM  75 

with  reference  to  the  origin  of  consciousness  or 
of  mental  processes,  that  all  existence  in  its 
very  nature  bears  this  character,  it  seeks  in  this 
way  to  give  a  satisfactory  answer  to  the  question 
concerning  the  empirical  difference  between  the 
conscious  and  the  unconscious,  a  difference 
which  seems  to  be  wholly  unrecognised  by 
Dilhring. 

In  spite  of  these  reservations,  which  in  fair- 
ness we  must  praise  in  Dilhring,  he  launches 
out,  when  it  fits  his  purpose,  into  the  boldest 
constructions.  When,  for  example,  he  makes 
the  scale  of  the  senses  a  reflection  of  the 
objective  stages  of  the  evolution  of  nature, 
and  thereby  immeasurably  exaggerates  and 
schematises  the  thought  of  a  parallelism  be- 
tween knowledge  and  its  outer  objects,  this  is 
certainly  not  a  philosophy  which  seeks  simply 
to  interpret  reality  as  it  is.  The  same  is  true 
of  his  peculiar  theory  that  the  sensation  of 
resistance  is  the  pure  elementary  form  of  all 
subjectivity,  and  reveals  the  origin  of  conscious- 
ness from  the  antagonism  of  mechanical  forces. 
In  this  category  we  must  place  also  his  argu- 
ments concerning  the  problematical  primordial 
state,   from  which  nature  has  arisen,  and  his 


76     PHILOSOPHY   OF  THE   PRESENT 

views  upon  the  future  of  cosmic  evolution. 
However  much  these  views  have  the  appearance 
of  cautious  and  strictly  scientific  research,  it 
is  not  to  be  questioned  that  they  rest  upon  very 
doubtful  presuppositions,  and  that  with  equal  or 
better  right  other  hypotheses  could  be  substi- 
tuted for  them.  So  we  see  that  his  premature 
fettering  of  thought,  his  attempt  to  confine  it 
within  determined  limits  which  are  later  dis- 
regarded, revenges  itself  in  the  case  of  Buhring. 
If  in  the  Absolute  Philosophy  the  centre 
of  gi'avity  was  found  in  the  activity  of  pure 
thought.  Positivism  shifts  the  centre  of  gravity 
to  the  reality  given  in  our  consciousness.  In 
this  limitation  and  depreciation  of  thought, 
Positivism  betrays  its  deepest  impulse,  its  most 
characteristic  position.  Herein  it  reacts  against 
the  boundless  confidence  in  the  efficiency  of 
reason  characteristic  of  the  Absolute  Philosophy, 
and  against  the  similar,  though  weaker  ten- 
dencies in  Herhart,  Schopenhauer,  and  other 
post-Kantian  philosophers.  Positivism,  there- 
fore, is  a  standpoint  of  revision — an  inventory, 
as  it  were,  which  precedes  new  enterprises  and 
loads  them  in  advance  with  a  heavy  ballast  of 
critical  foresight  and  caution.     In  order  to  do 


POSITIVISM  77 

this  work  thoroughly,  it  opposes  not  only  the 
all-too-many  answers,  but  also  the  all-too-many 
questions.  It  is  not  content  with  representing 
the  present  metaphysical  solutions  of  the  world- 
riddle  as  untenable,  unsafe  and  superfluous 
guesses,  but  it  wishes  also  to  suppress  the  very 
impulse  toward  such  speculation,  the  "  iiTepres- 
sible  "  need  of  metaphysics,  as  Kant  calls  it. 
But  in  so  doing.  Positivism  itself  falls  into  a 
kind  of  dogmatism,  since  it  starts  with  certainty 
instead  of  establishing  it,  and  fixes  in  advance 
the  goal  of  thought  at  the  same  time  as  the 
method. 


Ill 

MATERIALISM 

In  the  fii'st  half  of  the  nineteenth  century  there 
began  that  brilliant  advance  of  the  natural 
sciences  which  has  given  to  that  period  the 
name  of  the  scientific  or  technical  century. 
The  progress  in  method  and  in  matter  which 
took  place  in  all  the  branches  of  scientific 
knowledge  was  especially  marked  in  biology, 
the  science  of  vital  phenomena.  As  early  as 
the  seventeenth  century,  the  French  philosopher, 
Descartes,  taught  that  life  can  be  explained  on 
purely  mechanical  principles.  After  Descartes' 
time,  with  the  help  of  the  improved  and  refined 
methods  brought  into  use  by  the  gradually 
unfolding  natural  sciences,  modern  physiology 
set  to  work  to  confirm  by  careful  research  this 
mechanical  conception  of  vital  phenomena,  and 
to  explain  the  activity  of  muscles  and  nerves,  of 
glands  and  sense-organs,  according  to  physical 
and  chemical  laws.     Mental  life  thus  took  its 

78 


M.\TERIALISM  79 

place  among  other  vital  functions ;  it  was 
connected  with  a  special  organ,  namely,  the 
brain,  and  was  therefore  classed  among  material 
phenomena.  Some,  to  be  sure,  recognised  a 
fundamental  difference  between  mind  or  con- 
sciousness, on  the  one  hand,  and  phenomena  of 
life  in  general,  on  the  other,  and  claimed  a 
mechanical  explanation  only  for  the  latter. 
At  a  Congress  of  Natural  Scientists  held  in 
Gottingen  in  1854,  the  so-called  controversy 
over  Materialism  sprung  up,  in  which  the 
opposing  views  of  the  physiologists  clashed. 
MateriaHstic  views  were  openly  advocated,  and 
a  lively  war  of  words  followed. 

At  that  time  Budoljjh  Wagner  delivered  an 
address  upon  The  Creation  of  Man  and  the 
Substance  of  the  Soul,  and  professed  the  behef 
in  an  individual,  immortal  soul-substance,  be- 
cause, without  this,  the  moral  basis  of  the 
social  order  would  be  wholly  destroyed.  If  we 
assume  that  the  soul  is  merely  a  function  of 
the  brain,  it  follows  as  a  practical  consequence 
that  eating  and  drinking  must  be  the  highest 
ideal  of  mankind.  On  practical  rather  than 
on  theoretical  or  scientific  grounds,  therefore, 
Wagner  held  to   the   existence  of  a   soul  not 


80     PHILOSOPHY   OF  THE   PRESENT 

destructible  with  the  body.  He  even  declared 
that  faith  and  knowledge  could  exist  side  by 
side,  like  a  kind  of  double-entry  book-keeping. 
His  opponent,  who  sought  with  adroit  skill  to 
show  the  absurdity  of  this  belief,  was  Karl 
Vogt  (1817-1895).  In  a  work  entitled  Kbhler- 
glauhe  unci  JVissenschaft,  Vogt  makes  a  clever 
attack  upon  the  new  path  to  knowledge, 
called  faith,  to  which  we  owe  the  assumption 
of  an  immaterial  soul.  According  to  Vogt, 
the  limits  of  higher  thought  are  one  and  the 
same  with  the  limits  of  sense-experience.  But 
observation  reveals  to  us  that  the  brain  is  the 
organ  of  the  so-called  mental  functions,  and  to 
this  knowledge  we  must  accord  the  rank  of 
incontrovertible  truth. 

Jacob  Moleschott  (1822-1893),  in  his  work 
Kreislaiif  des  Lebens,  had  ah'eady  advocated 
similar  views  in  opposition  to  the  celebrated 
chemist  Liebig.  In  later  editions  of  this  work 
no  allusion  was  made  to  its  original  motive ; 
new  material  was  added,  greater  care  was  be- 
stowed upon  the  form,  and  finally,  when  the 
fifth  edition  appeared  in  1887  in  two  volumes, 
it  became  the  principal  work  on  Materialism  in 
Germany  in  the  nineteenth  century.     Moleschott 


MATERIALISM  81 

sought  to  clear  away  the  Kantian  opposition 
between  the  phenomenon  and  the  thing-in- 
itself  by  identifying  knowable  being  with  being 
itself.  Being  exists  only  through  its  attributes, 
and  all  attributes  consist  in  relations :  "  Only 
the  warm  hand  knows  the  cold  ice ;  only  the 
healthy  eye  knows  the  green  trees,  xlre  we  to 
suppose,  then,  that  green  is  something  different 
from  a  relation  of  light  to  the  eye  ?  And  if  it 
is  not  something  different,  does  not  the  green 
leaf  exist  in  itself  for  the  very  reason  that  it  is 
green  to  our  eye  ?  In  this  case,  then,  the  par- 
tition wall  is  broken  down  between  the  thing- 
for-us  and  the  thing-in-itself."  According  to 
this,  as  soon  as  we  have  succeeded  in  finding 
out  all  the  attributes  of  bodies  which  can  exert 
an  influence  upon  our  senses,  we  have  at  the 
same  time  grasped  the  essence  of  things. 
Materialism,  as  a  doctrine  of  unity,  is  opposed 
to  the  dualistic  doctrine  of  spiritualism ;  but 
here  the  distinction  is  not  clearly  made  between 
a  monistic  view  which  regards  the  physical  and 
the  mental  as  two  different  sides  of  the  same 
reahty,  and  a  materialistic  view  which  traces 
the  spiritual  back  to  the  physical.  This  am- 
biguity is  apparent  fi'om  the  fact  that  Moleschott 

F 


82     PHILOSOPHY   OF  THE   PRESENT 

explains,  on  the  one  hand,  that  the  materialist 
professes  the  unity  of  force  and  matter,  of 
mind  and  body,  of  God  and  the  world,  and,  on 
the  other  hand,  does  not  hesitate  to  allow  all 
psychical  processes  to  originate  through  brain- 
activity.  It  is  not  claimed,  of  course,  that 
thought  is  a  fluid  any  more  than  heat  or  sound ; 
it  is  rather  a  form  of  motion,  a  transposition  of 
brain  material. 

This  materialistic  doctrine  was  popularised 
by  Ludwig  Bilchner,  in  his  widely  circulated 
book,  Kraft  und  Stqff,^  the  nineteenth  edition 
of  which  appeared  in  1898,  shortly  before  the 
death  of  the  author.  As  a  good  monist,  he 
explains,  on  the  one  hand,  that  force  and  matter, 
just  like  mind  and  body,  are  only  designations 
of  two  different  aspects  of  one  and  the  same 
being,  or  primordial  substance,  whose  real 
nature  is  unknown  to  us ;  and,  on  the  other 
hand,  he  is  found  soon  after  inveighing  against 
the  "  fools  in  their  spiritual  blindness "  who 
seem  to  have  forgotten  that  matter  was  existent 
long  before  mind,  that  mind  exists  only  by 
reason   of  organised   matter,    and    that   not   a 

^  Force  and  Matter,  by  Ludwig  Biiclmer.     Translated  by  /.  F. 
Collingwood.     Triibner  &  Co.,  London,  1870. — (Tr.) 


MATERIALISM  83 

shadow  of  proof  can  be  advanced  to  show  that 
mmd  has  any  independent  existence  apart  from 
matter.  Buchner  carelessly  changes  from  one 
to  the  other  of  these  fundamentally  different 
conceptions  quite  at  will.  For  instance,  he 
does  not  wish  to  be  called  a  materialist,  because 
he  regards  matter,  force,  and  mind  as  different 
aspects  of  one  basic  principle.  Again,  he 
asserts  that  spiritual  forces  as  well  as  physical 
forces  reside  in  matter,  and  that  there  is  no 
matter  without  mind.  In  spite  of  these  asser- 
tions, which  quite  exclude  any  separation  of 
the  psychical  and  the  physical,  he  seriously 
discusses  the  question  how  matter  first  began 
to  produce  consciousness  or  sensation,  and  he 
comes  to  the  conclusion,  certainly  remarkable 
for  a  scientist,  that  it  is  quite  indifferent  to  us 
how  sensations  arose  from  matter,  it  being: 
sufficient  to  know  that  it  is  so. 


ERNST   HAECKEL.     {Bm-n  1834) 

In  the  year  1899,  the  year  oi Buchner' s  death, 
there  appeared  a  book  which  is  perhaps  destined 
to  put  into  definite  form  the  Materialism  of 
the  present  day,  and  to  replace  Buchnefs  work, 


84     PHILOSOPHY   OF  THE   PRESENT 

Kraft  unci  Stoff.  This  book,  Die  Weltmtsel ; 
Gemeiiiverstdndliche  Studien  iiber  monistische 
Philosojjhie,^  was  written  by  Ernst  Haeckel,  the 
well-known  zoologist  of  Jena.  It  has  passed 
through  many  editions,  and  has  been  the  sub- 
ject of  wide  and  lively  discussion.  This  leading 
work  of  the  materialistic  school  deserves  special 
consideration  in  this  connection.^ 

Haeckel  explains  that  his  researches  cannot 
reasonably  lay  claim  to  give  "  a  complete  solu- 
tion "  of  the  riddle  of  the  universe.  His  object 
is  "  rather  to  offer  to  a  wide  circle  of  readers  a 
critical  elucidation  of  the  problem,  and  to  seek 
to  determine   how  nearly  we  have  at  present 

^  The  Riddle  of  the  Universe,  by  Ernst  Haeckel.  Trans,  by 
Joseph  McCabe.  Harper  Brothers,  N.Y.  and  London,  1902. — (Tr.) 

^  As  a  sequel  tolthis  work,  the  author  published,  in  the  year 
1904,  Die  Lehenswunder  [Eng.  The  Wonders  of  Life,  by  Ernst 
Haeckel.  Trans,  by  Joseph  McGabe.  Harper  Brothers,  N.Y. 
and  London,  1905],  in  which  the  field  of  organic  science,  the 
science  of  life,  receives  special  treatment.  Since  the  philoso- 
phical standpoint  taken  in  this  book  does  not  differ  materially 
from  that  of  the  Weltrdtsel,  we  have  not  thought  it  necessary 
to  consider  it  more  at  length,  /.  Engert  has  given,  from  the 
catholic-theological  side,  a  detailed  exposition  and  evaluation 
of  this  philosophy  in  his  book,  Der  naturalistische  Moyiismus 
Haeckels  auf  seine  xoissenschafiliche  Haltbarkeit  geprUft  (1905). 
From  the  philosophical  standpoint  the  most  thorough  criticism 
of  Haeckel  is  thut  of  Erich  A  dickes  in  his  excellent  book,  Kant 
contra  Haeckel  (1901,  2nd  ed.  1906). 


MATERIALISM  85 

approached  its  solution."  The  explanation 
which  he  offers  concerning  the  being,  origin, 
and  development  of  the  world,  of  life,  and  of 
mind,  must  "  of  course  be  subjective  and  only 
partially  correct."  The  only  claim  which  he 
makes  for  the  theory  is  that  his  "  monistic 
philosophy  is  honest  from  beginning  to  end," 
The  book,  furthermore,  should  be  regarded  as 
''  a  kind  of  sketch-book  in  which  studies  of 
very  unequal  value  are  gathered  into  a  whole." 
It  was  indeed  his  desire  to  construct  a  complete 
system  of  monistic  philosophy,  but  this  plan 
could  not  be  carried  out.  He  declared,  too, 
that  he  was  wholly  a  child  of  the  nineteenth 
century,  and  with  its  close  his  life's  work 
would  end. 

All  world-riddles,  according  to  Haeckel,  can 
be  traced  back  to  a  single  universal  riddle, 
namely,  the  prohlem  of  substance.  He  grants 
that  the  real  nature  of  substance,  which  the 
realistic  scientist  regards  as  the  universe,  the 
idealistic  philosopher  as  substance,  the  devout 
believer  as  God,  becomes  ever  more  proble- 
matical the  more  intimately  we  become  ac- 
quainted with  its  countless  manifestations  and 
their   development.      What   lies   behind   these 


86     PHILOSOPHY   OF  THE   PRESENT 

manifestations,  as  "  thing-in-itself,"  we  are  not 
able  even  now  to  say.  But  concerning  this 
final  world-riddle,  which  Haeckel  himself  so 
fully  recognises,  he  comforts  himself  by  saying  : 
"  How  does  this  mystical  thing-in-itself  concern 
us  after  all,  since  we  possess  no  means  of  ex- 
ploring it,  since  we  do  not  even  know  clearly 
whether  it  exists  ?  Let  us  leave  to  the  meta- 
physicians this  fruitless  brooding  over  an  ideal 
phantom,  and  as  true  physicists  rejoice  instead 
in  the  wonderful  and  genuine  progress  which  our 
monistic  natural  philosophy  has  actually  made." 
In  understanding  the  world,  two  methods  are 
at  our  command,  says  Haeckel,  sense- experience 
and  rational  thought.  Although,  to  be  sure, 
he  sometimes  refers  the  latter  back  to  the 
former  as  its  source,  nevertheless  he  recog- 
nises the  two  methods  as  of  equal  right  and 
mutually  complementary,  based  as  they  are 
upon  two  different  functions  of  the  brain. 
Sense-perception  depends  upon  the  activity  of 
the  sense-organs,  and  the  corresponding  sensory 
centres  in  the  brain;  while  thought  depends 
upon  the  thought-centres  lying  between  these, 
that  is,  the  so-called  association-centres  of  the 
cortex. 


MATERIALISM  87 

According  to  Haeckel,  all  the  differences  in 
the  philosophical  systems  can  be  traced  back 
to  the  opposition  between  Dualism  and  Monism. 
Dualism  "  divides  the  universe  into  two  entirely- 
distinct  substances,  the  material  world  and  an 
immaterial  God,  who  is  its  creator,  sustainer, 
and  ruler.  Monism,  on  the  contrary,  recognises 
only  a  single  substance  in  the  universe,  which 
is  at  the  same  time  God  and  nature  ;  body  and 
mind  or  (matter  and  energy)  are  inseparable." 
This  pure  Monism  is  not  to  be  identified  either 
with  theoretical  Materialism,  which  denies  the 
existence  of  spirit  and  resolves  the  world  into 
a  heap  of  dead  atoms,  or  with  theoretical 
Spiritualism,  which  rejects  the  notion  of  matter 
and  considers  the  world  to  be  a  specially  ar- 
ranged group  of  energies  or  immaterial  natural 
forces.  On  the  contrary,  Haeckel  holds,  with 
Goethe,  that  matter  cannot  exist  and  be  opera- 
tive without  spirit,  nor  spirit  without  matter. 
He  also  holds  firmly  to  the  unequivocal  Monism 
of  Spinoza,  according  to  which  matter  as  in- 
finitely extended  substance,  and  mind  (or 
energy)  as  perceiving  or  thinking  substance, 
are  the  two  fundamental  attributes  of  the  all- 
embracing    divine    world-being,    the    universal 


88     PHILOSOPHY   OF  THE   PRESENT 

substance.^  God  and  the  world  are,  then,  one 
and  the  same,  and  atheism,  as  a  protest  against 
the  assumption  of  a  personal  God,  is  included 
in  the  monism  and  pantheism  of  modern  science. 
Indeed,  in  the  end,  the  conclusion  would  seem 
to  follow  that  the  opposition  between  theism 
and  pantheism,  vitalism  and  mechanism  almost 
melts  away.  It  is  in  harmony  with  this  assimi- 
lation of  all  possible  differences,  that  Haeckel 
himself  should  sometimes  speak  of  his  doctrine 
as  materialistic,  and  in  the  presentation  of  his 
views,  true  to  the  traditions  of  materialistic 
literature,  should  be  unable  to  keep  separate 
the  monistic  and  materialistic  conception. 
The  fundamental  idea  of  HaeckeVs  philosophy 

1  In  his  Lebenswundern,  HaeckeVs  desire  to  present  a  striking 
parallelism  between  "  monistic  "  and  "  dualistic  "  views  has 
led  him,  in  rather  bad  taste,  to  oppose  a  monistic  trinity  of 
substance  to  the  trinity  of  divine  persons  in  Christian  dogma. 
According  to  this  view,  substance  has  three  inseparable 
attributes  known  to  man:  matter  =  substance,  energy  =  force, 
psychom  =  sensation.  Although  the  false  identification  of 
energy  and  mind  is  here  avoided,  still  the  difficulty  is  in- 
creased of  co-ordinating  to  each  mode  of  one  attribute,  cor- 
responding modes  of  the  other.  That  all  matter  is  bound  up 
with  energy  will  perhaps  be  granted,  but  that  it  is  further- 
more always  connected  with  sensation,  something  essentially 
difierent,  is,  to  say  the  least,  a  speculative  assertion  tran- 
scending the  limits  of  experience. 


MATERIALISM  89 

is  the  idea  of  substance,  in  which  matter  and 
energy  are  conceived  of  as  inseparably  bound 
together ;  and  the  fundamental  law  which  it 
advances  is  the  law  of  substance,  which  includes 
the  older  chemical  law  of  the  conservation  of 
matter,  and  the  newer  physical  law  of  the 
conservation  of  energy.  After  all,  both  neces- 
sarily follow  from  the  law  of  causality.  With- 
out further  proofs,  the  terms  energy  and  spirit, 
or  energy  and  mind,  are  constantly  used  inter- 
changeably, and  so  Haeckel  aiTives  at  a  Monism 
which,  after  the  manner  of  Biichner,  substitutes 
for  the  connection  of  matter  and  energy,  or 
matter  and  force,  the  essentially  different  con- 
nection of  matter  and  spu'it,  or  matter  and 
mind.  This  fundamental  confusion  must  be 
kept  in  mind  in  order  to  understand  the  psycho- 
physical structure  of  the  world  in  IlaeckeVs 
plan. 

In  the  realm  of  the  inorganic  we  find,  as 
distinct  forms  of  matter,  the  ponderable  mass 
and  the  (at  least  practically)  imponderable 
ether.  These  are  not  dead,  but  are  endowed 
with  sensation  and  will  (of  the  lowest  de- 
gree to  be  sure),  or,  as  we  might  say,  with 
feeling   and    effort.     For   instance,    the    atoms 


90     PHILOSOPHY   OF   THE   PRESENT 

experience,  though  perhaps  unconsciously, 
pleasure  in  condensation,  and  pain  in  expansion, 
and  they  strive  for  the  former  and  struggle 
against  the  latter.  Even  in  the  simplest  chemi- 
cal process  there  is  shown  unconscious  affinity, 
which  is  later  manifested  in  the  relations  of 
the  sexes. 

The  soul-life  of  the  lower  organisms  reveals 
a  similar  unconscious  character.  Every  living 
cell  possesses  psychic  attributes,  and  the  soul- 
life  of  multicellular  animals  and  plants  is 
nothing  more  than  the  resultant  of  the  psychic 
functions  of  the  combined  individual  cells. 
But,  while  in  the  lower  stages  of  the  organic 
world  all  the  cells  of  the  body  possess  psychic 
functions,  in  the  higher  groups  only  the  soul- 
cells,  a  chosen  part,  possess  them.  In  these 
soul-cells,  the  unconscious  ideas  have  their 
seat.  These  cells  are  also  called  sensation-cells 
and  will-cells,  and  are  entrusted  with  the 
formation  of  thought,  especially  of  conscious- 
ness. 

Thus  Haeckel  distinguishes  between  the  un- 
conscious and  the  conscious  soul-life.  The 
former,  which  even  in  the  case  of  man  has  a 
much    larger    field,    is    co-extensive    with    all 


MATERIALISM  91 

matter;  the  latter  is  found  only  in  man  and 
in  those  higher  animals  which  have  a  central 
nervous  system  and  sense-organs.  Conscious- 
ness is  an  inner  perception,  and  may  be  com- 
pared to  a  mirroring.  The  new-born  child  lacks 
it  wholly.  It  is  only  when  he  says  ''I"  for 
the  first  time  that  his  consciousness  begins  to 
germinate.  These  two  realms  of  the  psychic 
life,  the  conscious  and  the  unconscious,  are, 
however,  after  all  closely  related  and  no  clearly 
defined  boundaries  can  be  drawn  between  them. 
The  soul  is,  therefore,  a  natural  phenomenon, 
and  psychology  becomes  a  branch  of  physiology. 
"  The  prevailing  conception  of  psychic  activity 
.  .  .  considers  soul  and  body  as  two  diff'erent 
entities.  These  two  entities  can  exist  inde- 
pendently of  each  other  and  are  not  necessarily 
united.  .  .  The  soul  .  .  .  is  an  immortal, 
immaterial  being,  a  spiritual  agent,  whose 
mysterious  activity  is  entirely  unknown  to  us." 
Haeckel  declares  this  hypothetical  independent 
spirit- world  to  be  a  product  of  poetic  fancy.  In 
opposition  to  this,  the  naturalistic  conception 
of  psychic  activity  sees  in  it  "  a  sum  of  vital 
phenomena  which,  like  all  other  vital  activities, 
are   dependent   upon   a    definite  material  sub- 


92     PHILOSOPHY    OF  THE   PRESENT 

stratum."  The  substratum  of  this  psychic  life 
is  called  "  psychoplasm,"  because  it  is  shown 
by  chemical  analysis  to  belong  to  the  proto- 
plasmic bodies.  The  'psyche  is  thus  used  as 
a  collective  name  for  the  totality  of  psychic 
functions  of  the  psychoplasm,  or  as  a  collective 
name  for  a  group  of  brain-functions.  Not  only 
are  the  processes  of  psychic  life  in  the  lower 
animals  determined  by  the  physiological  action 
in  the  plasma  of  the  appropriate  cells,  as  well 
as  by  physical  and  chemical  changes  therein, 
but  this  is  equally  true  of  all  higher  psychic 
activity  in  the  higher  animals  and  in  man. 

It  is,  therefore,  indispensable  to  a  scientific 
psychology,  in  addition  to  introspection,  to 
undertake  the  anatomical  study  of  the  psychic 
organs  and  the  physiological  analysis  of  their 
functions.  Unfortunately  most  so-called  psycho- 
logists either  have  no  knowledge  of  this  kind, 
or  at  best  their  knowledge  is  very  imperfect. 
This  is  the  reason  that  "  most  of  the  psycho- 
logical literature  of  to-day  is  so  much  waste 
paper."  In  the  current  text-books  on  modern 
psychology,  according  to  Haeckel,  instead  of  a 
painstaking  study  of  anatomy  and  physiology, 
the  fancy  runs  riot  concerning  the  immaterial 


MATERIALISM  93 

essence  of  the  soul,  which  no  one  knows  any- 
thing about,  and  to  this  immortal  phantom  all 
possible  wonders  are  ascribed.  In  these  words 
Haeckel  simply  betrays  the  fact  that  he  is  not 
acquainted  with  modern  psychological  literature. 

In  modern  psychology,  it  has  been  long 
customai'y  to  define  the  relations  between 
psychical  and  physical  processes  according  to 
the  principle  of  psychophysical  parallelism. 
That  is  to  say,  it  is  customary  to  affirm  a  co- 
ordination between  the  former  and  the  latter 
without  more  exactly  determining  the  manner 
of  this  relation,  which  in  the  present  state  of 
knowledge  could  only  be  hypothetical  and 
problematical.  This  cautious  reserve  is  shown 
in  the  fact  that  psychologists  avoid  speaking  of 
a  causal  connection  or  reciprocal  action  between 
physical  and  mental  phenomena.  Haeckel,  on 
the  contrary,  seems  to  think  that  this  principle 
establishes  a  complete  dualism  of  body  and 
mind,  and  reproaches  Wundt  because,  in  accept- 
ing this  principle,  he  refuses  to  recognise  a 
natural  causal  connection  between  psychical  and 
physical  processes. 

We  cannot,  within  the  limits  here  assigned, 
enter  into  a  more  exact  critical  examination  of 


94     PHILOSOPHY   OF  THE   PRESENT 

HaecJceVs  Monism  or  Materialism.  At  the  close 
of  this  section  we  shall  offer  a  general  criticism 
of  Materialism ;  so  that  it  is  scarcely  worth 
while  here  to  subject  HaeckeVs  theories  to  a  real 
critique,  especially  owing  to  the  lack  of  clear- 
ness in  his  arguments.  It  will  be  sufficient  to 
point  out  a  few  of  the  difficulties  which  a  merely 
superficial  examination  of  his  work  reveals,  and 
we  shall  not  try  to  decide  whether  they  are 
referable  to  a  lack  of  precision  in  the  mode 
of  expression  or  to  unobserved  contradictions. 
One  of  these  difficulties  we  have  already  pointed 
out,  in  presenting  HaeckeVs  views.  It  consists 
in  the  fact  that  he  uses  the  concept  "  energy  " 
quite  interchangeably  with  that  of  "mind"  or 
"  spirit."  It  is  owing  to  this  that  mental  life, 
on  the  one  hand,  is  bound  up  with  every  kind 
of  matter,  and,  on  the  other  hand,  appears  as  a 
function  of  a  particular  form  of  matter,  namely, 
the  psychoplasm.  This  explains  too  why  it  is 
that "  a  natural  causal  connection  "  is  demanded 
for  the  relation  between  psychic  and  physical 
processes  ;  while  in  the  relation  between  matter 
and  energy,  as  the  two  fundamental  attributes 
of  one  and  the  same  substance,  there  is  no 
mention    of  causality,    as   SjJinoza,    so    highly 


MATERIALISM  95 

revered  by  Haeckel,  plainly  taught.  A  further 
difficulty  of  a  fundamental  nature  appears  when 
we  try  to  make  clear  to  ourselves  HaeckeVs  idea 
of  the  relation  between  unconscious  and  con- 
scious psychic  life.  Although  no  sharply  defined 
boundaries  between  the  two  are  admitted,  yet, 
in  spite  of  this,  the  appearance  of  consciousness 
is  connected  with  a  definite  organ,  the  central 
nervous  system.  It  is  evidently,  then,  of  con- 
scious processes  that  he  speaks  when  the  soul  is 
defined  as  merely  a  collective  term  for  a  group 
of  brain  functions.  And  when  consciousness 
is  identified  Avith  inner  perception,  indeed  with 
self-consciousness,  there  is  plainly  lacking  in 
Haeckel  either  the  understanding  or  else  the 
knowledge  of  the  fact  that  sensations,  ideas, 
and  feelings  are  simply  experienced  without  the 
additional  element  of  a  knowledge  of  them,  or 
of  their  relation  to  an  ego  in  which  they  inhere. 
These  simple  immediately  experienced  mental 
phenomena  are  attributed  by  modern  psychology 
not  to  the  unconscious  but  to  consciousness. 
Finally,  the  idea  of  the  "  soul-cell  "  is  incompre- 
hensible if  the  whole  psychic  life,  including  the 
conscious  and  the  unconscious,  is  connected 
with   the    special   organs  of  the   brain.     This 


96     PHILOSOPHY   OF  THE    PRESENT 

would  lead  us  to  suppose  that  there  are  organisms 
in  which  certain  cells  have  no  psychic  function 
whatever,  so  that  matter  without  "  mind  "  exists 
in  rich  measure. 

In  our  examination  of  HaeckeVs  Weltrdtsel, 
we  have  limited  ourselves  to  those  parts  which 
deal  with  theoretical  Materialism  or  Monism ; 
but  we  may  still  indicate  in  a  few  words  the 
general  attitude  of  the  book,  not  trusting  alto- 
gether to  the  promises  of  modesty  and  caution 
which  the  author  himself  holds  out  in  the 
preface. 

The  book  is  written  in  the  same  tone  of 
scientific  arrogance,^  it  shows  the  same  hostile 
attitude  toward  the  traditional  and  dominant 
schools  of  philosophy,  it  betrays  the  same  in- 
excusable ignorance  in  matters  of  history, 
whether  of  philosophy,  rehgion,  or  the  church,^ 
and  the  same  lack  of  purpose  to  pass  a  correct 
and  unprejudiced  judgment  on  such  matters,  as 

^  How  little  Haeckel  is  to  be  relied  upon  in  exact  science, 
the  Russian  physicist,  Chivolson,  has  shown  in  his  work,  Hegel, 
Haeckel,   Kossuth   und   das  zwolfte   Gebot.      The   Twelfth   Com- 
mandment is  :  Thou  shalt  never  write  about  what  thou  dost 
not  understand ! 

^  In  the  popular  edition  of  1903  some  of  the  worst  sins  of 
this  nature  are  corrected. 


MATERIALISM  97 

is  shown  by  B'dchner  in  his  Kraft  unci  Stoff. 
The  book  also  bears  witness  to  the  same 
obscurity  in  thought,  faihng  as  it  does  to  dis- 
tinguish between  Monism  and  Materialism,  and 
the  same  incapacity  to  see  and  follow  up  the 
real  difficulties  and  the  real  problems.  We 
can  understand  Paulsen'' s  saying  that  he  read 
this  book  burning  with  shame  at  the  condition 
of  general  and  philosophical  culture  of  our 
people.  That  such  a  book  should  be  possible 
— that  it  could  be  written,  printed,  sold,  read, 
admired,  and  believed  by  a  people  who  possess 
a  Kant,  a  Goethe,  a  Schojjenhauer,  is  painful. 
But,  as  a  matter  of  fact,  every  people  and  every 
period  have  the  literature  which  they  deserve. 
Let  us  comfort  ourselves  that  it  is  here  again 
the  irresponsible  crowd  which  to-day  honours 
Uaeckel  with  blind  enthusiasm,  while  perhaps 
yesterday,  it  revelled  in  the  Nietzsche  cult,  and 
the  day-before-yesterday  swore  by  Schopenhauer. 
The  judgment  of  the  crowd  is  not  of  much 
weight,  and  its  applause  has  ever  been  un- 
trustworthy and  compromising  to  the  philo- 
sopher whom  it  heralded. 

As  for  Materialism,  Friedrich  Albert  Lange, 
in  his  fine  book,  Geschichte  des  Materialismus 

G 


98     PHILOSOPHY   OF  THE   PRESENT 

(8th  ed.  1908),  has  treated  the  subject  histori- 
cally and  critically/  Within  certain  limits, 
Lange  approves  of  Materialism.  For  the  special 
sciences,  he  thinks  it  is  an  acceptable  stand- 
point. In  particular,  scientific  psychology  may 
proceed  from  the  presupposition  that  mental 
phenomena  are  wholly  conditioned  by  the  states 
and  activities  of  the  brain.  But  as  a  world- 
theory,  Lange  finds  Materialism  wholly  in- 
adequate ;  an  Idealism  based  upon  the  Kantian 
theory  of  knowledge  is  much  better  adapted  to 
this  end.  Knowledge  of  the  transcendent  is 
impossible.  Here,  only  poetry,  such  as  is  suited 
to  the  moral  and  religious  needs  of  mankind, 
can  supplement  oiu:  view.  But  the  ideal  world, 
thus  poetically  conceived,  stands,  in  Lange' 8 
opinion,  higher  than  all  objects  of  scientific 
knowledge,  and  is  at  the  same  time  indis- 
pensable to  all  human  progress.  Thus,  Lange, 
the  neo-Kantian  and  Positivist,^  draws  a  sharp 
distinction  between  scientific  knowledge  and 
poetry  directed  toward  the  ideal. 

In  general  it  is  characteristic  of  Materialism 

1  History  of  Materialism.     By  Friedrich  Albert  Lange.    Trans- 
lated by  Ernest  Chester  Thomas.     Triibner  &  Co.,  1880.— (Tk.) 
'  Compare  p.  34. 


MATEEIALISM  99 

that  it  has  no  respect  for  the  mental  sciences, 
their  methods  and  results,  and  that  it  does  not 
recognise  the  metaphysical  character  of  its  own 
pronouncements.  Psychological  judgment,  his- 
torical researches,  criticism  of  sources,  none  of 
these  does  Materialism  consider  it  necessary  to 
take  into  account,  with  reference  to  the  special 
sciences  in  question,  and  it  believes  that  it  is 
able  to  proceed  independently  of  all  of  them. 
There  is  only  one  science  which  it  blindly  trusts, 
and  which  it  holds  in  unbounded  respect,  and 
that  is  natural  science.  So  it  comes  about  that 
Materialism  over  hastily  sets  up  its  dogma  of 
the  exclusive  reality  of  nature,  of  its  forces, 
laws,  and  substance  ;  and  demands  the  reduc- 
tion of  all  other  phenomena,  given  in  experience, 
to  matter  and  its  properties.  It  is  unable  to 
see  that  this  proceeding  is  itself  metaphysical 
and  involves  an  overstepping  of  empirical 
bounds — an  anticipation  of  results  which  the 
special  sciences  have  not  yet  established. 
Furthermore,  it  lays  claim  to  the  same  degree 
of  scientific  validity  for  its  assertions  that 
purely  scientific  theories  and  laws  have  won 
for  themselves.  Matter  and  force  seem  without 
further  proof  to  be  real   magnitudes — indeed, 


100     PHILOSOPHY   OF  THE   PRESENT 

the  only  realities.  Its  theory  of  the  universe 
is,  therefore,  altogether  dogmatic,  since  the 
necessary  critical  basis  for  such  a  theory  is 
absent,  and  since  there  is  lacking  that  thoughtful 
reserve  of  judgment  concerning  questions  of 
doubt  which  is  characteristic  of  sound  philo- 
sophy. 

There  are  three  main  arguments  against 
Materialism  which  thus  far  have  put  in  question 
its  validity  and  shown  it  to  be  neither  a  self- 
evident  nor  empirically  proved  theory  of  the 
world.  The  first  of  these  arguments  is  taken 
from  natural  science.  According  to  the  law 
of  the  conservation  of  energy,  which  was  ad- 
vanced about  the  middle  of  the  nineteenth 
century,  and  which  has  since  received  universal 
recognition,  the  sum  of  potential  and  kinetic 
energy  in  a  closed  system  is  constant,  no  matter 
what  kind  of  energy  this  may  be.  If  we  dis- 
tinguish mechanical,  electrical,  thermic,  and 
chemical  energy,  then,  according  to  this  law, 
there  can  take  place  within  any  independent 
whole  only  an  exchange  or  a  transformation 
of  this  energy,  but  never  any  new  creation  or 
any  complete  disappearance  of  it.  Mechanical 
work  can  be  transformed  wholly  or  in  part  into 


MATERIALISM  101 

heat;  chemical  energy  may  replace  a  corre- 
sponding '  equivalent '  quantum  of  electrical 
energy ;  but  the  total  energy  at  our  disposal  can 
suffer  no  change  in  amount.  By  virtue  of  this 
law  of  conservation,  the  production  of  any 
conscious  states  through  material  processes 
would  indicate  a  loss  of  energy,  say  in  chemical 
form,  without  an  equivalent  amount  of  any 
other  known  form  of  energy  taking  its  place. 
The  materialistic  claims  come  in  conflict,  there- 
fore, with  a  fundamental  law  of  natural  science, 
Numerous  attempts,  of  course,  have  been  made 
in  the  interest  of  other  theories  to  discover  a 
causal  relation  between  body  and  mind,  but  of 
these  it  is  not  necessary  to  speak  here. 

A  second  argument  comes  from  psychology. 
Materialism  would  be,  at  any  rate,  a  workable 
hypothesis  for  psychology,  if  it  were  possible 
with  its  help  to  make  even  the  simplest  and 
most  easily  apprehended  psychical  processes 
intelligible.  But  it  has  been  repeatedly  noted 
that  the  sensation  of  red,  or  a  tone  of  a  definite 
pitch,  is,  as  such,  in  no  wise  more  intelligible 
from  the  fact  that  we  may  trace  it  back  to  some 
particular  activity  of  the  brain.  To  a  person 
born  blind,  for  instance,  the  most  careful  de- 


102     PHILOSOPHY   OF  THE   PRESENT 

scription  of  the  retina,  of  the  optic  nerve  and 
optic  centre,  and  the  most  complete  description 
of  all  the  processes  which  must  take  place  in 
these  organs  in  order  that  a  colour  sensation 
shall  arise,  can  give  no  idea  of  this  elementary 
psychical  process.  Mental  activities  must  be 
immediately  experienced  or  given  as  facts  of 
consciousness,  if  actual  knowledge  of  them  is 
to  be  gained,  and  they  are  present  and  compre- 
hensible only  for  the  subject  experiencing  them. 
Thus,  it  follows  that  we  can  gain  an  under- 
standing of  the  mental  life  of  others  only  on 
the  ground  of  our  own  experience,  and  can 
interpret  their  expressions  in  countenance, 
gestures,  and  language  only  according  to  our 
personal  experiences,  as  signs  of  definite  states 
of  consciousness.  Even  Biichner  is  obliged  to 
admit  that  we  do  not  know  how  a  nerve-process 
can  bring  about  a  state  of  consciousness.  From 
this  point  of  view,  therefore.  Materialism 
appears  to  be  an  impracticable  assumption  for 
psychology,  because  it  is  incapable  of  explaining 
psychological  facts.  The  conditioning  of  mental 
phenomena  by  material  processes,  particularly 
by  nervous  processes,  is  not  to  be  denied ;  but 
in  modern  psychology  this  demand  is  simply 


MATERIALISM  103 

and  satisfactorily  met  by  the  concept  of  a 
psyGhophysical  ijarallelism,  according  to  which 
the  mental  processes  are  accomjpanied  hy  phy- 
sical processes,  without  our  being  able  to 
determine  more  exactly  the  manner  of  this 
connection.^ 

The  most  exact  study  of  the  structure  and 
function  of  the  cerebral  cortex  enables  us,  at 
the  best,  to  advance  only  so  far  as  the  physics 
and  chemistry  of  stimuli  permit.  We  know 
that  the  sensation  '  red '  corresponds  to  light 
waves  of  a  certain  number  of  vibrations,  and 
we  assume  that  the  taste  '  sour '  is  connected 
with  the  chemical  constitution  of  matter,  to 
which  we  trace  it  back.  We  hope  sometime 
to  know  as  accurately  the  nature  of  the  brain- 
excitations  which  run  parallel  to  these  two 
sensations  ;  but  that  '  red  '  is  experienced  in 
the  former  case,  and  '  sour '  in  the  latter, 
remains  after  all  still  accidental — that  is,  it 
remains  a  simple  fact,  which  cannot  be  deduced 
from  the  physical  premises  but  which  may 
indeed  be  something  of  a  wholly  different  order. 
The  qualities  of  the  contents  of  consciousness 
are  not  deducible  from  matter,  and  so  psycho- 

1  Compare  p.  93. 


104     PHILOSOPHY   OF  THE   PRESENT 

physics  contents  itself  with  being  the  science 
of  the  interrelation  between  psychic  and  physi- 
cal processes,  to  the  end  that  we  may  bring  into 
connection  with  a  corresponding  state  of  brain- 
excitations  the  regular  appearance  and  dis- 
appearance, union  and  separation,  expansion 
and  contraction,  conservation  and  change  of 
sensations,  representations,  and  feelings, 

A  third  argument,  based  on  the  theory  of 
knowledge,  may  be  added  to  the  ones  just 
considered.  If  we  inquire  how  it  is,  after  all, 
that  we  arrive  at  the  assumption  of  such  things 
as  matter,  energy,  &c.,  we  may  make  the  general 
statement  that  these  concepts  serve  to  represent 
that  in  our  experience  which  is  independent 
of  us — that  which  belongs  to  an  independent 
uniformity  of  phenomena.  It  is  not  simply 
that  we  experience  blue  and  yellow,  tones  and 
odours,  but  that  we  have  impressions  of  this 
kind  in  a  determinate  order  of  co-existence, 
an  order  which  cannot  be  arbitrarily  changed 
by  us, — this  is  the  fact  which  leads  us  to  affirm 
a  real  outer  world  with  the  help  of  the  above- 
mentioned  concepts  of  matter  and  energy.  It 
is  not,  then,  the  sensations,  the  psychical  pro- 
cesses, the  contents   of  consciousness  as  such, 


MATERIALISM  105 

which  form  the  starting-point  of  all  scientific 
researches  and  concepts  and  allow  us  to  speak 
of  a  body  which  we  perceive  or  a  force  which 
works  upon  us,  but  it  is  rather  the  observation 
that  these  things  come  and  go,  change  or  re- 
main fixed,  are  absolutely  given  in  determinate 
order  and  grouping  without  any  dependence  upon 
us,  without  being  thought  of  as  our  creative  act ; 
in  other  words,  the  determining  feature  is  the 
connection  in  which  they  appear,  apart  from 
our  will  and  our  influence.  Such  a  connection 
is  forced  upon  the  sensations,  and  is,  thus, 
contingent  for  them.  In  the  sensations  them- 
selves, therefore,  we  are  not  able  to  discover  the 
reason  why  they  stand  in  certain  relations  and 
not  in  others.  And  just  as  little  can  this  reason 
be  found  in  the  experiencing  subject  who  lays 
claim  to  the  sensations  in  question  as  his 
contents  of  consciousness.^  From  this,  without 
further  discussion,  we  can  understand  that  the 
scientific  concepts  used  by  Materialism  essenti- 
ally lack  the  character  necessary  to  explain 
conscious  processes,  in  their  special  and  peculiar 
character.     Materialism  mistakes  completely  the 

*  Compare  p.  45. 


106     PHILOSOPHY   OF  THE   PRESENT 

purpose  and  significance  of  such  realities  as 
matter  and  energy,  when  it  extends  them  be- 
yond their  legitimate  field,  and  considers  them 
capable  of  generating  from  themselves  the  whole 
psychical  life. 


IV 

NATURALISM 

With  a  fateful  regularity  the  demand  is  made 
from  time  to  time,  that  we  should  be  natural 
and  live  naturally,  that  we  should  regard  our- 
selves as  a  part  of  nature,  that  we  should  obey 
nature's  laws  and  recognise  them  as  norms  for 
our  own  conduct.  Now,  when  we  hold  nature 
up  in  this  way  as  an  ideal  in  the  struggle  against 
the  unnatural,  or  against  what  is  contrary  to 
nature,  much  depends  upon  just  what  we  mean 
by  '  nature.'  When  the  Stoics  demanded  a 
life  according  to  nature,  they  had  in  mind  a 
rational  life  founded  upon  the  dominance  of 
the  highest  spiritual  faculties  of  human  nature. 
On  the  other  hand,  when  Bousseaii  preached  a 
return  to  nature,  he  had  reference  to  the  casting 
off  of  all  the  fetters  of  culture  and  returning 
to  the  child-land  of  innocent,  harmless,  and 
genuine  simplicity  and  happiness.  And  finally, 
still  another  colouring  is  given  to  Naturalism  in 

107 


108     PHILOSOPHY   OF  THE   PRESENT 

the  hands  of  its  chief  representatives  of  the 
nineteenth  century,  Ludwig  Feuerhach  and 
Friedrich  Nietzsche.  As  a  rule,  this  school  is 
somewhat  polemical  and  revolutionary,  standing 
in  the  strictest  opposition  to  prevailing  views 
and  combating,  as  a  matter  of  course,  all 
supernatural  tendencies.  A  theory  and  critique 
of  supernatural  worths  in  morals  and  in  religion 
forms  the  basis  for  the  establishment  of  a 
system  of  natural  worths,  which  are  to  take  the 
place  of  the  former.  Modern  Naturalism  thus, 
like  Materialism,  stands  under  the  dominating 
influence  of  the  natural  sciences. 

Ludwig  Feuerhach  (1804-1872)  has  summed 
up  the  stages  of  his  development  in  the  for- 
mula, "  God  was  my  first  thought ;  reason,  my 
second  ;  man,  my  third  and  last."  From  the 
beginning,  his  eflPorts  were  directed  to  establish- 
ing a  natural  history  of  religious  development. 
At  first,  therefore,  religion  is  conceived  as  an 
objectification  of  the  human  species,  as  a  self- 
gratification  of  man,  who  raises  his  own  being 
to  the  infinite,  and  thus  projects  himself  out- 
ward as  God.  So  God  becomes  the  realisation 
or  actuality  of  human  wishes  for  happiness, 
perfection,  and  immortality ;    he    becomes    the 


NATURALISM  109 

"  yea  of  our  desires."  Later,  Feuerbach  finds  in 
this  emphasis  of  that  which  is  typical  of  the 
race,  after  all,  merely  a  remnant  of  theological 
and  religious  conceptions,  and  demands  hence- 
forth of  true  philosophy  that  it  shall  be  em- 
pirical, that  it  shall  occupy  itself  only  with 
concrete  reality,  with  the  sensuous.  Therefore 
he  speaks  of  the  logical  concept  which  gives  ex- 
pression to  the  universal — that  is,  to  the  race — 
as  the  despair  of  the  poverty  of  thought  in  the 
presence  of  the  inexhaustible  riches  of  sensuous 
reality.  Philosophy,  as  the  doctrine  of  the 
sensuous,  must  connect  itself  closely  with 
natural  science.  Nevertheless,  the  most  im- 
portant object  of  sensuous  knowledge  is,  ac- 
cording to  him,  man;  and  not  indeed  the  general 
or  ideal,  but  the  corporeal  man.  The  body  of 
man  is  to  be  the  measure  of  all  things ;  and 
physiology,  as  the  science  of  bodily  functions, 
is  to  form  the  basis  of  philosophy.  It  is  quite 
comprehensible,  as  Feuerbach  himself  inciden- 
tally says,  that  the  peculiarity  of  his  philosophy 
is  that  it  is  no  philosophy.  In  religion  is  found 
the  simple  fundamental  truth,  that  man  is  a 
child  of  nature  and  a  part  of  nature,  and  has 
a  sense  of  his  connection  with  nature  and  the 


110     PHILOSOPHY   OF  THE   PRESENT 

world,  of  his  oneness  with  it,  of  his  mortality, 
and  his  dependence  upon  nature  and  its  laws. 

Naturalism  takes  an  individualistic  colouring 
with  Max  Stirner  (a  pseudonym  for  Kaspar 
Schmitt:  1806-1856),  who  with  Feuerhach 
wholly  renounced  all  supematuralism,  but  at 
the  same  time  proclaimed  the  most  decided 
egoism.  The  brilliant  success  of  his  book,  Der 
Einzige  unci  sein  Eigentum  (1845),  was,  to 
be  sure,  of  passing  significance ;  but  it  remains 
one  of  the  most  remarkable  works  in  German 
literature  of  the  period  after  Hegel,  and  is 
exciting  a  very  lively  interest  again  at  the 
present  time.  "  God  and  humanity,"  it  reads, 
"have  rested  their  cause  upon  nothing,  upon 
nothing  but  themselves.  I,  then,  shall  rest  my 
cause  likewise  upon  myself,  I,  who  am,  like 
God,  the  nothing  of  all  other  things,  I  who 
am  my  all,  I  who  am  the  only  one."  The  first 
part  of  the  work  contains  a  clever  critique  of 
the  various  human  conceptions  which  have  pre- 
vailed in  antiquity,  as  well  as  in  Christianity, 
and  among  the  "  free  spirits  "  in  political,  social, 
and  humane  spheres.  In  the  second  part,  the 
ego  takes  the  place  of  mankind.  "  In  posses- 
sion of  my  individuality,  I  am  master  of  my 


NxiTURALISM  111 

powers,  of  my  intercourse,  of  my  individual  en- 
joyment, and  this  I  attain  when  I  know  myself 
as  the  only  one."  "  The  only  one"  means,  thus, 
a  being-for-one's-self,  an  individuality,  the  fact 
that  one  lives  but  once.  From  this  limitation 
of  everything  to  the  self,  there  follows  an  egoism 
which  proclaims  that  each  one  lives  in  his  own 
world  and  is  its  centre.  Self-forgetfulness  is 
not  contradictory  to  this  egoism,  since  it  is 
only  a  kind  of  self-satisfaction,  an  enjoyment 
of  our  world  and  of  our  possessions.  Stirner 
thinks  that  we  have  renounced  our  individuality 
in  favour  of  the  humanity  idea,  and  have  over- 
looked the  fact  that  in  this  individuality  lies 
the  only  possible  reality  of  mankind.  My  right 
is  that  to  which  I  make  myself  entitled ;  my 
possession  is  that  which  I  can  master.  As 
enemies  of  myself,  of  my  ego,  I  count  every 
form  of  community — the  family,  the  state,  and 
society.  Toward  others  I  have  no  duty,  and 
before  no  power  do  I  humble  myself.  Truths 
which  claim  general  vahdity  are  just  phrases, 
modes  of  expression  and  words;  and  logic, 
science,  and  philosophy  are  nothing  more  than 
these  phrases  formulated  into  a  system.  Far 
more  am  I  the  measure   of  all;    truths  below 


112     PHILOSOPHY   OF   THE   PRESENT 

me,  I  love;  truths  above  me,  I  do  not  know. 
The  earth  swarms  with  fools  who  imagine  that 
they  are  sinners,  but  they  live  only  upon  the 
dreams  of  their  morbid  fancy.  I  know  that  we 
are  altogether  perfect.  "  If  I  rest  my  cause 
upon  myself,  the  only  one,  then  it  rests  upon 
that  which  is  transitory,  upon  the  mortal  self- 
creator  and  self-destroyer,  and  I  dare  to  say : 

Ich  hab'  mein'  Sach'  auf  Nichts  gestellt." 

It  is  doubtful  just  how  far  the  bold  and  un- 
couth utterances  of  this  book  are  to  be  taken 
seriously.  Perhaps  it  all  means  just  this,  that 
we  are  all,  consciously  or  unconsciously,  egoists. 
Let  us  examine  this  standpoint  fearlessly,  let  us 
seek  to  determine  logically  what  follows  there- 
from. Perhaps  withal  it  was  aimed  at  an 
unmasking  of  widespread  hypocrisy,  which  in 
self-denial,  compassion,  and  love  extolled  the 
higher  powers,  which  were  free  from  all  unholy 
reference  to  their  own  weal  and  woe,  and 
allowed  their  adherents  to  be  free,  and  which 
yet  was  not  free  from  egoistic  impulses  and 
motives.  It  must  be  admitted  furthermore  that 
the  book  betrays  an  original  individualism,  an 
incisive  and  powerful  protest  against  the  petty 


NATURALISM  113 

regulation  of  all  the  natural  impulses  and  needs 
of  the  individual,  who  knows  no  duty  and  no 
law,  but  with  free  and  independent  will  stands 
opposed  to  every  law  and  every  restraint.  This 
reaction  against  the  levelling  influence  of 
society,  of  the  state  and  of  culture,  has  found 
its  strongest  expression  in  Nietzsche,  who  knew 
how  to  uphold  the  interest  of  personality  with 
his  peculiar,  passionate,  and  captivating  lan- 
guage. The  powers  of  the  masses  which  regu- 
late, equalise,  and  reduce  evei^thing  to  the 
average ;  the  reign  of  lies  and  conventions ; 
the  limitation  of  conscious  desires  through  the 
influence  of  public  opinion ;  the  humility,  self- 
renunciation,  and  resignation  to  a  higher  will 
which  is  preached  by  religion, — these  are  the 
tendencies,  moods,  and  forces  against  which 
modern  Naturalism  is  directed.  Hand  in  hand 
with  the  personal  form  of  the  struggle,  goes  a 
tendency  to  paradoxes  and  exaggerations,  a 
constant  agitation  for  a  differently  constituted 
ideal  of  life,  and  an  unscientific  character  of 
argumentation  such  as  aims  at  persuading,  not 
at  convincing;  at  compelling,  not  at  establishing. 
In  what  follows,  these  general  remarks  will  have 
ample  illustration. 

H 


114     PHILOSOPHY   OF  THE   PRESENT 


FRIEDRICH   NIETZSCHE.     (1844-1900) 

Friedrich  Nietzsche,  following  Schajpenhauer 
and  Richard  Wagner,  two  authorities  held  in 
high  esteem  by  him,  originally  thought  and 
wrote  quite  in  their  vein.  After  the  beginning 
of  the  eighth  decade  of  the  nineteenth  century, 
his  own  views  appeared  in  various  works,^ 
clothed  in  a  half-poetic,  half-didactic  form.  In 
his  great  book  entitled  Also  sjyrach  Zarathustra,^ 
his  thoughts  are  mainly  poetical.  This  book 
was  pubHshed  in  1883-1891,  and  is  rich  in 
thought  and  sentiment.  Jenseits  von  Gut  und 
Bose^  published  in  1886,  presents  his  views  in 
a  strongly  aphoristical  character.  A  simpler, 
more  scientific  and  more  systematically  arranged 
presentation  is  given  in  his  Zur  Genealogie  der 

^  The  Works  of  Friedrich  Nietzsche.  Edited  by  Dr.  Oscar 
Levy,  18  vols.  The  Macmillan  Co.,  New  York.  T.  N.  Foulis, 
London.— (Tr.) 

^  Thus  Spake  Zarathustra.  Translated  by  A.  Title,  1896. 
The  Macmillan  Co.— (Tr.) 

T/ius  Spake  Znrathusfra.  Translated  by  Thomas  Common.  In- 
troduction by  Mrs.  Forster-Nietzsche.    The  Macmillan  Co. — (Tr.) 

^  Beyond  Good  and  Evil.  Prelude  to  a  Philosophy  of  the 
Future.  Translated  by  Helen  Zimmern.  The  Macmillan  Co., 
New  York.— (Tr.) 


NATURALISM  115 

Moral,^  published  in  1887,  which  was  designed 
to  be  explanatory  of  the  works  before  mentioned. 
The  best  account  of  his  whole  new  philosophy 
is  contained  in  his  book  Der  Wille  zur  Macht^ 
published  in  1901,  as  the  fifteenth  volume  of 
his  works. 

Of  the  extensive  literature  on  Nietzsche,  we 
call  attention,  first,  to  the  comprehensive 
biography  by  his  sister,  Elizabeth  Forster- 
Nietzsche,  entitled  Das  Lehen  Friedrich 
Nietzsches  (1895-1904).^  Further,  there  is  a 
finely  appreciative  study  by  Iliehl,  entitled 
Friedrich  Nietzsche,  der  Kihistler  und  Lenker 
(5th  ed.  1909)  ;  a  presentation  by  Lichtenherger, 
especially  recommended  by  Nietzsche's  sister, 
entitled  Die  Philosophie  Friedrich  Nietzsches 
(1899);  the  book  by  Th.  Ziegler,  following 
more  closely  the  development  of  the  philosopher, 
entitled  Friedrich  Nietzsche  (1900);  the  work 
of    R.    Bichter,    a    critical   exposition    of    the 

^  The  Genealogy  of  Monds.  Translated  by  Horace  B.  Samueln. 
The  Macmillan  Co.,  New  York.— (Tr.) 

^  The  Will  to  Power.  Translated  by  A.  M.  Lvdovici,  2  vols. 
The  Macmillan  Co.,  New  York.— (Tr.) 

^  A  supplementary  and  partly  corrective  exposition  is  found 
in  the  work  of  G.  A.  Bernouilli,  Franz  Overbeck  und  Friedrich 
Nietzsche.     Fine  Freundschaft  (2  vols.,  1908). 


116     PHILOSOPHY   OF  THE   PRESENT 

philosophical  content  of  Nietzsche's  teaching, 
entitled  Friedrich  Nietzsche,  sein  Lehen  U7id 
sein  Werk  (2nd  ed.  1909);  and  the  extensive 
work  of  A.  Brews,  containing  an  estimate  of 
Nietzsche's  whole  literary  activity,  entitled 
Nietzsches  Philosophie  (1904).  There  is  a 
complete  edition  of  his  works  in  two  parts,  of 
which  the  first  in  eight  volumes  includes  the 
writings  which  Nietzsche  himself  published  ; 
while  the  second  in  seven  volumes  contains 
fragments,  sketches,  and  notes  from  his  post- 
humous writings.  There  is  also  a  pocket 
edition  in  ten  volumes,  which  presents  the 
above-mentioned  work,  Ber  Wille  zur  Macht, 
in  a  second,  fully  revised  edition. 

The  task  which  Nietzsche  set  himself  in  the 
last  period  of  his  thinking,  he  himself  desig- 
nated as  the  revaluation  of  all  values.  "It  is 
my  good  fortune,  after  ages  of  error  and  con- 
fusion, to  have  again  found  the  way  which 
leads  to  a  Yea  and  a  Nay. 

"I  teach  the  Nay  to  all  that  makes  weak, 
that  exhausts. 

"  I  teach  the  Yea  to  all  that  strengthens, 
that  conserves  force,  that  justifies  the  feeling 
of  force. 


NATURALISM  117 

"Neither  the  one  nor  the  other  has  been 
taught  up  to  this  time.  Virtue,  self-renuncia- 
tion, compassion,  even  negation  of  life,  have 
been  taught ;  all  these  are  values  of  the 
exhausted." 

Before  we  fix  upon  a  new  valuation,  we  must 
have  full  insight  into  the  uselessness  of  the  old 
values,  we  must  go  through  a  "pathological 
intermediate  state,"  which  is  a  simple  nihilism 
of  prevailing  customs  and  beliefs. 

Extreme  positions  are  not  relieved  by  moderate 
ones,  but  only  by  extremes  which  are  their 
opposites.  Nihilism  attains  its  most  extreme 
form  in  the  assertion  that  everything  is  irra- 
tional, and  that  this  irrationality  is  eternal. 
The  pathology  of  this  view  consists  in  its 
vast  generalisation,. in  passing  from  a  relative 
to  an  absolute  senselessness. 

The  current  ruling  scale  of  values  determin- 
ing human  conduct  seemed  to  Nietzsche  to  be 
meaningless.  In  the  evaluation  of  our  times, 
virtues  like  veracity,  philanthropy,  goodness,  and 
helpfulness  are  highly  prized.  Even  Kant  and 
ScJw])enhauer,  very  critical  and  independent 
thinkers  in  other  respects,  show  reverence  for 
these  virtues.     But  with  Nietzsche  there  is  no 


118     PHILOSOPHY   OF  THE   PRESENT 

other  objective  standard  of  values  than  life  and 
vitality.  Life  is  ivill  to  jpoiver.  "  What  man 
wills,  what  each  smallest  part  of  a  living 
organism  wills,  that  is  a  surplus  of  power." 
In  another  place  we  read,  "  It  belongs  to  the 
concept  of  life  that  there  must  be  growth,  that 
its  power  must  be  widened,  and  so  must  take 
unto  itself  new  powers."  Therefore,  we  can 
undertake  a  determination  of  values  only  from 
the  standpoint  that  we  estimate  the  relation  of 
the  qualities  or  activities  to  be  valued  to  the 
"  quantum  of  increased  and  organised  power  " 
produced  by  them.  In  this  sense  there  are 
useful,  wholesome,  normal  instincts,  as  well  as 
injurious,  sick,  and  abnormal  ones,  of  which  the 
former  affirm  life  and  the  latter  deny  it.  There- 
fore, veracity,  goodness,  &c.,  are  to  be  opposed 
just  so  soon  as  they  become  detrimental  to 
vitality,  to  vigour.  Schiller  indeed  says  in  his 
Braut  von  Messina,  "Life  is  not  of  all  goods 
the  highest";  but  directly  the  opposite  view 
best  expresses  the  standpoint  here  taken  by 
Nietzsche :  "Of  all  goods  life  is  the  highest." 

Nietzsche  proceeds  to  subject  the  moral  views 
and  moral  judgments  which  have  arisen  under 
the  influence  of  Christianity  to  a  sharp  criticism. 


NATURALISM  119 

He  finds  in  these  "  a  turning  away  from  willing 
to  being."     He  believes   that  the  richest  and 
most  pregnant  impulses    of  life   have  hitherto 
been  denied,   so  that   over  life   there  hangs  a 
curse.     In  opposition  to  these  rejected  morals, 
Nietzsche,   "the  immoralist,"  labours  for  "the 
restoration  of  the  egoism  of  humanity."     There 
are,     according    to     him,    two     fundamentally 
different  forms  of  moral  evaluation  among  all 
people  and  in  all  times,  which  may  be  desig- 
nated  as  the    morals  of  the  masters  and  the 
morals  of  the  slaves,  aristocracy  and  democracy, 
individuaUsm  and   dominance   by  the    masses. 
The  representative  of  the  morals  of  the  masters, 
the  nobleman  and  gentleman,  calls  good  all  those 
^physical  and  moral  attributes  which  he  values 
in  himself  and  his  class :  strength,  might,  bold- 
ness,  austerity  toward  himself  and  others,  and 
even  cunning   and  cruelty.     He   has   duties   of 
thankfulness  and  fidelity  only  to  his  own  class, 
and  respects  the  tradition  in  which  he  has  been 
reared.     Weakness  and  cowardice  he  condemns  ; 
compassion   and   unselfishness  do   not  concern 
him.     His  emotions  are  pride  and  the  joy   of 
life.     His  type  is  characterised  as  "  the  genuinely 
good,  the  distinguished,  the  great  of  soul,  the 


120     PHILOSOPHY   OF   THE   PRESENT 

opulent,  those  who  do  not  give  in  order  to 
receive,  who  do  not  wish  to  be  exalted  because 
of  their  charitableness.  Lavishness  is  the  type 
of  genuine  goodness ;  richness  of  person  is  the 
presupposition."  Again,  he  praises  this  type  as 
"  the  sane,  sound,  self-seeking,  which  springs 
from  a  strong  soul,  to  which  belongs  the  stal- 
wart body,  the  fine,  victorious,  re-creative  body." 
Quite  otherwise  is  it  with  the  slaves.  They 
are  filled  with  a  mistrust  of  life,  and  with  an 
instinctive  hatred  of  the  mighty  who  pursue 
and  persecute  them.  These  seem  to  them  like 
barbarians,  the  very  type  of  evil ;  and  so  the 
weak  regard  as  evil  everything  powerful,  in- 
flexible, formidable,  and  strong.  On  the  con- 
trary, goodness  signifies  to  them  the  virtues 
despised  by  the  masters ;  compassion,  patience, 
humility,  benevolence,  industry.  In  Judaism 
and  Christianity  these  morals  of  the  slaves  have 
triumphed  over  the  morals  of  the  masters.  Here 
the  instinct  of  the  masses  has  found  a  bulwark 
against  the  strong  and  independent;  the  in- 
stinct of  the  suffering  and  downtrodden  has 
rebelled  against  the  fortunate ;  the  instinct  of 
the  common  man  has  found  its  justification 
against  the  elect. 


NATURALISM  121 

The  result  of  this  victory  of  the  morals  of 
the  slaves  over  those  of  the  masters  is,  as 
Nietzsche  believes,  decadence,  the  incontro- 
vertible symptom  of  which  is  a  lessening  of 
vitality,  visible  along  the  whole  line  of  creative 
and  effective  activity  of  life.  This  degeneracy 
does  not  necessarily  lead  to  destruction,  to  self- 
dissolution  ;  it  may  rather  be  the  point  of 
departure  for  new  life,  for  higher  power.  The 
goal  of  humanity  lies  not  in  its  end,  but  in  its 
highest  exemplars.  To  produce  such  men  will 
be  our  problem,  if  we  are  to  rise  superior  to 
nihihsm.  This  lofty  exemplar  of  the  human 
race,  who  represents  the  type  of  the  master, 
grand  and  ^o\\e\h\\,yietzsche  calls  the  superman. 
For  him  shall  the  man  who  avows  the  morals  of 
the  slaves  be  a  jest  and  a  laughing-stock.  The 
task  of  this  higher  race  consists  not  in  the 
guidance  of  the  lower;  it  is  rather  that  the 
lower  ones  form  the  pedestal  on  which  the 
superman  stands  and  from  which  he  pursues 
his  own  interests.  The  conditions  under  which 
a  strong  and  distinguished  species  maintains 
itself  are  the  reverse  of  those  under  which  the 
multitude  prolongs  its  existence.  What  is 
allowed    only  to  the    strongest  and  most  pro- 


122     PHILOSOPHY   OF  THE   PRESENT 

ductive  natures  to  make  their  existence  pos- 
sible— leisure,  adventure,  unbelief,  even  excess, 
would,  if  permitted  to  the  mediocre  natures, 
necessarily  destroy  them.  With  the  latter  class, 
industry  is  the  rule  and  temperance  and  fixed 
convictions — in  short,  the  virtues  of  the  multi- 
tude ;  by  these  is  the  mediocre  class  of  men 
perfected.  Even  after  the  successful  production 
of  supermen,  the  common  people  remain  the 
quiet  and  obedient  labourers,  whose  religion 
alleviates  the  misery  of  their  pitiful  lives.  But 
the  superman,  the  wise  one,  creating  values, 
must  be  inflexible  toward  himself  as  well  as 
toward  others — must  renounce  for  himself 
comfort,  rest,  and  the  quiet  enjoyment  of  life, 
and  yet  in  all  life's  conditions  he  must  show 
the  cheerfulness  of  the  good  player,  the  joyful 
innocence  of  the  romping  child,  the  bright 
grace  of  the  dancer. 

The  development  of  this  positive  theory  of 
the  goal  of  mankind,  the  rise  of  a  higher  type 
of  the  race,  alone  made  bearable  to  Nietzsche 
the  thought  (repeatedly  taught  in  Greek  philo- 
sophy) of  an  eternal  cycle  of  events — a  thought 
which  at  first  caused  him  many  sad  and  heavy 
hours.     According  to  this  view,  the  world  con- 


NATURALISM  123 

sists  of  a  limited  number  of  elements,  and  has 
at  its  disposal  a  limited  sum  of  energy.  There- 
fore, a  given  combination  must  repeat  itself  in 
an  endless  period  of  time.  But  if  a  certain 
cosmic  condition  which  formerly  existed  is 
again  reinstated,  then  according  to  the  law 
that  a  wholly  definite  effect  must  follow  upon 
given  determinate  causes,  it  would  involve  all 
the  other  conditions  which  had  previously 
followed  upon  it.  The  eternal  hour-glass  of 
being  will  always  be  turned  agahi.  There  is, 
then,  no  endless  progress,  no  unbroken  ascent 
to  higher  and  higher  goals,  but  all  the  steps 
already  mounted  must  ever  be  climbed  anew  ; 
all  the  mistakes  and  weaknesses  in  the  eternal 
cycle  of  events  must  be  repeated  without  end. 
Hence  also  the  practical  consequence  follows 
for  me,  that  this  life  which  I  now  live  is  my 
eternal,  my  ever-recurring  life.  This  thought, 
the  necessity  of  which  Nietzsche  believed  he 
could  not  escape,  was  made  endurable  to  him 
only  because  he  saw  therein  a  problem  set  for 
human  development.  Since  in  any  case  we 
must  live  again,  we  should  live  at  every  moment 
as  we  would  wish  to  live  again.  And  so  he 
admonishes  mankind :  "  Forget  not  that  thou 


124     PHILOSOPHY   OF   THE    PRESENT 

art  acting  for  all  eternity."  Has  life  the  highest 
values  to  offer?  Can  it  perfect  itself  according 
to  the  morals  of  the  masters  ?  Then  it  is  worth 
while  to  live  again ;  then  the  thought  of  an 
eternal  return  loses  its  painful  sting,  its  de- 
pressing weight, 

Nietzsche  himself  has  designated  his  views 
as  ethical  Naturalism,  He  regarded  it  as  his 
special  work  to  translate  the  moral  values,  which 
had  become  apparently  emancipated  and  un- 
natural, back  to  their  real  nature — that  is,  to 
their  natural  "  immorality."  Hence  he  is  pri- 
marily and  essentially  a  critic  of  existing  moral 
views  and  an  agitator  for  a  new  order  of  values. 
And  in  this  he  proceeds  as  most  agitators  do : 
he  caricatures  existing  conditions  and  exag- 
gerates in  a  one-sided  way  his  own  point  of 
view,  his  own  ideal.  The  morals  of  the  slaves 
which  he  pictures  have  never  ruled  anywhere. 
And  the  morals  of  the  masters,  as  he  conceives 
them,  have  never  existed,  and  presumably  never 
will. 

The  thought  of  a  natural  selection  in  the 
struggle  for  existence,  which  he  gained  from 
Darwin's  doctrine  of  organic  evolution,  forms 
the  basis  for  his  theory   of  the   cultivation   of 


NATURALISM  125 

supermen.  The  biological  point  of  view,  where- 
by all  phenomena  fall  under  the  rule  of  vital 
fitness,  is  of  supreme  significance  for  Nietzsche's 
doctrine  in  its  final  form.  Not  only  morality, 
all  conduct  and  behaviour,  but  also  knowledge, 
and  its  goal,  the  truth,  must  in  the  last  analysis 
prove  their  claims  before  this  tribunal.  There- 
fore, everything  has  a  relative  value  compared 
with  the  one  absolute  essential  of  life — that  is, 
vigorous  health,  and  the  free  exercise  of  the  will 
to  power.  Thus  Nietzsche  appears  as  the  cham- 
pion of  a  renaissance  of  antiquity,  which  has  so 
often  and  in  such  various  forms  celebrated  its 
revival.  Especially  does  the  opposition  between 
the  morals  of  the  masters  and  the  morals  of  the 
slaves  remind  us  of  the  views  of  the  ancients 
and  their  social  order,  and  of  the  flourishing 
of  the  bold  self-conscious,  forceful  natures  of 
the  period  of  humanism.  Nietzsche  may  be 
called  the  Rousseau  of  the  nineteenth  century, 
although  we  must  not  forget  that  his  ideas 
differ  materially  from  those  of  his  French  pre- 
decessor. He  himself  regarded  Rousseau  as 
"  an  exponent  of  self-contempt  and  fevered 
vanity,"  as  the  plebeian,  with  whom  he 
contrasts    Voltaire,    the    aristocrat.      He,    like 


126     PHILOSOPHY   OF   THE   PRESENT 

Rousseau,  demands  a  return  to  nature,  but 
"upward  to  the  high,  free,  even  fearful  nature 
itself  and  to  naturalness,  such  as  plays  with 
great  tasks  and  is  well  qualified  to  play." 

We  cannot  here  enter  upon  the  numerous 
difficulties  with  which  Nietzsche  s  thought-world 
is  burdened.  We  may  refer  to  only  one  striking 
contradiction.  On  the  one  hand,  he  is  evi- 
dently deeply  impressed  with  the  belief  in 
the  moral  self-determination  of  man,  since  he 
expressly  demands  that  we  shall  so  regulate 
our  lives  that  we  may  be  willing  to  be  forced 
to  repeat  them.  On  the  other  hand,  his  theory 
rests  upon  a  rigid  fatalism  (he  himself  inciden- 
tally pleads  guilty  to  an  amor  fati),  which  is 
apparent  not  only  in  his  theory  of  the  necessary 
production  of  higher  individuals,  but  also  in  his 
assumption  of  a  mechanical  world-cycle.  This 
contradiction  between  two  fundamentally  ex- 
clusive views  becomes  more  incisive  when  we 
consider  that  Nietzsche  could  not  at  all  be  sure 
whether  his  life  and  that  of  his  associates,  the 
whole  creation  of  which  he  was  a  part,  had  not 
already  been  acted  out. 

The  immoderate  way  in  which  he  directs  his 
attacks  against  the  religion  of  love  and  com- 


NATUKALISM  127 

passion,  against  social  endeavours  and  social 
sentiments,  is  entirely  incompatible  with  his 
professed  wish  that  his  influence  upon  mankind 
should  be  reformatory,  educative,  and  elevating. 
Since  Nietzsche  is  described  by  his  sister  as  one 
of  the  most  considerate  and  amiable  of  men, 
he  himself  was  evidently  not  the  proud  super- 
man whom  he  longed  for,  who,  remorseless  and 
without  scruple,  tramples  upon  the  ruined  lives 
of  the  weary  and  heavy-laden,  of  the  weak  and 
the  sick.  But  Nietzsche  himself,  as  we  know, 
was  a  great  sufferer,  and  perhaps  for  this 
reason  he  felt  intensely  the  worth  of  vigorous 
health  and  the  joys  of  life  which  were  denied 
him,  and  which  he  experienced  only  in  hours 
of  overflowing  productivity ;  and  this  fact  may 
have  lent  to  his  ideal  a  decided  colouring. 

Without  doubt,  Nietzsche  is  one  of  the  most 
gifted  authors  of  all  times,  and  from  aesthetic 
and  psychological  view-points  deserves  the 
very  highest  esteem.  He  belongs  to  those 
poet-philosophers  who,  like  Plato  and  Bruno, 
cultivated  philosophy  not  in  a  scientific  spirit, 
but  rather  in  the  spirit  of  the  poet  and  artist, 
who  are  able  to  depict  life  and  the  world 
with  intuitive  clearness,  and  to  present  them 


128     PHILOSOPHY   OF  THE   PRESENT 

in  warm  and  inspiring  language.  The  sterner 
philosophical  disciplines,  such  as  logic  and 
the  theory  of  knowledge,  Nietzsche  touched 
upon  only  casually,  and  never  gave  himself  up 
to  their  problems  with  original  interest ;  and  in 
the  other  branches  which  he  liked  to  cultivate, 
such  as  metaphysics  and  ethics,  he  has  no  exact 
results  to  offer.  We  cannot  call  him,  therefore, 
really  a  philosopher.  Life  was  his  problem, 
and  his  heartfelt  interest  was  the  determination 
of  life's  value  and  of  life's  problems.  This  is 
the  only  theme  which  his  thought  mastered, 
and  this  theme  he  was  able  with  astonishing 
versatility  of  spirit  to  express  in  every  form  of 
variation,  from  the  lowest  to  the  most  ideal. 
What  life  and  science,  religion  and  art,  past 
and  present,  really  are,  and  what  laws  control 
them — these  theoretical  questions  trouble  him 
only  in  so  far  as  they  are  related  to  his  funda- 
mental problem  of  life. 

Nietzsche's  greatest  and  most  enduring  fame 
is  as  an  artist  and  as  a  highly  gifted  musical 
poet.  Long  after  his  unjust  warfare  against 
Christianity,  his  contradictory  theories  which 
do  violence  to  facts,  his  clumsy  constructions 
and  exaggerations,  have  been  forgotten,  he  will 


NATUKALISM  129 

be  remembered  as  one  of  the  greatest  German 
stylists,  as  a  poet  of  powerful  diction,  as  a 
master  of  language  and  of  musical  declamation 
in  words  ;  and  as  such  we  shall  admire  him  and 
enjoy  him.  To  be  sure,  not  all  registers  of  the 
author's  art  are  open  to  him.  He  lacks  grand 
simplicity  and  plainness,  he  lacks  quiet  and 
rich  beauty  ;  he  lacks  the  grandeur  of  deep  and 
blessed  peace ;  he  lacks  the  Olympic  clearness, 
harmony,  and  serenity.  He  storms  and  under- 
scores  too  much  ;  he  is  -toc-patjxrtic  and  too 
restless.  When  we  read  him,  we  are  moved 
not  by  classic  but  by  romantic  art ;  he  transfers 
us  to  the  rococo-mood,  not  to  that  of  the 
Renaissance ;  he  incites  in  us  dramatic  tension 
and  lyric  stress,  while  he  lacks  epic  calm  and 
exuberance.  But  he  is  a  master  of  his  art, 
and  we  might  call  him,  in  a  certain  sense,  the 
Richard  Wagner  of  German  prose.  His  aphor- 
isms, sui'e  of  aim  and  rich  in  meaning,  stride 
in  pomp  and  splendour,  with  effective  and 
surprising  turns.  And  the  truth  which  lives  in 
all  poetry  thrills  us  here  also.  But  art  solves 
the  problems  of  reality  as  little  as  it  does  the 
problems  of  science.    The  saga  of  the  superman, 

of  the  eternally  recurring  cycle  of  events,   of 

I 


130     PHILOSOPHY   OF  THE   PRESENT 

the  morals  of  the  slaves  and  the  morals  of  the 
masters,  have  power  to  stir  us  and  thrill  us, 
when  we  place  ourselves  under  the  spell  of  his 
art.  But  for  a  revaluation  of  all  values,  some- 
thing more  is  necessary  than  prophetic  words 
and  personal  moods.  New  values,  in  order  to 
gain  acceptance,  must  have  been  lived  for  and 
died  for,  and  must  be  concurrent  with  the  dissolu- 
tion of  the  old  values.  But  it  is  still  far  from 
evident  that  "  life  "  or  "  the  will  to  power  "  is  the 
unconditional  worth  which  is  to  be  considered 
as  the  goal  of  all  striving  and  all  evaluation. 
Unless  all  signs  fail,  the  vitality  of  the  old 
values  is  still  unweakened  and  unbroken. 

However  much  we  may  wish  that  Nietzsche 
should  be  understood  and  enjoyed  in  the  field 
in  which  he  lias  excelled,  nevertheless  it  is  true 
that  his  influence  has  not  taken  those  quiet 
paths  where  such  admiration  and  understanding 
would  be  harmless.  His  influence  tends  always 
to  lead  astray  the  immature  crowds  of  his  fol- 
lowers, exulting  in  his  phrases  and  catchwords, 
which  they  only  half  understand.  It  seems  as 
if  it  was  not  for  the  wise  that  he  wrote  his  mys- 
terious parables,  his  pensive  poetry,  his  glittering 
paradoxes,  but  for  the  credulous  fools  who  revel 


NATURALISM  131 

in  his  speeches  and  make  absm*d  attempts  to 
realise   his  dream  of  the  superman.     But  his 
own  time  will  come,  when  we  shall  revere  him 
as  a  poet,  whose  original  pictures  and  compari- 
sons, whose  enchanting  pathos  and  vital  warmth 
of  expression,  whose  complete  mastery  over  a 
certain  music  of  language,  will  give  him  a  place 
of  honour  upon  the  German  Parnassus.     Then 
we  shall  welcome  his  criticisms  just  so  far  as 
they  point  to  actual  evils,  and  in  his  fantasies 
we  shall  hear  the  noble  song  of  the  rights  and 
the  value  oijjersonality.     Then  we  shall  recog- 
nise in  his  judgments  and  descriptions  the  direct 
expression  of  an  original  and  significant  sensi- 
bility, a  proud  ideal  of  heroic  thought  and  noble 
independence,    and  a   stern    protest    against   a 
ban*en  levelling  process  and  an  inw^ard  lack  of 
freedom.     But  in  view  of  the  wild  eruptions  of 
his  unbridled  spirit,  the  cry  will  be  wrung  from 
us  as  in  Hmnlet,  "What  a  noble  mind  is  here 
o'erthrown ! "     We   shall  not  forget,  however, 
that  Hamlet  chose  the  mask  of  madness  in  order 
to   ferret  out  a  monstrous  truth,  and  that  he 
made  use  of  the  dramatic  art  in  order  to  force 
the  self-revelation  of  a   secret   of  the  human 
heart,  slumbering  in  concealment.     Nietzsche  is 


132     PHILOSOPHY   OF   THE   PRESENT 

the  truth- seeker  in  the  garb  of  the  erring  and 
stumbling  man,  who  with  restless,  passionate 
effort  sought  the  ideal  goal  of  understanding, 
and  delayed  to  test  the   safety  of  the   ground 
over  which  he  hastened.     "  This  passion  for  the 
true,  the  real,  the  certain,  the  non-phenomenal, 
how  angry  I  am  with  it !  "  he  once  cried.     "  Why 
does  precisely  this   gloomy  and  vehement  op- 
pressor pursue  me  1     I  long  for  rest,  but  he  will 
not   allow   it."     Overheck,    one  of  his   nearest 
friends,  declared  that  the  striving  after  greatness 
really  controlled  him,  but  that  his  greatest  gift 
was  that  of  a  critic,  a  gift  directed  not  the  least 
against  himself.     "  Anyone  who  had  such  a  fine 
and  critical  talent,  and  directed  it,  as  he  did,  so 
exclusively  and  vehemently  against  himself,  must 
end  in  madness  and  self-destruction." 

x\gainst  Naturalism  in  general  the  following 
objections  may  be  urged.  It  does  not  follow, 
because  the  traditional  views  as  to  the  origin 
of  religion  and  morality  may  be  wrong,  that 
religion  and  morality  themselves  are  wrong. 
Granting  that  the  description  which  Feuerhach 
and  Nietzsche  give  of  the  origin  of  religion  and 
of  the  moral  teachings  of  Christianity  is  correct, 


NATURALISM  133 

it  would  not  necessarily  follow  that  these  con- 
victions or  principles  are  themselves  incorrect. 
Furthermore,  it  is  much  to  be  feared  that  the 
Naturalism  of  a  Feuerhach  or  a  Nietzsche,  if 
it  should  become  a  dominant  and  successful 
theory,  would  not  conduce  to  human  progress, 
but  to  quite  the  opposite.  We  should  return 
to  the  level  of  animals,  if,  according  to  the  last 
phase  of  Feuerhach' s  thought,  we  were  to  place 
our  bodily  needs  above  our  character  and  duty, 
or  if,  with  Nietzsche,  we  should  regard  life  at 
any  price  as  the  criterion  of  highest  value,  by 
which  all  other  good  is  to  be  measured.  But 
the  fact  is  that  Naturalism  means  the  end  of 
all  real  philosophy.  With  Feuerhach  it  passes 
over  into  empirical  observation  or  natural 
science ;  with  Nietzsche,  into  agitation  or  the 
unsettling  of  all  standards.  In  this  way. 
Naturalism  renounces  not  only  a  comprehensive 
world-theory,  but  attacks  the  foundation  of 
the  special  sciences,  and  indeed  all  attempts 
at  scientific  understanding  and  explanation. 
Knowing,  thinking,  understanding  become 
only  means  to  an  end ;  they  are  only  mani- 
festations of  life  like  any  other,  and  lose  their 
distinctive  meaning,  absolutely  fundamental  for 


134     PHILOSOPHY   OF  THE   PRESENT 

the  investigator  and  philosopher.  Although  a 
most  significant  phenomenon  in  the  history  of 
culture,  Naturalism  in  its  scientific  relations 
has  always  been  of  slight  value.  It  has  roused 
and  stimulated,  brought  thoughts  and  moods 
into  flux,  but  it  has  solved  no  problems,  really 
answered  no  questions.  It  resembles  a  wind- 
storm which  purifies  the  air,  shakes  decaying 
fruit  and  withered  leaves  from  the  trees,  but 
brings  with  it  no  life-bearing  and  fructifying 
seeds. 


IDEALISM 

When  I  make  the  statement :  The  sun  is  ninety 
million  miles  distant  from  the  earth,  I  mean 
that  the  sun,  the  earth,  and  the  distance  between 
them  are  real.  The  reality  which  is  thereby 
expressed,  and  which  is  ascribed  to  certain  ob- 
jects, has  nothing  to  do  with  the  truth  of  my 
judgment  or  of  my  statement,  since  the  latter 
relates  only  to  my  knowledge  of  an  object,  not 
to  the  object  itself.  Just  as  little  is  it  identical 
with  the  conscious  reality  of  the  fact  expressed. 
For  I  am  not  thinking  of  the  dazzling  orb,  nor 
of  the  ground  at  my  feet,  nor  of  the  distance 
measured  by  my  glance  between  myself  and 
that  orb,  but  of  heavenly  bodies,  whose  size, 
constitution,  and  distance  from  each  other  can 
only  be  fixed  and  determined  conceptually  in 
words  and  numbers. 

Precisely  the   same   is    true   in    other  cases. 
If  I  speak  of  the  vibrations  of  the  ether  which 

135 


136     PHILOSOPHY   OF  THE   PRESENT 

correspond  to  the  colours  that  we  see  ;  or  of 
the  chemical  analysis  of  bodies  into  elements 
and  atoms ;  or  assume,  according  to  the  theory 
of  evolution,  the  development  of  higher  animal 
forms  from  lower  ones  ;  or  refer  to  character  as 
one  of  the  mainsprings  of  human  action ;  or 
speak  of  Aristophanes  as  the  most  important 
representative  of  Attic  comedy : — in  all  these 
cases  I  am  thinking  always  of  realities,  not  of 
ideas  or  sensations,  nor  indeed  of  contents  of 
consciousness.  All  of  the  concepts  and  expres- 
sions of  which  I  make  use  in  such  statements, 
manifestly  imply  a  reference  to  independent  exist- 
ences not  conditioned  by  our  thinking,  hearing, 
seeing,  and  understanding — existences  whose 
essential  being  is  only  indicated  and  not  exhaus- 
tively defined  in  the  contents  of  consciousness, 
no  matter  what  the  nature  of  those  contents 
may  be. 

If  we  divide  all  the  sciences,  according  to  a 
current  classification,  mio  formal  and  real  dis- 
ciplines, we  can  say  that  in  all  the  real  sciences 
such  realities  play  an  important  part.  With 
the  formal  disciplines,  logic  and  mathematics,  on 
the  other  hand,  the  question  of  the  real  signi- 
ficance of  their  objects  is  of  no  import.     The 


IDEALISM  137 

meaning  of  logical  and  mathematical  expressions 
and  laws  is  as  little  affected  by  the  conception 
of  magnitude  as  an  attribute  of  real  objects,  or 
of  judgments  as  real  thought-processes,  as  by 
the  opposite  view.  In  the  sciences  of  nature 
and  of  mind,  however,  as  well  as  in  metaphysics, 
a  reality  is  always  taken  for  gi-anted,  and  an 
attempt  made  to  determine  it  more  exactly  as 
to  its  kind.  If  now,  in  the  field  of  the  real 
sciences,  following  the  lead  of  the  positivists, 
we  take  our  stand  simply  on  the  conscious 
reality  of  sensations,  ideas,  and  thoughts,  then 
we  see  that  the  traditional  point  of  view  of 
natui'e  and  of  mind,  as  well  as  of  metaphysics, 
is  a  gratuitous  assumption  of  an  uncritical  fancy, 
unavoidable  perhaps,  but  nevertheless  unjustifi- 
able. In  contesting  all  such  realities,  in  elimi- 
nating them  from  scientific  knowledge,  the  anti- 
metaphysical  tendency,  %Yhich  we  have  learned 
to  value  in  Mach,  asserts  itself.  And  in  fact, 
metaphysics  has  been  trying,  from  ancient  times 
to  the  present,  to  determine  the  reality  of  the 
objects  of  our  knowledge  and  the  being  of  the 
world.  When  Plato  pictui-es  Ideas  as  the  abid- 
ing, the  unchangeable,  the  essential,  as  opposed 
to   the   transitory  and  illusory  images   of  the 


138     PHILOSOPHY   OF  THE   PRESENT 

senses;  when  Leibniz  thinks  of  the  whole 
cosmos  as  consisting  of  monads,  simple  beings, 
which  are  equipped  with  ability  to  represent  the 
whole  world,  we  are  here  met  by  earnest  meta- 
physical eiforts  to  escape  from  all  the  decep- 
tion and  instability  of  the  senses,  and  from  all 
partial  or  accidental  views,  and  to  arrive  at  a 
unified  and  reliable  world-theory.  If  the  result 
of  these  efforts  is  the  hypothesis  that  the  world 
in  the  final  analysis  is  composed  of  psychic  values 
which  are  thought  of  after  the  analogy  of  the 
facts  of  mental  Hfe  given  in  our  inner  experience, 
then  we  speak  of  an  idealistic  metaphysics,  or 
of  a  pure  Idealism.  An  IdeaHsm  of  this  kind  is 
found  in  Plato  and  Leibniz ;  it  has  also  become 
the  foundation  of  a  modern  metaphysics. 

Of  a  different  nature  is  the  epistemological 
Idealism  represented  by  Kant  and  many  of  his 
followers,  and  especially  by  the  modern  neo- 
Kantians.  This  Idealism  emphasises  the  fact 
that  knowledge  is  a  product  of  mind,  of  reason ; 
that  it  contains  ideal  factors,  and  is  therefore 
not  in  position  to  comprehend  objects  accessible 
to  our  experience  as  these  objects  are  in  them- 
selves independent  and  detached  from  such 
factors.     Hence  the  known  world  is  perception, 


IDEALISM  139 

intuition,  representation,  idea,  or  the  totality  of 
such  actual  facts,  but  the  world  in  itself  remains 
an  empty  notion,  which  cannot  be  filled  with  a 
definite  content — ^just  an  eternal,  insurmount- 
able boundary  of  knowledge.  This  doctrine, 
which  is  also  called  transcendental  or  critical 
Idealism,  naturally  shuts  out  metaphysics,  as 
the  science  of  things-in-themselves,  whether  it 
bears  an  idealistic  or  materialistic  character,  and 
belongs  thus  far  to  the  circle  of  Positive  theories.^ 
It  is  by  no  means  true,  however,  as  I  have 
attempted  to  show  in  another  place, ^  that  this 
phenomenalism,  this  limitation  of  all  knowledge 
to  appearances,  makes  metaphysics,  as  a  real 
science,  impossible. 

The  difference  between  the  older  Idealism 
and  the  idealistic  metaphysics  of  the  present 
consists  principally  in  this,  that  the  latter  wins 
its  results  by  an  entirely  different  method. 
The  method  which  Leibniz,  for  example,  used 
as  a  basis  for  his  doctrine  of  monads,  was  the 
analysis  of  the  definition  of  the  idea  of  sub- 
stance, and  with  this  definition  he  begins  his 

^  Compare  p.  33  f . 

*  Compare  my  work  on  Ivvmanuel  Kant  (p.  146),  in  the  series, 
Av^  Natur  unci  Geistesivelt, 


140     PHILOSOPHY    OF   THE   PRESENT 

work.  He  was  fully  convinced  that  if  we  can 
establish  and  carry  through  non-contradictory 
judgments  concerning  a  given  object,  this  is 
entirely  sufficient  to  give  reality  to  the  object 
on  which  these  judgments  have  fallen.  If  jt 
were  possible  to  define  the  idea  of  God  in  such 
a  way  that  no  logical  contradiction  should  arise 
in  the  concepts  used,  then  the  reality  of  a 
divine  Being  would  at  once  be  proved.  As  a 
result  of  this  obliteration  of  the  difference  be- 
tween formal  and  real  disciplines,  a  deductive 
method  such  as  that  used  in  geometry,  based 
on  certain  definitions  and  axioms,  would  be 
regarded  as  valid  also  in  metaphysics  and  as 
yielding  trustworthy  results. 

This  belief  in  the  similarity  of  metaphysics 
and  mathematics  was  expressly  shattered  by 
Kant.  Apart  from  experience,  empirical  obser- 
vation, and  research,  there  is,  according  to  him, 
no  knowledge  in  the  real  sciences.  Since  now  any 
special  kind  of  experience — such,  for  instance, 
as  intellectual  intuition — is  not  at  the  command 
of  metaphysics ;  and  since  it  treats  in  pure 
conceptual  form  of  the  transcendent,  of  things 
which  lie  beyond  the  boundaries  of  possible 
experience,  therefore,  according  to  this  defini- 


IDEALISM  141 

tion,  it  could  not  be  a  science.  In  spite  of 
this,  in  the  post-Kantian  philosophy  there  was 
a  return  to  metaphysical  definitions  and  specula- 
tion. Schopenhauer,  for  example,  found  the 
essence  of  the  world  in  Will,  and  believed  that 
he  had  avoided  Kanfs  critique  of  all  meta- 
physics, in  that  he  proclaimed  a  special  in- 
tuitive experience  as  the  empirical  point  of 
departure  for  the  fundamental  principle  of  his 
metaphysics. 

About  the  middle  of  the  nineteenth  century, 
a  new  method  in  metaphysics  was  deliberately 
demanded  and  adopted  for  the  purpose  of  estab- 
lishing a  theory  of  the  world.  It  rested  upon 
the  unreserved  recognition  of  the  work  of  the 
special  sciences,  as  an  intermediary  between 
experience  and  a  theory  of  the  world.  It  re- 
nounced, furthermore,  any  claim  to  a  special 
philosophical  method,  or  to  any  method  ig- 
noring the  several  sciences.  The  first  clear 
statement  of  this  new  standpoint  is  found  in 
Fechner.  It  bears  the  name  of  a  theoretical 
principle,  and  is  as  follows : 

"  It  is  necessary  to  start  with  the  largest 
possible  circle  of  experience  in  the  field  of 
existence,  in  order  that  by  generalising,  widen- 


142     PHILOSOPHY   OF  THE   PRESENT 

ing,  and  extending  the  point  of  view  which  we 
here  employ,  we  may  attain  to  a  view  of  what 
prevails  in  those  other,  broader,  and  higher 
fields  of  existence,  to  which,  on  account  of 
their  distance,  our  experience  does  not  extend ; 
or  which  reach  above  and  beyond  our  experi- 
ence because  of  their  breadth  and  height.  But 
in  this  excursion  beyond  the  field  of  the  em- 
pirical, we  must  take  care  always  to  employ 
our  generalisations,  extensions,  and  enlargements 
only  in  the  sense  and  in  the  manner  in  which 
they  have  already  been  employed  in  the  field 
of  the  empirical.  Thus,  we  shall  claim  nothing 
as  valid  in  the  other,  wider,  and  higher  sphere 
which  does  not  become  correspondingly  more 
generalised,  widened,  and  extended  the  wider 
and  higher  we  direct  our  gaze  in  the  field  of 
the  empirical;  and  thus  we  shall  make  full 
allowance  for  the  difi'erences  which  are  due  to 
the  greater  distance,  extent,  and  height  of  the 
other  sphere," 

In  his  principal  metaphysical  work,  Zend- 
Avesta,  which  appeared  in  1851,  Fechner  had 
already  employed  this  methodological  principle, 
and  had  declared  that  "  generalisation  by  induc- 
tion and  analogy,  and  the  rational  combination 


IDEALISM  143 

of  the  common  elements  gathered  from  different 
sides,"  was  the  only  theoretical  way  which  could 
lead  to  relatively  safe  and  practical  results  in 
metaphysics.  That  he  was  fully  conscious  of 
his  divergence  from  the  older  method  is  shown 
in  his  declaration  that  "  It  is  not  a  preconceived 
idea  of  God  which  determines  God's  existence, 
but  whatever  of  God  can  be  perceived  in  the 
world  and  in  us." 

Thus  was  gained  the  notion  of  an  inductive 
metaphysics,  which  was  safe  from  the  attack  of 
Kant's  critique,  because  it  was  immediately 
connected  with  the  special  sciences,  and  made 
no  use  of  the  sharp  distinction  between  the 
immanent  and  transcendent  which  Kant  pre- 
supposed in  his  critique  of  metaphysics.  Pre- 
cisely the  same  standpoint  was  taken  later  by 
Ediiard  von  Hartinann,  in  his  Philosophy  of  the 
Unconscious  published  in  1869,  when  he  de- 
clared that  he  had  arrived  at  his  conclusions 
by  the  "  inductive  scientific  method."  Wuiidt  is 
governed  by  a  similar  conception,  and  Erhardt 
in  hisMetaphysik,  published  in  1894,  has  yielded 
likewise  to  the  demand  for  an  inductive  proce- 
dure. According  to  this  demand,  metaphysics 
has  the  task  of  carrying  further  the  work  of  the 


144     PHILOSOPHY   OF   THE   PRESENT 

special  sciences,  by  anticipating  the  results  of 
careful  detailed  researches,  by  deciding  between 
opposing  views,  by  uniting  the  separate  paths  of 
the  different  sciences,  and  in  short  by  seeking 
to  draw  a  complete  world-picture.  All  of  this 
takes  place  on  a  smaller  scale  and  within 
narrower  limits  in  the  special  sciences  them- 
selves, so  that  an  inductive  metaphysics  in  its 
scientific  character  offers  nothing  especially  new. 
To  be  sure,  with  the  recognition  of  the  greater 
uncertainty  of  such  anticipations,  decisions, 
and  combinations,  there  is  connected  a  more 
modest  conception  of  the  validity  and  signi- 
ficance of  metaphysical  assertions.  But  this 
attitude  is  certainly  to  be  preferred  to  the 
obtuseness  and  indifference  of  Agnosticism,  or 
the  proud  resignation  of  Positivism,  in  the 
presence  of  the  great  world-riddles. 

Modern  Idealism,  which  in  general  discerns 
the  reality  of  the  world  in  something  like  soul 
or  mind,  is  fully  convinced  that  natural  science 
and  the  science  of  mind  have  furnished  and 
must  furnish  the  necessary  work  preliminary 
to  such  a  metaphysics ;  and  that  one  must 
acquire  an  intimate  knowledge  of  this  prelimi- 
nary work  if  one  proposes  to  attempt  a  meta- 


IDEALISM  145 

physical  extension  of  its  results.  At  the  present 
time,  such  an  Idealism  is  represented  by  a  large 
number  of  philosophers.  We  may  mention, 
for  instance,  Julius  Bergmann,  who  has  pre- 
sented in  his  System  des  ohjectiven  Idealismus, 
published  in  1903,  certain  characteristic  features 
of  an  idealistic  theory  of  the  universe.  Accord- 
ing to  him,  the  material  world  is  "in  the  nature 
ascribed  to  it  by  mathematico-empirical  science, 
a  content  of  consciousness  embracing  in  itself 
as  parts  of  itself  all  simple  conscious  beings." 
Only  a  being  which  perceives  itself,  as  Bergmann 
seeks  to  show,  can  have  existence,  and  there 
exists  a  multiplicity  of  things  which  can  be 
thought  of  only  as  parts  of  one  and  the  same 
thing.  As  a  consequence,  all  realities  must  be 
conscious  unities,  and  these  again  members  of 
a  universal  consciousness.  The  conviction  of 
the  immediate  and  exclusive  self-certainty  of 
all  that  is  given  in  our  consciousness  forms 
the  avowed  presupposition  of  this  Idealism, 
developed  throughout  in  a  strictly  dialectical 
manner. 

Rudolf  Eucken  has  undertaken  to  construct 
an  objective  Idealism  in  another  form.  Of  his 
numerous  writings,  we  may  mention  particularly 


146     PHILOSOPHY   OF   THE   PRESENT 

Der  Kampf  um  einen  geistigen  Lehensinhalt : 
Neue  Grundlegung  einer  JVeltanschauung  (1896, 
2nd  ed.  1907).  Over  against  all  the  limitations 
of  nature  and  all  her  laws,  which  he  never  dis- 
parages or  contests,  Eucken  seeks  to  show  the 
independence  of  the  mind.  For  this  purpose, 
he  attempts  an  analysis  and  evaluation  not  only 
of  personal  striving  and  realisation,  and  the 
peculiar  development  and  tendencies  of  the 
individual,  but,  above  all,  of  the  historical  ob- 
jective significance  of  art,  science,  and  religion. 
Mind  appears  as  an  inner  movement  of  the  all, 
as  a  universal  and  endless  force  which  through 
self-activity  generates,  maintains,  and  advances 
itself.  With  the  multiplicity  and  antagonism  of 
the  separate  mental  currents,  there  co-operates 
a  superior  unity  of  the  whole,  leading  and 
controlling  these  currents,  making  possible  their 
progress  and  determining  its  nature.  The  fact  of 
a  spirituality  overcoming  all  opposition  insures 
the  absoluteness,  originality,  and  independence 
of  mental  life.  Here  Idealism  becomes  not  merely 
a  theory  but  at  the  same  time  a  problem,  as  with 
/.  G.  Fichte ;  indeed  idealistic  reality  is  nothing 
but  the  solution  of  this  problem,  the  result  of  a 
striving  after  ideal  ends.     Eucken,  however,  has 


IDEALISM  147 

found  the  inductive  foundations  of  his  Idealism 
not  in  the  inner  experiences  of  the  individual, 
but  rather  in  those  of  objective  and  universal 
mental  life. 

In  trying  to  gain  a  closer  acquaintance  with 
this  school,  we  shall  limit  ourselves  again  to 
the  study  of  a  few  typical  representatives. 
With  this  end  in  view,  we  shall  select  such 
philosophers  as  have  formulated  a  comprehen- 
sive world-theoiy,  and  thereby  have  aroused  a 
more  universal  interest.  To  this  class  belong 
Fechner,  Lotze,  von  Ilartmann,  and  Wundt. 


1.   GUSTAV   THEODOR   FECHNER.     (1801-1887) 

From  the  literature  on  Fechner,  we  may  men- 
tion the  following  works  :  J.  E.  Kuntze's  Gustav 
Theodor  Fechner  [Dr.  Mises)  (1892) ;  an  appre- 
ciation of  the  life  work  of  Fechner  from  a  very 
narrow  standpoint.  Kurd  Lasswitz's  Gustav 
Theodor  Fechner  (3rd  ed.  1910);  the  first 
volume  of  the  excellent  collection,  Frommann's 
Klassiker  der  Philosojjhie,  and  the  best  complete 
account  of  the  life  and  teachings  of  our  philo- 
sopher.     Wilhelm    Wundfs    Gustav    Theodor 


148     PHILOSOPHY   OF  THE   PRESENT 

Fechner  (1901) ;  a  very  attractive  characterisation 
of  certain  aspects  of  FecJmer's  personality  and 
work. 

In  considering  the  unusually  diversified  life 
work  of  Fechner,  which  was  partly  in  exact 
science,  partly  in  art  and  art  criticism,  partly  in 
philosophy,  let  us  first  call  to  mind  the  immortal 
services  he  has  rendered  in  the  field  of  scientific 
psychology.  Starting  out  with  a  general  study 
of  the  relation  of  the  physical  and  psychical, 
and  the  relation  between  body  and  mind,  he 
arrived  at  the  fruitful  conception  of  a  psycho- 
physics,  fortified  with  all  the  aids  of  exact 
method,  and  marking  the  memorable  begin- 
ning of  experimental  psychology.  In  connec- 
tion with  this,  his  most  distinguished  service, 
Fechner  conceived  the  outlines  of  an  experi- 
mental aesthetics.  His  poetical  gift  is  revealed 
especially  in  his  Kleinen  Schriften,  which  were 
collected  and  published  in  1875,  originally  under 
the  name  of  Br.  Mises,  and  which  deal  satiri- 
cally with  questions  relating  to  the  older  theory 
of  medicine  and  natural  science.  Here,  for 
example,  he  upholds  with  telling  wit  the  thesis 
that  medicine  aims  to  establish  the  following 
proposition : — Every  remedy  heals  all  diseases, 


IDEALISM  149 

and  every  disease  is  healed  by  all  remedies. 
Of  his  philosophical  writings  in  the  naiTower 
sense  of  the  word,  we  mention  : 

1.  Zend-Avesta,  oder  uber  die  Dinge  des  Himmels 

und    des  Jenseits  (3   vols.    1851,    3rd   ed. 
1906). 

2.  Uber    die    physikalische    und    philosophische 

Atomenlehre  (1855,  2nd  ed.  1864). 

3.  Uber  die  Seelenfrage.     Ein    Gang  durch  die 

sichtbare  Welt,  um  die  ^onsichtbare  zufinden 
(1861,  2nded.  1907). 

4.  Die  Tagesansicht  gegenilber  der  Nachtan^icht 

(1879). 

In  reference  to  his  predecessors,  Fechner  him- 
self says,  that  his  starting-point  was  the  natural 
philosophy  of  Schelling's  school,  that  he  had 
plucked  the  best  fruit  from  a  branch  of  Hegel 
(a  branch,  to  be  sure,  bent  far  from  the  tree), 
and  that  in  the  ashes  of  Herharfs  fire  he  had 
found  some  coals  for  his  own  hearth.  Compared 
with  the  Absolute  Philosophy  of  a  Schelling 
and  Hegel,  who  had  sought  to  build  up  a  com- 
prehensive system  of  philosophy,  his  tendency 
is  not  so  different  as  his  method,  which  de- 
mands a  methodical,  careful  connection  with 
the   results   of  the   special   sciences.     He    has 


150     PHILOSOPHY   OF  THE   PRESENT 

repeatedly  recognised  the  fact  that  he  shares 
with  the  Absolute  Philosophy  the  problem  of 
seeking  that  which  is  highest,  most  universal, 
and  final ;  and  he  criticises  its  efforts  solely 
on  the  ground  that  earnest  desire  has  been  con- 
fused with  actual  possession,  the  course  with 
the  goal.  x\nd,  in  fact,  in  his  theory  of  the 
world  we  see  an  attempt,  rendered  specious 
by  the  clearness  of  his  presentation,  to  bring 
all  the  theories  and  speculations  on  the  universe 
and  its  realities  into  connection  with  the 
ideas,  thoughts,  and  results  of  the  empirical 
sciences. 

His  theory  of  the  universe  is  primarily  deter- 
mined by  the  assumption  of  a  coherent,  inter- 
connected psychophysical  whole.  Just  as  body 
and  soul  supplement  each  other  in  the  single 
living  being,  so  in  the  greater  complexes  of  the 
world,  and  finally  in  the  world  itself,  we  have 
to  do  with  unities  of  a  psychophysical  kind. 
All  of  these  unities,  including  not  only  men  and 
animals,  but  also  plants,  and,  as  examples  of 
the  more  comprehensive  forms,  the  earth  and 
the  other  heavenly  bodies,  Fechner  places  in 
a  relation  to  each  other  which  becomes  plainer 
from  the  following  illustration : — Let  us  suppose, 


IDEALISM  151 

he  says,  a  great  circle  and  in  the  gi'eat  circle 
many  small  ones.  Each  small  circle  has  a  soul- 
content  which  it  takes  up  and  encloses  within 
itself,  concerning  which  it  knows.  But  since 
the  great  circle  includes  all  the  small  ones,  it 
includes  and  encloses  within  itself  their  soul- 
content  as  well.  From  the  great  circle,  none 
of  the  small  ones  are  distinctly  separate,  since 
they  are  all  parts  of  it ;  it  knows,  therefore,  the 
contents  of  the  individual  circles.  On  the  other 
hand,  each  small  circle  is  distinctly  separate 
from  the  other  small  ones,  so  that  none  of 
them  know  directly  the  contents  of  the  others, 
and  the  great  circle,  in  turn,  is  distinctly  separate 
from  other  great  circles,  while  altogether  both 
gi'eat  and  small  circles  are  contained  in  one 
greatest  circle  of  all.  We  are  the  small  circles, 
the  great  circle  is  the  earth,  the  greatest  one 
is  God. 

Accordingly,  Fechner  is  of  the  opinion  that 
the  earth,  as  well  as  the  other  celestial  bodies, 
has  a  soul.  To  the  support  and  proof  of  this 
assumption,  he  has  devoted  close  and  clever 
consideration.  He  seeks  to  show  that  the 
earth,  in  its  form  and  material,  in  its  relations 
of  cause  and  effect,  is  uniformly  related  to  the 


152     PHILOSOPHY   OF  THE   PRESENT 

whole  ;  that  it  has  within  itself  individual  pecu- 
liarities, that  it  is  relatively  independent  of  other 
similar  entities ;  that  through  stimulation  and 
influence  from  an  outside  world,  it  evolves  out 
of  itself,  brings  forth  out  of  its  own  fullness  and 
creative  power,  an  inexhaustible  manifoldness 
of  creation ;  that  it  changes  in  detail,  but  re- 
mains an  entity.  In  all  these  directions,  it 
acts  exactly  as  our  body  does,  except  that  it  is 
the  whole  of  which  our  body  is  only  a  member ; 
and  it  is  permanently  that  which  our  body  is  but 
for  the  moment.  Now,  since  we  can  only  judge 
of  soul  life  in  others  by  signs,  expressive  move- 
ments, and  the  like,  Fechner  thinks  it  must  be 
inferred  that  the  earth  is  possessed  of  a  soul 
or  conscious  unity  peculiar  to  itself.  Hence, 
we  ourselves  belong  to  the  parts  and  members 
of  the  earth,  and  are  included  in  its  more 
comprehensive  consciousness. 

Of  course,  Fechner  does  not  conceal  from 
himself  the  fact  that  all  these  phenomena  can 
be  differently  interpreted  and  explained,  but  he 
is  of  the  opinion  that  no  better,  clearer,  more 
natural,  and  more  beautiful  point  of  view  can 
be  found  than  the  one  he  has  proposed.  The 
earth  and  its  neighbours  are  creatures  of  God 


IDEALISM  153 

with  individual  souls  like  ourselves — souls,  how- 
ever, of  a  loftier  nature,  on  a  higher  plane  of 
individuality  and  independence.  To  understand, 
thus,  that  we  are  all  of  one  spirit,  which  is  of 
God,  will  make  it  easier  for  every  one  of  us  to 
be  of  one  spirit,  in  the  sense  that  the  higher  and 
highest  spirit  may  have  peace  in  and  with  us. 

The  relation  of  the  lower  to  the  higher  forms 
of  consciousness,  however,  can  be  determined 
somewhat  more  exactly  by  a  consideration  of 
our  own  soul  life.  In  each  of  us  appears 
a  variety  of  sensations,  feelings,  ideas  and 
thoughts,  which  call  forth  and  displace  each 
other,  now  agreeing,  now  striving  for  mastery. 
This  exchange  and  intercoiu-se  between  the 
separate  psychical  processes  depends,  according 
to  Fechner,  on  a  fundamental  condition — namely, 
they  all  take  place  in  one  common  consciousness. 
Otherwise  they  would  not  find  each  other, 
would  not  affect  each  other,  and  would  neither 
check  nor  advance  each  other.  Furthermore, 
all  that  we  call  unconscious  activity  in  our  mind 
is  not  without  consciousness ;  it  is,  rather,  a 
consciousness  engulfed  in  the  universal  con- 
sciousness, but  determining  very  largely  the 
latter's  position  and  conduct.     In  like  manner 


154     PHILOSOPHY   OF  THE   PRESENT 

we  must  think  of  individual  minds  as  partial 
expressions  of  a  comprehensive,  upholding,  uni- 
fying higher  mind,  which  includes  them  all. 
Only  in  this  way  can  we  understand  the  active 
intercourse  and  communication  between  human 
minds.  We  could  not  understand  this  give  and 
take,  this  growth  of  ideas,  and  this  intermingling 
of  one  mind  with  another,  if  we  did  not  regard 
a  greater  and  mightier  consciousness  as  the 
common  point  of  departure  for  them.  The  differ- 
ence is  onlythis,  that  we  are  obliged  to  think  of 
this  mind  which  surrounds  us  as  infinitely 
richer,  more  efficient,  more  enduring  than  our 
own  weak  and  limited  consciousness.  But  as 
we  ourselves  are  more  than  the  separate  ideas, 
thoughts,  sensations,  and  feelings  which  pass 
through  our  minds,  so  must  the  higher  mind  be 
greater  than  the  various  individual  minds  which 
it  embraces.  It  experiences,  to  be  sure,  all 
that  we  experience,  and  as  we  experience  it, 
but  it  feels  at  the  same  time  the  way  in  which 
the  '  what '  and  the  '  how '  of  our  experience 
enter  into  relations  with  each  other — relations 
which  are  as  a  closed  book  to  us,  and  which 
have  a  much  higher  significance  than  our  in- 
dividual mental  processes. 


IDEALISM  155 

When,  therefore,  the  earth  is  held  to  be 
something  higher  than  men,  animals,  and  plants, 
this  is  not  to  be  understood,  according  to 
Fechner,  as  if  it  were  merely  a  higher  step  of 
the  same  stairs.  On  the  contrary,  mankind  is, 
and  will  for  ever  remain,  the  highest  step  of  the 
earthly  stairs.  But  the  house,  into  which  the 
whole  stairs  is  built,  can  be  spoken  of  as  some- 
what above  the  highest  step,  and  this  house  is 
the  earth.  "The  highest  step  leading  out  to 
the  open — that  is,  the  human  being — may  always 
be  the  pinnacle,  and  the  best  fitted  from  all 
points  of  view  to  overlook  the  whole  house  and 
the  broad  heavens  out  beyond ;  but  the  house 
that  bears  this  pinnacle  will  signify  something 
more  and  higher  than  the  pinnacle  itself,  which 
would  fall  into  ruin  without  the  house,  while 
the  house  without  this  highest  step  leading  into 
the  open  would  only  lack  its  highest  point  of 
vantage." 

This  figure  of  the  stairs  Fechner  brought  later 
into  a  still  closer  relation  to  his  psychophysical 
theories.  If  we  distinguish,  for  example,  be- 
tween the  waking  condition  and  sleep,  we  can  fix 
an  absolute  threshold  of  consciousness  which 
divides  the  complete  unconsciousness  of  sleep 


156     PHILOSOPHY   OF   THE   PEESENT 

from  the  sjeueral  activity  of  consciousness  in 
waking.  But  within  the  latter,  the  attention 
becomes  the  occasion  for  establishing  a  new 
threshold,  which  Fechner  calls  the  relative 
threshold.  Everything  that  in  a  given  moment 
attracts  oiu'  interest  to  itself,  raises  itself 
above  this  threshold,  and  forms,  so  to  speak, 
the  summit  of  a  wave  of  mental  or  psychophysi- 
cal activity.  But,  at  the  same  time,  there  are 
always  a  number  of  unnoticed  phenomena,  which 
are  lost  in  the  background  of  consciousness  and 
form  a  more  or  less  indistinct  mass.  This  un- 
noticed mass  corresponds  to  the  trough  of  the 
wave,  in  the  wave-scheme  chosen  by  Fechner 
for  his  illustration.  Now,  all  phases  of  the 
wave,  not  the  crest  alone,  belong  to  the  waking 
state.  It  forms  the  whole  consciousness,  em- 
bracing what  is  noticed  as  well  as  what  is  un- 
noticed. In  like  manner,  individual  minds 
represent  only  the  waves  within  a  wider  con- 
sciousness. So  Fechner  has  used  induction  and 
analoofv  in  order  to  be  able  to  conceive  of  the 
whole  world  as  governed  by  similai'  laws,  beings, 
and  forces.  The  most  comprehensive  conscious- 
ness within  this  psychophysical  stau'-building, 
the  being  whose  body  is  the  world,   is  called 


IDEALISM  157 

God,  whose  miud,  according  to  the  principles 
of  this  doctrine,  includes  within  itself  all  the 
separate  forms  of  consciousness,  but  at  the 
same  time  transcends  them  and  forms  above 
them  a  unity  peculiar  to  itself. 

There  exist  for  Fechner,  therefore,  no  sharp 
boundaries  between  individual  souls  and  the 
bodies  belonging  to  them.  They  are  united  by 
many  and  firm  bonds.  This,  his  synechological 
view,  he  opposes  to  the  monadology  of  a  Leibniz 
or  a  Lotze,  according  to  which  individual  souls 
only  apparently  affect  each  other,  or  are  con- 
nected with  each  other,  while  remaining  in  fact 
substantially  independent.  Finally  he  regards 
soul  and  bodv  as  two  sides  of  one  and  the  same 
being,  whose  diversity  rests  upon  a  difference 
of  view-point.  Just  as  one  and  the  same  circle 
appears  to  possess  a  convex  or  concave  periphery 
accordins;  as  one  stands  within  or  chooses  a 
view-point  outside  of  the  circle,  so  the  physical 
may  everywhere  be  substituted  for  the  outer 
perception — the  mental,  on  the  contrary,  for 
the  inner  self-perception  of  the  same  object 
With  Fechner,  therefore,  body  is  appearance  for 
others ;  soul,  appearance  to  one's  self.  Accord- 
ing to  this,  soul  must  be  understood  as  the  real 


158     PHILOSOPHY   OF  THE   PRESENT 

true  being  of  an  object,  inasmuch  as  we  know 
ourselves  doubtless  better  than  others  know  us. 
The  correlation  of  body  and  soul,  therefore, 
cannot  be  judged  as  a  causal  relation,  or  as  a 
relation  of  reciprocal  action.  It  is  rather  a 
relation  of  simultaneous  dependence,  such  as 
obtains,  for  instance,  between  the  lines  and 
angles  of  one  and  the  same  figure. 

Since  in  individual  consciousness,  individual 
experiences  do  not  vanish,  but,  as  daily  obser- 
vation teaches,  very  often  return,  therefore  we 
may  assume,  according  to  Fechner,  that  there  is 
an  immortality  for  the  individual  soul.  In  his 
little  book,  Vom  Lehen  nach  dem  Tocle  (6th  ed. 
1906),^  Fechner  has  given  clear  and  beautiful 
expression  to  this  thought. 

The  general  significance  of  Fechner  in  the 
history  of  philosophy  rests,  on  the  one  hand, 
upon  the  fact  that  he  first  established  a  system 
of  metaphysics  in  connection  with  the  special 
sciences  and  their  results,  proceeding  by  induc- 
tion and  analogy,  and  free  from  a  priori  construc- 
tion ;  on  the  other  hand,  it  is  based  on  the 
fact  that  he  has  carried  through  in  a  peculiarly 

'^  On  Life  After  Death,  by  Gustav  Theodor  Fechner.      Trans- 
lated by  H.  Wernecke.     Open  Court  Co.,  Chicago,  1906.— (Tr.  ) 


IDEALISM  159 

striking  manner  the  monistic  conception  of  a 
unity  of  God  and  the  world  by  the  illustration 
of  a  psychophysical  system  of  graduated  stages. 
Both  have  contributed  new  and  fruitful  impulses 
to  metaphysics. 

We  have  already  discussed  ^  the  value  of  an 
inductive  metaphysics,  and  have  seen  how  much 
influence  it  has  had.  The  idea  of  a  pyscho- 
physical  system  of  graduated  stages  clearly  stands 
or  falls  with  the  assumption  that  the  heavenly 
bodies  have  souls ;  and  this  assumption  is  very 
difficult  for  us  to  accept.  For  one  of  the  best 
established  facts  in  this  field  of  experience  is 
that  life  and  mind  belong  together,  and  that  the 
limits  of  the  latter  are  at  the  same  time  those 
of  the  former.  Now  we  can  of  course  agree  with 
Fechner  in  saying  that  the  earth  is  alive  to  the 
extent  that  it  produces,  maintains,  and  nourishes 
life.  But  it  produces  also,  and  indeed  more 
abundantly,  the  inanimate,  which  lacks,  so  far 
as  can  be  determined  by  observation,  the  char- 
acteristic attributes  either  of  life  or  mind.  We 
have  found  no  occasion  thus  far  to  efface  the 
boundaries  between  the  animate  and  the  inani- 
mate,   or  to   regard    this    difference    simply  as 

^  Compare  p.  141  f. 


160     PHILOSOPHY   OF  THE   PRESENT 

relative  or  gradual,  or  to  look  upon  the  transi- 
tion from  one  phenomenal  form  to  the  other  as 
continuous  or  fluent.  The  arguments  advanced 
by  Fechner  in  behalf  of  his  doctrine  that  the 
earth  is  an  organism,  cannot  abolish  this  dis- 
tinction. For  when  one  examines  them  more 
closely,  he  discovers  that  all  the  characteristics 
which  the  earth  has  in  common  with  the  human 
or  animal  body  depend  wholly  upon  abstract 
and  superficial  analogy.  Nevertheless,  Fechner^ s 
philosophical  writings  deserve  a  wide  circle  of 
readers,  and  it  is  to  be  hoped  that  the  animated, 
clear,  and  attractive  form  which  characterises 
them,  the  fine  and  earnest  spirit  which  prevails 
in  them,  and  the  original  blending  of  science 
and  mysticism  which  they  exhibit,  will  satisfy 
the  metaphysical  impulse  and  philosophical 
interest  of  a  large  circle  of  readers  in  a  fuller 
degree  than  has  hitherto  been  the  case. 


2.    HERMANN    LOTZE.    (1817-1881) 

The  following  works  treat  of  Lotze's  life  and 
philosophy  : 

Edmund    Pfleiderer :    Lotzes  philosophische 


IDEALISM  161 

Weltanschauung  nach  ihren  Gnmdzugen  (2nd 
ed.  1884),  a  sympathetic  treatment. 

Von  Hartmann :  Lotzes  Philosophie  (1888), 
an  adverse  treatment. 

Richard  Falckenherg :  Hermann  Lotze  (1901) 
(in  Frommann's  Klassiker  der  Philosophie) :  a 
complete,  reliable,  and  impartial  presentation  of 
the  life  and  development  of  this  philosopher. 

Lotze's  writings  deal  partly  with  physiology 
and  medicine,  and  are  partly  of  a  philosophical 
nature.  To  the  former  field  belongs  a  treatise 
on  vital  energy,  fundamental  and  influential  for 
his  time,  attacking  the  vitalistic  theory  and 
supporting  a  strictly  mechanical  conception  and 
scientific  treatment  of  life  processes.  Among 
his  philosophical  writings  we  may  mention : 

1.  Medizinische  Paychologie  (1852,  new  ed.  1896). 

2.  Mikrokosmus}      Ideen    zur     Oeschichte     und 

Naturgeschichte  der  Menschheit  (1856-1864, 
5th  ed.  1896-1905). 

3.  System  der  Philosophie.     1,   Logik^  (2nd   ed. 

1881) ;  2,  Metaphysik^  (1879,  2nd  ed.  1884). 

^  Microcosmus,  by  Hermann  Lotze.    Translated  by  Elizabeth 
Hamilton  and  E.  E.  C.  Jones.    T.  &  T.  Clark,  Edin.,  1897.— (Tr.) 

*  Logic,  by  Hermann  Lotze.    Translated  by  Bernard  Bosanqiiet. 
2nd  ed.,  2  vols.     Oxford,  1884.— (Tr.) 

'  Metaphysics,  by   Hermann  Lotze.    Translated   by   Bernard 
Bosanquet.     2nd  ed,  3  vols.     Oxford,  1884  — (Tr.) 

L 


162     PHILOSOPHY   OF  THE   PRESENT 

The  general  standpoint  taken  by  Lotze  is 
largely  determined  by  his  relation  to  the  pre- 
ceding schools.  When  Lotze  began  to  work 
out  his  metaphysical  ideas,  Hegel's  downfall 
was  not  yet  final.  The  spirit  oi  Hegel's  method 
still  stood  resolutely  in  the  foreground  of 
philosophical  effort.  Therefore,  Lotze  sought  to 
come  to  some  definite  conclusion  concerning  the 
Absolute  Philosophy  and  the  dialectic  method 
which  it  used.  This  Absolute  Philosophy,  he 
believed,  had  set  up  a  significant  goal  always 
to  be  reckoned  with,  but  it  made  the  great  and 
momentous  mistake  of  believing  this  goal  attain- 
able to  finite  scientific  knowledge.  The  goal  of 
a  rational  theory  of  the  world  which  would 
satisfy  all  demands  for  exactness  and  thorough- 
ness lies  in  infinity,  says  Lotze.  We  can  reach 
it  only  provisionally,  and  we  must  constantly 
bear  in  mind  that  reality  is  much  richer  than 
our  thought  which  masters  it.  The  problem 
of  metaphysics  is  to  present  the  sum-total  of 
reality  in  a  logically  adequate  form,  but  it  has 
nothing  to  do  with  the  impossible  task  of 
creating  or  constructing  a  world.  The  Absolute 
Philosophy  believed  that  it  possessed,  in  the 
dialectic   method,    an    expedient   by   which   it 


IDEALISM  163 

could  arrive  at  all  facts  without  particular 
reference  to  experience ;  for  Lotze,  on  the 
contrary,  reality  is  a  given  existing  magnitude, 
which  we  are  to  understand  by  pointing  out  its 
inner  continuity. 

To  the  reality  which  is  presupposed  by  meta- 
physics, belong,  according  to  Lotze,  things  w^hich 
exist,  events  which  take  place  with  reference  to 
these  things,  qualities  which  they  have,  and 
relations  which  subsist  between  them.  Further- 
more, we  have  representations  and  perceptions, 
of  which  all  the  above  elements  of  reality  are 
to  be  regarded  as  objects.  The  question  how 
it  comes  about  that  things  exist  or  happen,  in- 
stead of  not  existing  or  not  happening,  is  put 
aside  by  Lotze,  once  for  all,  as  a  question  ab- 
solutely unanswerable.  If  we  desired  to  solve 
such  a  problem,  we  should  have  to  be  able  to 
take  a  standpoint  outside  of  all  reality,  a  pro- 
cedure which  is  unthinkable.  For  an  under- 
standing of  this  given  reality,  which  is  therefore 
the  only  problem  left  to  a  philosophy  seeking 
to  examine  into  the  essence  of  things,  it  is  not 
enough  that  we  should  be  able  to  enumerate 
the  laws  of  its  operation  and  the  elements  into 
which   it   is    divisible.      A   knowledge   of  the 


164     PHILOSOPHY   OF  THE   PRESENT 

mechanism  of  its  operation  is  not  sufficient  to 
give  us  an  insight  into  the  progress  and  pheno- 
menal forms  of  our  present  world.  Far  more 
must  we  know  the  goal  toward  which  the 
whole  machinery  of  events  is  working,  and  we 
must  have  a  notion  of  the  value  which  this 
actual  world  is  to  realise  in  its  existence  and 
its  development.  Hence  a  teleological  con- 
sideration necessarily  rises  above  mere  mechan- 
ism in  a  metaphysics  which  understands  what 
is  given. 

In  his  metaphysics,  Lotze  starts  with  an 
analysis  of  the  concept  of  being.  What  does 
it  mean  when  we  assert  that  a  thing  is?  To 
this  question,  a  distinguished  English  philoso- 
pher, Berkeley  (1685-1753),  answered:  "To 
be  is  to  be  perceived."  When,  therefore,  I 
declare  that  a  thing  is,  I  mean  nothing  more 
than  that  it  is  perceived.  This  conception  Lotze 
finds  insufficient ;  that  an  object  exists  inde- 
pendently of  its  being  perceived  is,  as  he  says, 
the  very  thing  we  wish  to  indicate  by  our 
affirmation  of  being.  Another  philosopher, 
Rerbart,  has  defined  the  concept  of  being  as 
absolute  "position,"  thereby  excluding  not  only 
every  negation  but  also  all  relativity — that  is, 


IDEALISM  165 

every  relation  of  one  existing  thing  to  another. 
This  answer,  again,  to  the  question  concerning 
the  essence  of  being  does  not  satisfy  Lotze. 
For  in  the  notion  of  absolute  "position,"  a  kind 
of  being  is  assumed  which  might  exist,  but 
which  actually  does  not  exist — an  abstraction 
which  denotes  something  possible  only  in 
thought,  something  which,  when  taken  alone, 
would  represent  not  a  being  but  merely  a  pos- 
sibility. If  we  leave  out  of  consideration  all 
question  of  relation,  and  still  try  to  hold  fast 
to  the  being  of  things,  we  find  that  this  un- 
related being  can  no  longer  be  distinguished 
from  non-existence.  A  thing  completely  with- 
out relations  could  not  be  conceived  at  any 
place  in  space,  or  at  any  point  of  time ;  it  could 
not  make  itself  felt  in  the  world  through  any 
effect  which  it  exerted  upon  others,  and  could 
just  as  little  receive  any  impression  from  them. 
But  these  qualities  are  the  very  ones  we  give 
to  anything  which  we  wish  to  characterise  as 
non-existent ;  for,  of  the  non-existent  we  say 
that  it  is  never  and  nowhere,  that  it  does 
nothing  and  suffers  nothing.  If  we  wish,  there- 
fore, to  define  the  being  of  things  with  reference 
to  given  reality,  and  at  the  same  time  to  abstract 


166     PHILOSOPHY   OF  THE   PRESENT 

from  our  perception  or  knowledge,  then  nothing 
else  remains  for  us  except  to  identify  being 
with  standing  in  relation.  Only  under  the 
presupposition  of  such  existing  relations,  is  it 
comprehensible  that  being  could  be  ascribed  to 
things  even  when  they  are  not  perceived,  or 
that  they  can  again,  under  favourable  circum- 
stances, become  objects  of  our  knowledge. 

Now,  things  of  which  we  say  that  they  exist, 
cannot  be  conceived  as  qualities.  Therefore, 
each  thing  cannot  be  conceived  as  a  single 
quality,  because  a  quality  or  attribute  is  never 
the  thing,  but  is  only  ascribed  to  it.  Or  if  we 
w^ere  to  consider  each  thing  as  the  sum  of  the 
attributes  perceptible  in  it,  then  all  unity  of  a 
being  subsisting  for  itself  would  be  lost  to 
it.  Again,  we  can  never  determine  the  final 
totality  of  a  sum  of  attributes,  but  must  ever 
regard  such  a  sum  as  only  relatively  complete. 
Furthermore,  we  regard  a  thing  as  unchangeable 
even  when  the  attributes,  which  are  perceptible 
in  it,  change.  Under  these  conditions,  a  thing 
can  be  thought  of  only  as  a  unity  in  multi- 
plicity. But  how  can  these  two  be  brought 
into  harmony — how  can  the  unity  of  a  thing  be 
reconciled  with  the  multiphcity  of  its  attributes  ? 


IDEALISM  167 

According  to  Lotze,  there  is  only  one  form  in 
which  we  can  conceive  of  such  a  connection  of 
unity  with  multiplicity  existing  without  logical 
difficulties.  This  form  is  the  rule,  the  law,  the 
formula,  as  the  representative  of  unity.  Just 
as  we  can  insert  various  values  in  a  mathe- 
matical formula  without  changing  its  meaning 
or  without  destroying  the  unity  of  its  logical 
reference,  so  all  changing  attributes  are  to  be 
thought  of  as  controlled  by  the  unity  of  the 
thing  in  such  a  way  that  changes  go  on  between 
them,  which  conform  to  a  definite  law.  When, 
therefore,  an  element  or  an  attribute  of  being 
changes  along  certain  lines,  the  other  elements 
or  attributes  must  change  along  definite  lines, 
determined  by  the  general  law  governing  them. 
At  the  same  time,  it  is  not  of  course  impossible 
that  such  a  formula  points  to  an  existence  in- 
dependent of  us — to  an  independent  reality. 
Lotze  says  that  reality  consists,  "according  to 
the  manner  of  its  origin,  in  absolute,  incompre- 
hensible, energising  actuality,  in  which  there 
is  posited  a  determinate  content  of  a  thing, 
and  by  which  it  is  distinguished  as  a  thing 
from  its  mere  thought-image." 

If,    therefore,  the   relations  which    exist  be- 


168     PHILOSOPHY   OF   THE   PRESENT 

tween  individual  things,  and  by  virtue  of  which 
being  is  ascribed  to  them,  can  firmly  establish 
such  being,  then  they  must  be  real  relations, 
not  formal  or  simply  conceived.  We  know  real 
relations,  however,  only  in  the  form  of  recipro- 
cal action.  Consequently  the  whole  problem 
of  being  narrows  down  to  acquiring  an  under- 
standing of  reciprocal  relations.  Lotze  thinks 
that  these  relations  are  only  intelligible  when 
we  assume  that  every  being  reacts  to  a  given 
stimulus  with  an  expression  peculiar  to  that 
being  and  corresponding  to  its  nature.  A  pass- 
ing over  of  any  efi'ect  or  of  any  changes  from 
one  thing  to  another,  is  entirely  unthinkable. 
When  a  thing  '  a '  acts  upon  a  thing  '  b,'  this 
means  :  that  to  the  change  '  a '  happening  in  '  a,' 
there  corresponds  a  change  '  ft '  happening  in  '  b.' 
Therefore,  the  corresponding  states  need  be  in 
no  way  like  or  similar  to  each  other.  If,  for 
example,  we  maintain  an  attitude  of  knowledge 
toward  things,  and  consider  this  knowledge 
of  things  as  their  effect  upon  us,  this  never 
means  that  the  things  simply  mirror  themselves 
in  us,  but  that  the  ideas  and  thoughts  which 
serve  in  the  acquisition  of  our  knowledge  are 
created  by  us  with  the  capacity  of  beings  fitted 


IDEALISM  169 

for  situations  of  this  kind.  They  may,  therefore, 
be  altogether  different  from  the  things  toward 
which  they  are  directed,  and  which  they  wish 
to  represent  and  apprehend. 

At  this  point,  let  us  return  to  the  result  pre- 
viously established  concerning  the  concept  of 
an  existing  thing.  We  found  that  a  unity  can 
only  be  thought  of  as  a  rule  or  law,  to  which 
the  individual  elements  or  attributes  must  be 
subject  in  their  variation  and  relation  to  each 
other.  If  we  hold,  together  with  this,  that  a 
real  unity  must  be  distinguished  from  a  rule 
which  is  only  conceived,  and  that  the  relations 
existing  between  separate  things  are  of  the 
nature  of  reciprocal  action,  we  arrive  at  the 
necessaiy  assumption  that,  at  the  root  of  all 
changes  which  coiTespond  to  each  other  in  con- 
formity with  law,  and  which  take  place  in 
individual  existing  things,  there  must  be  a  sub- 
stantial unity,  an  unconditioned,  comprehensive 
substance.  The  action  of  thing  '  a '  upon  thing 
'b '  means,  then,  that  the  change  arising  in  '  a,' 
which  we  may  call '  a,'  reacts  on  the  world- cause 
which  comprehends  and  upholds  all  things,  and 
excites  this  in  turn  to  a  reaction  which  appears 
in  '  b '  as  '  /3.'     Now  since  the  real  unity  of  an 


170     PHILOSOPHY   OF  THE   PRESENT 

individual  thing  exists  side  by  side  with  a  multi- 
plicity of  changes  in  its  attributes,  we  must 
presuppose  a  world-unity,  which  insures  to 
all  the  individual  existences  the  possibility  of 
entering  into  uniform  relations  of  reciprocal 
action.  If  individual  beings  were  absolutely 
independent  or  dissimilar,  interaction  among 
these  beings,  according  to  Lotze,  would  be  en- 
tirely incomprehensible.  Only  when  we  con- 
ceive of  them  as  modifications,  parts,  or  limited 
existences,  can  we  comprehend  the  fact  that 
real  corresponding  relations  exist  between  them. 
Just  how  the  essential  unity  of  that  world- 
cause  manages  to  compensate  '  a '  through  '  /3,' 
we  are  of  course  unable  to  say ;  we  could  explain 
this  only  if  we  were  that  world- cause  itself. 

We  must,  therefore,  as  Lotze  thinks,  dis- 
tinguish an  Absolute  Being  and  the  individual 
beings  comprehended  in  it,  rooted  in  its  unity, 
and  because  of  this  unity  acting  upon  each 
other.  The  nature  of  these  individual  beings 
we  can  determine  still  more  exactly.  According 
to  experience,  only  a  spiritual  being,  a  soul,  has 
the  property  of  remaining  a  unity  through  all 
changing  circumstances  and  phenomena — that 
is,  of  being  a  thing  which  stands  in  a  relation 


IDEALISM  171 

of  reciprocal  action  with  other  things.  Con- 
sequently all  things,  whose  unity  we  recognise 
and  for  which  we  presuppose  real  relations, 
must  be  considered  after  the  analogy  of  our 
own  inner  being,  as  spirits  or  souls.  According 
to  this,  our  body  is  regarded  by  Lotze,  as  it 
was  earlier  by  Leibniz,  as  a  multiplicity  of 
individual  souls  or  substances. 

The  concept  of  the  Absolute  which  had  to 
be  advanced  in  metaphysics  simply  with  regard 
to  the  conceivableness  of  reciprocal  action  in  the 
world,  receives  by  a  religious-philosophical  treat- 
ment, supplementing  metaphysical  considera- 
tions, the  character  of  a  highest  value  and 
of  a  personal  Deity.  Only  from  such  a  stand- 
point can  the  world-mechanism  be  placed  at  the 
service  of  a  teleological  relation,  and  thereby 
the  last  task  in  the  explanation  of  the  world  be 
fulfilled.  The  development,  the  course  of  all 
events  in  the  world  according  to  mechanical  laws, 
tends  to  a  realisation  of  the  good,  and  becomes 
thereby  an  instrument  expressing  divine  intent 
and  purpose.  The  mechanism  is  then  in  fact 
simply  an  outwardly  appearing  regular  form  of 
phenomena,  whose  inner  meaning  is  first  revealed 
through  a  teleological  conception. 


172     PHILOSOPHY   OF  THE   PRESENT 

Lotze  did  not  found  a  real  school.  For  this 
he  lacked  a  closed  system,  which,  elaborated  by 
prophetic  fantasy,  could  answer  the  bold  and 
persistent  demands  of  the  intellect.  What  is 
more,  the  presentation  of  his  views  lacked 
that  convincing  decisiveness  which  carries  the 
reader  along,  and  conceals  the  difficulties  in  the 
arguments  and  deductions.  In  contrast  with 
Schopenhauer,  for  instance,  a  skeptical  vein  of 
the  shrewdest  foresight  and  reserve  prevails  in 
Lotze's  writings.  It  has,  therefore,  been  said 
that  his  philosophy  resembles  the  autumn  wind, 
which  strips  the  trees  of  their  withered  leaves, 
while  a  gleam  of  the  setting  sun  lights  up  the 
bare  tree-tops.  In  spite  of  this,  Lotze  has  been 
a  source  of  inspiration  even  outside  the  more 
select  circle  of  his  colleagues.  This  is  in  part 
due  to  his  excellent  art  of  presentation,  which 
takes  high  rank  in  philosophical  literature,  and 
is  seen  to  best  advantage  in  his  Mikrokosmus, 
a  book  no  one  should  fail  to  read.  The  general 
fineness  and  acumen  of  his  train  of  thought  are 
also  very  attractive,  his  original  turns  affording 
continual  surprise  and  a  real  intellectual  plea- 
sure.   Lotze  thinks  ahead  of  us,  and  leads  us  to 


IDEALISM  173 

think  after  him.  He  who  does  not  allow  him- 
self to  be  blinded  or  caught  napping,  but  who 
seeks  the  tnith  honestly  and  profoundly,  finds 
in  Lotze  an  excellent  guide.  He  belongs  to  the 
philosophers  who,  without  following  the  fashion 
or  flattering  the  interests  of  the  day,  have 
quietly  helped  to  give  to  philosophy  a  recog- 
nition in  wider  circles,  scientific  in  its  spirit, 
earnestly  and  carefully  elaborated. 

In  his  metaphysics,  the  theory  of  reciproca 
action  is  the  most  original  and  most  important 
point.  It  diflferentiates  itself  from  an  out- 
spoken Positive  conception  of  facts,  such  as 
we  found  in  Mack,  only  by  the  assertion,  that 
what  it  conceives  as  unity,  or  as  law,  is  real. 
If  we  hold  to  the  view  that  in  all  reciprocal 
action,  regular  changes  are  involved  which 
correspond  to  each  other  and  can  be  expressed 
by  a  formula,  by  a  law,  then  we  renounce  a 
realistic  interpretation  of  the  concepts  of  cause 
and  eff'ect,  the  metaphysics  of  which,  according 
to  Mach,  is  akin  to  the  fetichism  of  primitive 
races.  Hence  Lotze's  theory  of  reciprocal  action 
can  be  considered  an  independent  result  essen- 
tially different  from  the  Positive  view  only  on 


174     PHILOSOPHY   OF  THE   PRESENT 

the  hypothesis  of  a  solution  of  the  problem  of 
reality.  This  fundamental  problem,  however, 
Lotze  dismissed  with  few  words.  Here,  then, 
we  find  the  greatest  defect  in  his  philosophy. 

The  method  of  his  thought  is,  as  we  have 
seen,  decidedly  modern  in  content,  but  not 
in  form.  He  handles  the  separate  problems 
much  as  Herhart  had  done  before  him.  We 
could  say  of  him,  also,  that  he  strives  to 
make  the  concepts  of  experience  thinkable 
without  giving  up  or  questioning  their  validity. 
Nevertheless  a  stronger  emphasis  on  the  signi- 
ficance of  an  empirically  given  reality  for  our 
philosophising,  lends  to  Lotze's  Idealism  an 
inductive  character  in  the  main  closely  related 
to  that  of  Fechner. 

3.  EDUARD  VON   HARTMANN.     (1842-1906) 

Eduard  von  Hartmann  has  himself  written 
an  account  of  his  life  and  mental  development  in 
his  Gesammelten  Studien  und  Aufsdtzen  (1876), 
and  in  Gesellschaft,  in  its  annual  publication 
of  1887.  There  has  recently  appeared  a  very 
exhaustive  presentation  of  his  views  by  a  warm 


IDEALISM  175 

admirer,  Arthur  Brews:  Eduard  von  Hart- 
manns  jphilosojihisches  System  im  Grundnss 
(1902,  2nd  ed.  1906).  There  is  also  a  more 
condensed  and  more  critical  review  in  From- 
mann's  Klassiker  der  Philosophie,  by  0.  Braun : 
Eduard  von  Hartmann  (1909). 

Hartmann  is  one  of  the  most  productive  and 
many-sided  philosophical  writers,  and  is  dis- 
tinguished for  his  clear  flowing  style,  which  has 
a  certain  elegance  and  pleasing  diffuseness. 
No  other  philosopher  has  so  often  quoted  and 
commented  upon  himself,  or  tried  by  means  of 
historical  and  critical  references  to  make  his 
own  standpoint  clear  and  bring  it  into  relation 
with  others.  Of  his  very  numerous  writings 
only  the  following  need  be  mentioned  : 

1.  Philosophie  des  Unbeiuussten '^  (1869,  11th  ed. 

3  vols.  1904).  As  with  Schopenhauer's  Die 
Welt  als  Wille  und  Vorstellung,  all  suc- 
ceeding editions  contain  the  text  of  the 
first  edition  almost  unchanged,  but  have 
additions  and  supplements. 

2.  Die  Phdnomenologie  des  sittlichen  Bewusstseins 

(1879,  2nd  ed.  1886,  under  the  new  title : 
Das  sittliche  Bewiisstsein). 

*  The  Philosophy  of  the  Unconscious,  by  Eduard  von  Hartmann. 
Translated  by  William  Cliatterton  Coupland.  3  vols.  Macmillan 
and  Co.,  New  York,  1884.— (Tr.) 


176     PHILOSOPHY   OF   THE   PRESENT 

3.  Das  religiose  Bewusstsein  der  Menschheit  im 

Stufengang  seiner  Entwicklung  (1881),  to 
which  is  joined  (1882)  a  positive  philosophy 
of  religion  under  the  title,  Die  Religion 
des  Geistes  (3rd  ed.  1907). 

4.  Asthetik  (1886-87).     The  first  volume  contains 

an  historical-critical  review  of  German 
aesthetics  since  Kant,  while  the  second 
volume  deals  in  an  original  manner  with 
the  philosophy  of  the  beautiful. 

5.  Das     Grundproblem     der     Erkenntnistheorie 

(1890). 

6.  Kategorienlehre  (1896),  in   which  the   author 

treats  of  the  most  important  and  most 
universal  forms  of  relation  between  per- 
ception and  thought,  such  as  time,  space, 
causality,  finality,  &c.,  in  their  various 
spheres  of  application. 

The  Ausgewdhlten  Werke,  published  since 
1885,  contain  thirteen  volumes.  From  the 
posthumous  works  there  has  been  published  a 
System  der  Philosophie  im  Grundriss,  in  eight 
volumes.  It  includes  Theory  of  Knowledge 
and  Natural  Philosophy  (1907);  Psychology, 
Metaphysics,  and  Axiology  (Theory  of  Values) 
(1908);  Principles  of  Ethical  Theory,  Philo- 
sophy of  Religion,  and  ^.sthetics  (1909). 

Hartmann  has  repeatedly  set  forth  his  rela- 


IDEALISM  177 

tion  to  earlier  philosophers.  He  asserts  that 
he  is  most  closely  related  to  Schelling,  Hegel, 
and  Sehojjenhauer.  To  Schelling's  first  system, 
the  so-called  negative  philosophy,  he  refers  his 
idea  of  the  Unconscious,  and  the  construction 
of  matter  out  of  immaterial  centres  of  force ; 
while  the  second  system  of  the  same  philo- 
sopher, the  positive  philosophy,  serves  as  the 
immediate  basis  of  his  metaphysics,  since  it 
strives  to  connect  the  one-sided  principle  of  a 
rational  Idea  and  the  principle  of  a  blind  Will, 
which  Hegel  and  Schopenhauer  respectively 
raised  to  world  realities.  Hartmanu's  indebted- 
ness to  Schopenhauer  is  mainly,  as  he  says,  in 
respect  to  the  philosophy  of  nature ;  neverthe- 
less his  pessimism,  his  leaning  toward  the 
religion  of  the  Hindus,  as  well  as  his  conception 
of  the  relation  in  which  will  and  intellect  stand 
to  each  other,  have  been  strongly  determined  by 
this  philosopher.  Hegel  has  influenced  Hart- 
mami  principally  by  his  philosophy  of  spirit ;  by 
the  historical  character  of  his  system,  which 
considers  all  the  preliminary  stages  of  know- 
ledge as  relatively  essential  moments  of  the 
same ;  and  by  his  demand  for  speculative 
syntheses  to  reconcile  opposite  views  with  each 

M 


178     PHILOSOPHY   OF  THE   PRESENT 

other.  In  the  method  of  his  research,  however, 
Hartmann  thinks  that  he  has  followed  ex- 
clusively the  rules  and  proceedings  of  induction, 
as  they  are  used  in  the  modern,  natural  and 
historical  sciences. 

Hartmann  himself,  accordingly,  characterises 
his  system  as  "  a  synthesis  oi Hegel  and  Schopen- 
hauer, with  a  decided  preponderance  of  the 
former,  carried  on  under  the  guidance  of  the 
doctrine  of  principles  from  Schelling's  positive 
philosophy,  and  the  idea  of  the  Unconscious 
from  Schelling's  first  system ;  the  first  abstract 
result  of  this  synthesis  is  then  joined  with  the 
individualism  oi  Leibniz  and  with  modern  scien- 
tific realism  and  thus  fused  into  a  concrete 
monism,  in  which  the  real-phenomenal  pluralism 
has  become  of  less  moment,  so  that  the  resulting 
system  is  established  upon  an  empirical  basis 
by  the  inductive  method  of  the  modern  natural 
and  historical  sciences."  Doubtless  Hartmann, 
through  such  easily  multiplied  data  concerning 
the  origin  of  the  separate  elements  of  his  philo- 
sophy and  of  their  relation  to  other  systems, 
has  greatly  lightened  the  task  of  the  future 
historian. 

In  his  metaphysics,  which  is  the  part  of  his 


IDEALISM  179 

philosophy  of  chief  interest  to  us,  Hartmann 
prepares  his  way  by  stating  certain  epistemo- 
logical  principles,  the  tendency  of  which  he 
characterises  by  the  name  of  transcendental 
realism,  Kant  represented  the  opinion  that 
only  phenomena,  that  is,  objects  to  which  the 
forms  of  our  perception  and  thinking  had  con- 
tributed an  indispensable  share,  could  be  known  ; 
but  that  things-in-themselves,  conceived  and 
determined  independently  of  our  perception  and 
thought,  could  not  be  known.  In  opposition 
to  this  transcendental  Idealism,'  Hartma^in 
undertakes  to  show  that  things-in-themselves, 
their  properties  and  reciprocal  relations,  can  be 
considered  not  only  as  really  existing,  but  can 
be  known,  if  only  mediately.  Phenomena,  that 
is,  the  contents  of  our  perception,  are  connected 
with  those  realities  through  transcendent  caus- 
ality, and  things-in-themselves  are  looked  upon 
as  causes  of  phenomena.  From  this  it  follows 
that,  to  the  diversity  of  objects  of  perception, 
there  must  correspond  a  diversity  of  realities 
producing  them ;  and  so  we  are  able  not  only 
to  posit  things-in-themselves,  but  also  to  make 
more  exact  statements  concerning  their  nature. 

'  Compare  p.  138. 


180     PHILOSOPHY   OF   THE   PRESENT 

As  operative,  the  thing-in-itself  must  have 
reality  and  existence,  and,  in  order  to  explain  a 
change  of  phenomena,  it  must  itself  be  change- 
able and  thus  determined  in  time.  At  the 
foundation  of  its  changing  being  there  must  be 
a  changeless  essence,  a  substance.  Both  unity 
and  multiplicity,  as  well  as  necessity  of  action, 
must  be  predicated  of  things-in-themselves.  If, 
as  Kant  assumed,  space  and  time  as  forms  of 
perception,  together  with  the  primal  concepts  of 
the  understanding,  are  first  of  all  subjective, 
they  must  at  the  same  time  have  a  transcendent 
meaning,  because  otherwise  we  should  be  obliged 
to  renounce  all  knowledge  of  the  real.  The 
essential  forms  of  things  and  the  thought-forms 
of  our  intellect  agree  with  each  other.  But 
such  a  harmony  between  our  knowledge  and 
the  real  objects  to  which  it  is  directed  can  only 
be  accounted  for  by  assuming  that  the  same  all- 
embracing,  all-controlling  reason  is  active  in 
both. 

What,  then,  is  the  nature  of  the  reality  to 
which  we  are  justified  in  reasoning  from  the 
facts  of  our  experience  ?  Hartmann  designates 
it  at  the  outset  as  the  Unconscious,  and  by 
this  he  understands  first  the  unknown  positive 


IDEALISM  181 

subject  to  which  the  predicate  "to  be  uncon- 
scious "  belongs.  He  then  institutes  a  search 
throughout  the  realms  of  nature  and  of  mind 
for  the  facts  which  shall  point  out  to  us  the 
significance  of  the  Unconscious.  Take,  for 
example,  the  purposiveness  exhibited  in  the 
reflex  movements  of  animal  organisms,  in  so- 
called  instinct,  or  in  the  healing  power  of 
nature ;  or,  again,  the  unconscious  productivity 
in  thought  and  in  artistic  creation ;  the  instinc- 
tive attraction  of  sexual  love ;  the  unconscious 
intellectual  activity  which  manifests  itself  in 
the  genesis  of  sense-perception,  and  many  other 
facts  of  a  similar  nature — all  these  may  be  cited 
as  material  for  our  knowledge  of  an  unconscious 
principle.  All  the  processes  here  mentioned 
point,  as  Hartmann  thinks,  to  the  law  of  a 
transcendent  causality,  to  a  universal  ground 
which  is  called  the  Unconscious,  and  which  is 
identified  at  the  same  time  with  the  Absolute, 
the  World-cause,  and  the  All-one.  Spinoza's 
Substance,  Fichte's  Absolute  Ego,  and  other  like 
concepts  of  earlier  philosophers  were  the  dim 
half- true  anticipations  of  the  knowledge  of  the 
new  world-principle,  the  Unconscious.  Con- 
sciousness  appears    accordingly   as    secondary, 


182     PHILOSOPHY   OF  THE   PRESENT 

but  in  a  certain  sense  it  represents  a  higher 
stage,  inasmuch  as  "  all  progress  consists  in 
the  enlargement  and  deepening  of  the  sphere 
unfolded  in  consciousness." 

In  the  Unconscious,  will  and  representation 
(or  idea,  reason,  intellect)  are  bound  together 
in  inseparable  unity.  "  What  is  not  repre- 
sented cannot  be  willed,  and  what  is  not  willed 
cannot  be  represented."  In  the  latter  respect 
the  Unconscious  is  distinguished  from  con- 
sciousness, in  which  the  emancipation  of  in- 
tellect from  will  is  possible,  as  Schopenhauer 
indeed  had  taught.  Now,  since  will  and  idea 
stand  in  unmistakable  antithesis  within  the 
Unconscious,  but  at  the  same  time  reciprocally 
advance  each  other,  they  form  an  absolute 
unity.  Neither  through  spatial  nor  other  differ- 
ences can  a  plurality  of  being  be  imputed  to 
the  Unconscious. 

We  must  think  of  the  world-process,  accord- 
ing to  Hartmann,  in  the  following  way :  The 
original  peace  and  self-sufficiency  of  the  Ab- 
solute, which  depends  on  the  undifferentiated 
unity  of  will  and  idea  and  upon  the  lack  of  an 
activity  of  the  will,  is  disturbed  by  the  blind 
rousing  of  the  potential  will  to  volition.     The 


IDEALISM  183 

origin  of  the  world,  the  result  of  this  movement, 
is  hence  irrational,  because  it  goes  back  to  an 
unmotived  act  of  the  will.  But  since  the  Un- 
conscious is  not  simply  will,  but  also  idea  or 
representation,  the  world,  which  is  its  product, 
must  bear  in  itself  the  character  of  the  rational. 
The  world  as  it  now  is  may,  therefore,  be  called 
the  best  of  all  possible  worlds.  Owing,  however, 
to  the  disparity  between  the  infinity  of  the  will, 
which  can  never  be  fully  satisfied,  and  the 
finite  contents  of  the  world  and  its  representable 
nature,  there  results  an  unhappiness  or  pain  in 
the  world-principle,  in  the  Unconscious  itself. 
This  impels  to  ever  further  striving  and  activity, 
whose  purpose  is  the  escape  from  pain,  that  is, 
the  restoration  of  the  original  harmony  between 
the  will  and  the  idea,  or  the  dissolution  of  the 
world.  So  the  whole  world-process  becomes 
a  purposive  development  corresponding  to  the 
tendencies  of  the  Unconscious. 

If  now  the  world-process  is  the  necessary 
means  to  the  destruction  of  the  world,  we  must 
hold  it  good  and  desirable,  and  in  spite  of  the 
universal  pessimism  which  prevails  with  regard 
to  the  origin  and  existence  of  the  world,  we 
must  cherish  an  optimistic  attitude  with  refer- 


184     PHILOSOPHY   OF  THE   PRESENT 

ence  to  the  work  of  world-development  and  to 
our  own  part  therein.  So  there  arises  for  us 
the  obligation  to  live  and  to  work  for  the 
furthering  of  consciousness,  because  this  alone 
can  negative  the  creative  will,  caught  in  the 
stream  of  endless  activity.  In  other  words,  we 
have  to  regard  ourselves  as  means,  in  that  we 
take  up  the  purposes  of  the  Unconscious  in  our 
conscious  end-affirming  reason.  Every  cowardly 
personal  renunciation  must  therefore  be  regarded 
as  an  immoral  method  of  action.  Morality  con- 
sists rather  in  nothing  else  than  the  working 
together  to  shorten  the  way  of  suffering  and 
the  way  of  redemption  of  the  Unconscious. 

Clearly,  blind  will,  the  principle  of  irration- 
ality, can  only  be  overcome  through  the  growing 
self-knowledge  of  the  Absolute,  through  the 
final  mastery  of  the  idea.  A  very  powerful  help 
in  attaining  this  end  is  the  individualising  of 
the  Absolute.  For  the  separate  individuals,  in 
which  the  Unconscious  objectifies  itself,  are  each 
to  the  others  simply  an  idea,  that  is,  a  "not 
will."  The  control  of  the  logical  over  the  will 
becomes  so  much  the  greater  as  the  individuals 
are  more  numerous.  The  individual,  A,  for 
example,  is  simply  an  element  of  will.     If  we 


IDEALISM  185 

add  now  a  second  individual,  B,  the  number 
of  will- elements  is  increased  by  one,  while  at 
the  same  time  every  individual  is  an  idea  for 
another.  With  three  individuals  we  have  three 
units  of  will,  and,  at  the  same  time,  six  ideas. 
In  general  terms,  the  number  of  will-units  is  to 
the  number  of  idea-units  as  n  :  n  (n — 1),  or,  if 
we  include  the  idea  of  his  own  body  that  each 
individual  has,  as  n  :  n.^  And  so  the  Uncon- 
scious creates  a  legion  of  individuals.  The 
most  rudimentary  of  such  simple  will-fragments 
are  the  "atoms"  of  natural  science,  which  are 
to  be  conceived,  according  to  Hartmann's  dyna- 
mic views,  as  individualised  discrete  forces. 

Consciousness  arises  within  an  individual 
mind  in  this  way :  the  latter  is  amazed  at  the 
sudden  emancipation  of  the  idea  from  its  will, 
as  the  result  of  the  existence  of  other  individual 
minds,  and  seeks  to  deny  it.  This  wonderment 
of  the  will  at  the  rebellion  against  its  recognised 
mastery,  this  surprise  that  the  invader  of  an 
idea  impregnated  from  without,  calls  forth,  is 
consciousness.  Now  the  opposing  will  in  the 
presence  of  the  idea  is  too  weak  to  carry  through 
its  intention  of  negation.  Such  an  impotent 
will  is  associated  with  unhappiness,   and  this 


186     PHILOSOPHY   OF  THE   PRESENT 

appears  therefore  at  every  awakening  of  con- 
sciousness as  an  expression  of  the  anger  of  the 
Unconscious  at  the  intruder  whom  it  must 
endure  and  cannot  displace.  But  if  the  self- 
knowledge  of  the  Absolute  has  become  great 
enough  through  the  growth  of  consciousness, 
then,  says  Hartmann,  the  negation  of  the  will 
appears.  The  necessary  condition  for  this  end 
is  the  existence  of  a  universal  human  culture, 
whose  insight  alone  makes  possible  a  unified 
action.  If  all  humanity  is  impressed  by  the 
folly  of  volition  and  the  misery  of  existence ; 
if  it  is  filled  with  a  deep  longing  for  peace 
and  for  the  painlessness  of  non-being;  if  the 
wasting  of  old  age  has  seized  upon  all  or  at 
any  rate  the  greater  part,  then,  yielding  to 
one  simultaneous  resolve,  as  sick,  exhausted, 
and  useless  cripples,  we  shall  all  take  leave  of 
existence  and  plunge  ourselves  and  the  world 
into  nothingness. 

Such,  then,  are  Hartmann  s  metaphysical 
theories.  Let  us  turn  now  to  a  short  criticism 
of  these  views,  since  it  is  not  practicable,  if  we 
remain  true  to  our  general  plan,  to  enter  upon 
a  more  detailed  study  of  his  contributions  in 
the  field  of  the  special  philosophical  disciplines, 


IDEALISM  187 

although  some  of  them  might  be  well  worth 
our  attention.  Hartmami  himself  has  called 
his  standpoint  monistic,  and,  in  relation  to  the 
theory  of  knowledge,  realistic ;  nevertheless  we 
may  still  count  him  among  the  representatives 
of  modern  Idealism,  since  the  reality  which  he 
espouses  and  whose  nature  he  seeks  to  deter- 
mine more  exactly,  is  conceived  as  mental  or 
spiritual  reality.  The  Unconscious  is  an  inti- 
mate unity  of  will  and  idea,  so  that  we  must 
remember  that  Hartmann  recognises  in  these 
functions  real  forces,  which  rule  and  act  in- 
dependently of  our  knowledge  of  them,  and 
hence  independently  of  consciousness.  More- 
over, his  method  is  pronouncedly  inductive ; 
from  a  very  large  number  of  facts  he  seeks 
to  arrive  at  the  most  comprehensive  conception 
of  a  world-theory. 

But  certainly  the  method  which  he  employs 
in  his  philosophy  of  the  Unconscious  is  at  bottom 
only  apparently  induction  in  the  sense  of  modern 
empirical  science.  Perhaps  he  himself  meant 
to  recognise  this  when,  in  explaining  the  special 
characteristics  of  his  system,  he  placed  in  the 
foreground  his  relation  to  the  theories  of  earlier 
philosophers,  and  mentioned  only  at  the  close 


188     PHILOSOPHY   OF  THE   PRESENT 

the  empirical  basis  upon  which  the  resulting 
system  was  established.  Hartmann,  the  meta- 
physician, may  be  regarded  rather  as  a  late 
offshoot  of  the  Absolute  Philosophy,  a  late 
Hegelian  or  late  follower  of  Schelling.  The 
strong  influence  of  Hegel  and  Schelling  shows 
particularly  in  the  way  he  proceeds  in  historical 
discussion.  He  prefers  always  the  abstract- 
logical  evolution,  which  treats  ideas  as  magni- 
tudes standing  in  peculiar  relations  to  each 
other ;  always  the  dialectic-speculative  method 
of  careful  regard  for  chronological  relations ; 
always  the  arrangement  of  historical  facts  ac- 
cording to  the  clue  given  within  themselves ; 
always  the  explanation  and  motivation  of  sepa- 
rate modes  of  intuition  according  to  historical 
findings.  In  metaphysics,  with  Havtmann  as 
with  Schelling,  the  difference  between  research 
and  speculation,  between  science  and  myth  is 
obliterated  and  misunderstood,  while  the  real 
meaning  of  Schelling's  positive  philosophy  is  not 
grasped.^  And  he  uses  experience  just  as  Scho- 
Ijenhauer  did,  as  a  mere  springboard  for  a  flight 
into  the  realm  of  things-in-themselves,  and  is 
not  dissuaded  as  to  the  certainty  of  his  results 

^  Compare  p,  245  f. 


IDEALISM  189 

by  the  knowledge  that  he  can  deal  in  his  specu- 
lations only  with  hypotheses  of  greater  or  less 
probability.  We  may,  therefore,  say  that  he 
uses  the  inductive  method,  which  he  asserts  to 
be  fundamental,  only  in  a  very  superficial  way. 
All  he  has  used  of  it  is  the  empirical  point 
of  departure,  and  the  merely  probable  validity 
of  its  results.  As  for  his  metaphysical  specula- 
tions on  the  beginning  and  end  of  the  world, 
there  is  lacking  any  deliberate  connection  be- 
tween them  and  the  special  sciences  in  the 
form  of  a  generalisation  or  enlargement  of  the 
knowledge  and  results  gained  by  these.  There 
is  sadly  lacking,  also,  any  critical  safeguarding 
of  the  steps  of  his  argument  through  a  careful 
weighing  of  all  instances.  The  system  of  Hart- 
mann,  like  that  of  ScJiopenhaaer,  may  be  styled 
a  philosophical  romance,  a  half  mythological 
speculation,  like  the  myths  of  Plato,  rather 
than  an  extension  and  completion  of  scientific 
knowledge. 

How  little  the  method  of  Hartmann  is  to  be 
considered  inductive  in  the  sense  of  the  natural 
sciences  can  easily  be  shown  by  the  fundamental 
idea  of  his  system.  Although  he  repeatedly 
emphasises  the  fact  that  the  Unconscious  signi- 


190     PHILOSOPHY   OF  THE   PRESENT 

fies  something  positive,  yet  the  grounds  are 
wholly  lacking  for  the  determination  and  de- 
finition of  this  principle  as  a  coherent  world- 
cause.  The  examples  which  Harimann  submits 
as  inductive  arguments  for  his  theory  are  all  of 
them  taken  from  the  sphere  of  vital  phenomena. 
It  is,  furthermore,  not  easy  to  understand  what 
positive  meaning  the  idea  of  the  Unconscious 
could  have  when  it  is  not  limited  to  the  sphere 
where  alone  consciousness  has  a  part.  In  spite 
of  this  scantiness  of  inductive  material,  the 
Unconscious  is  raised  to  the  Absolute,  to  the 
All-one,  to  a  world-principle  outright.  Perhaps 
the  disparity  between  the  facts  supporting  this 
world-theory  and  the  theory  itself  has  some 
connection  with  the  fact  that  an  epistemological 
tendency  has  determined  the  choice  of  the 
concept  of  the  Unconscious.  The  opposition 
between  the  world  which  appears  in  conscious- 
ness and  the  world  which  is  independent  of 
consciousness,  and  therefore  in  a  way  "  uncon- 
scious," has  doubtless  played  a  part  in  Hart- 
manris  metaphysics.  In  this  way  the  idea  of 
the  real,  in  distinction  from  the  phenomena  of 
consciousness,  may  have  become  the  Uncon- 
scious. 


IDEALISM  191 

The  argument  for  the  existence  of  an  Un- 
conscious, as  the  real  cause  for  all  phenomena, 
logically  considered,  has  of  course  no  conclusive 
force.  That  which  is  common  to  a  group  of 
phenomena  can  be  applied  only  to  the  constitu- 
tion of  their  generic  idea;  it  cannot  be  used 
for  the  determination  of  their  cause.  If  one 
wishes  to  study  the  common  features  of  a  class 
of  phenomena  with  respect  to  their  causal  rela- 
tions, such  a  study  can  lead  of  course  to  the  de- 
mand for  a  cause  for  just  these  common  features 
and  nothing  more.  With  the  same  right,  or 
possibly  with  a  better  right,  we  might,  after 
Hartmanns  example,  draw  the  conclusion  that 
time  is  the  universal  cosmic  principle,  following 
the  myth  of  Chronos,  since  all  phenomena  in 
the  world  have  in  common  a  time -character, 
and  so  time  could  be  postulated  as  the  world- 
cause,  and  hypostatised.  In  such  an  argument 
the  inductive  material  would  be  far  more  com- 
plete and  comprehensive  than  that  offered  by 
Rartmann  in  his  argument,  and  the  conclusion 
to  a  world-cause  would  be  a  safer  one. 

In  passing,  we  wish  to  call  attention  to  the 
inconceivability  of  Hartmann^s  conception  of 
the  end  of  the  world.     It  is  not  very  consistent 


192     PHILOSOPHY   OF  THE   PRESENT 

with  the  principles  of  modern  science,  as  laid 
down  in  the  laws  of  the  conservation  of  matter 
and  energy,  nor  with  Hartmanns  own  doctrine 
of  "  realism,"  to  suppose  that  the  decision  of 
cultivated  humanity  to  destroy  itself  would  re- 
sult in  the  annulling  of  the  whole  world.  In 
this  matter,  Schojjenhauer,  with  his  idea  of  the 
negation  of  the  world,  was  much  better  able 
fi:om  his  standpoint  of  transcendental  Idealism 
to  protect  his  argument  from  obvious  objections. 
However,  we  place  no  w^eight  on  this  difficulty, 
since  Hartmami  himself  afterwards  reckoned 
with  it,  when  he  characterised  the  end  of  the 
world-process  as  a  supernatural  act,  "  in  which 
the  world-essence  withdraws  itself  from  its 
former  manifestation  of  will,  and  with  the 
world  of  phenomena  annuls  also  its  laws  and 
apparent  substance  (matter)."  But  this  elucida- 
tion certainly  does  not  lessen  the  mythological 
character  of  his  metaphysics. 

Nevertheless,  Haftmann  has  done  one  service 
to  metaphysics  in  that  he  has  clearly  shown 
that  the  reality  of  consciousness  and  the  reality 
which  we  recognise  and  seek  to  determine  in 
the  real  sciences,  are  two  entirely  different 
things.     The  system  stands,  therefore,  in  strik- 


IDEALISM  193 

ing  opposition  to  the  Immanent  Philosophy,  to 
the  phenomenaHsm  and  Positivism  of  our  day. 
To  be  sure,  the  epistemological  foundation  of 
transcendental  realism  is  inadequate,  and  the 
application  of  the  principle  of  transcendent 
causality,  as  our  earlier  arguments  have  shown, ^ 
misses  the  real  point  of  departure  for  the  forma- 
tion of  a  concept  of  reality.  But  Hartmann  is 
without  doubt  one  of  the  most  energetic  and 
clearest  defenders  of  "  realism,"  against  the 
anti-metaphysical  tendency  common  among 
scientists  and  philosophers  of  the  present. 


4.   WILHELM   WUNDT.     {B0111  1832) 

Wilhelm  Wundt  took  up  the  work  of  Fechner 
and  carried  it  further.  He  established,  in  the 
year  1879,  the  first  laboratory  for  experimental 
psychology,  and  founded  a  school,  whose  scope 
and  scientific  activity  mark  him  as  the  most 
efficient  philosopher  and  psychologist  of  the 
present  day.  A  thorough  presentation  of  his 
main  doctrines  may  be  found  in  Frommann's 
Klassiker  der  Philosophie: — Wilhelm  Wundt, 
seine  PkilosopJiie  und  Psychologie  (3rd  ed.  1909), 

^  Compare  p.  44  f.  and^p.  104  f . 

N 


194     PHILOSOPHY   OF  THE   PRESENT 

by  E.  Konig ;  also  in  Budolf  JSisler's  Wilhelm 
Wundts  Philoso^hie  iind  Psychologie  (1902). 
Wimdfs  literary  contributions  reveal  an  aston- 
ishing versatility  and  productivity.  Together 
with  a  great  number  of  works  in  natural  science, 
chiefly  of  a  physiological  nature,  he  has  published 
a  large  number  of  philosophical  works  upon 
most  varied  themes.  We  can  mention  here 
only  the  most  important  of  these : 

1.  Vorlesungen  uher  die  Menschen-  und  Tierseele 

(1863,  4th  ed.  1906).i 

2.  Grundziige    der  ijliysiologisclien    Psychologies 

(1874,  6th  ed.  in  3  vols,  from  1908). 

3.  Logih  (1880-83,  3rd  ed.  in  3  vols.  1906-8). 

4.  Ethih  (1886,  3rd  ed.  in  2  vols.  1903).^ 

5.  System  der  Pkilosophie  (1889,  3rd.  ed.  1907). 

6.  Volker psychologie.     (So  far  5  vols.,  published 

since  1900,  partly  in  2nd  ed.) 

Wundfs  ability  to  familiarise  himself  thor- 
oughly with  all  fields  of  knowledge,  and  to 
enrich  them  all  by  his  ingenious  combinations, 

^  Lectures  on  Human  and  Animal  Psychology,  by  Wilhelm 
JVundt.  Translated  by  /.  E.  Creighton  and  E.  B.  Titchener. 
Swan  Sonnenschein  &  Co.,  London. — (Tr.) 

^  Principles  of  Physiological  Psychology.  Vol.  i.  Translated 
by  E.  B.  Titchener.  Swan  Sonnenschein  &  Co.,  London, 
1904.— (Tr.) 

»  Ethics.  Translated  by  E.  B.  Titchener, ./.  H.  Gulliver,  and  M.  F. 
Washburn.     3  vols.    Swan  Sonnenschein  &  Co.,  London. — (Tr.) 


IDEALISM  195 

by  his  inspiring  ideas  and  researches,  and  by 
a  rare  gift  for  systematic-architectonic  analysis, 
has  made  him  not  only  the  greatest  all-round 
scholar  of  our  time,  but  also  the  most  successful 
representative  of  those  who  aim  at  a  mediation 
between  philosophy  and  the  special  sciences. 
In  this  respect  he  may  be  called  a  modern  Aris- 
totle or  Leibniz.  Wundt,  if  anyone,  has  aided 
in  fostering  a  greater  respect  for  philosophy, 
its  efforts  and  results,  and  in  restoring  a  more 
lively  interest  to  the  queen  of  the  sciences  in 
the  higher  sense  of  the  word.  He  has  not  only 
projected  and  carried  through  a  comprehensive 
and  detailed  system  of  philosophy,  but  through 
exhaustive  researches  in  the  sphere  of  the  sepa- 
rate philosophical  disciplines,  he  has  also  been 
able  to  preserve  the  connection  everywhere  with 
the  results  of  the  separate  sciences.  Chrono- 
logically also  his  philosophy  is  the  final  step  in 
the  series  we  are  here  considering.  But  above 
all,  it  is  in  the  writings  of  Wundt  that  we  first 
find  the  process  of  approximating  and  assimi- 
lating the  methods  and  results  of  the  natural 
and  mental  sciences,  brought  to  a  provisional 
conclusion — a  conclusion,  indeed,  which  may 
for  a  long  time  serve  as  an  example. 


196     PHILOSOPHY   OF  THE   PRESENT 

Philosophy,  according  to  Wundt,  is  based 
upon  all  the  separate  sciences,  and  forms  a 
general  supplement  and  completion  of  them. 
Its  task  is  to  unite  into  a  consistent  system  the 
general  knowledge  contained  in  these  various 
sciences,  and  to  trace  back  to  their  principles 
the  general  methods  and  presuppositions  of 
knowledge  used  by  science  in  general.  There- 
fore, the  division  of  philosophy  is  dependent 
upon  the  logical  arrangement  of  the  separate 
sciences — that  is,  upon  their  system.  Without 
further  discussion,  we  shall  give  in  the  follow- 
ing table  the  main  divisions  of  his  general 
conception  of  philosophy. 


Philosophy 


Science  of  Knowledge 


Formal 
Logic 


Theory  of 
Knowledge 


History  and 

Development 

of 

Knowledge 


General 

and 

Special 

Theorv 

of  ' 

Knowledge 


Science  of  Principles 
Special 


General  = 
Metaphysics 


Philosophy 

of 

Nature 


Philosophy 

of 

Mind 

I 

Special  = 
Ethics 


General      Special  = 
General 
Cosmology,     and  Phil- 
General        osophy  of 
Biology,  Rights, 

General        Esthetics, 
Anthropology    Philosophy 
of  Re- 
ligion, 
Philosophy 
of  History 


IDEALISM  197 

Among  these  philosophical  disciplines,  the 
science  of  knowledge  deals  with  the  origin  of 
the  contents  of  knowledge,  with  knowledge  in 
the  making  ;  while  the  science  of  principles  deals 
with  the  systematic  combination  of  the  principles 
of  the  contents  of  knowledge — that  is,  with 
completed  knowledge.  For  our  purpose  we 
need  not  consider  formal  logic,  on  the  one 
hand,  nor  the  special  forms  of  the  science  of 
principles  on  the  other.  Our  immediate  purpose 
will  be  rather  to  give  a  brief  presentation 
of  the  epistemology  and  metaphysics  of  this 
philosopher. 

Now,  according  to  Wundt,  while  our  thinking 
in  its  application  has  nothing  whatever  to  do 
with  the  question  as  to  whether  the  ideas  to 
which  it  relates  have  a  real  objective  signi- 
ficance or  not,  knowledge,  on  the  contrary,  is 
determined  by  this  relation  of  thought  to  a 
reality  of  its  contents.  If  we  isolate  this  reality 
of  a  thought-content,  there  arises  the  idea  of 
experience,  which  is  to  be  conceived  as  immedi- 
ate, so  far  as  it  precedes  all  deliberation,  reflec- 
tion, and  logical  relation,  while  the  contents  of 
knowledge  in  which  the  determinations  of  our 


198     PHILOSOPHY   OF   THE   PRESENT 

thought  have  in  any  way  intervened  must  be 
considered  as  mediate  experience.    Accordingly, 
we   can  classify  all  of  our  affective  processes, 
ideas,  and  voluntary  actions  as  immediate  experi- 
ence.    To  them,  then,  we  can  apply  the  term 
'  data  of  experience.'     Among  these,  ideas  first 
engage  the    interest    of  the   knowing   subject. 
These  ideas,  however,  are  originally  not  different 
from  the  objects  of  our  perception,  and  can  there- 
fore be  characterised  on  account  of  this  unity 
as  '  objects  of  idea.'    The  separation  of  our  ideas 
from  the  objects  to  which  they  refer  is  a  subse- 
quent step,  a  later  result   of  logical   analysis. 
The  elaboration  which  thought  performs  on  these 
'  data  of  experience '  cannot,  to  be  sure,  destroy 
their  original    unity,   but   can   only   remove  it 
conceptually.    The  concepts  formed  in  this  way 
by  reflection   must   never  be    mistaken  for  or 
confused  with  the  original  experience.     More- 
over, the  motives  which  lead  to  a  discrimination 
in    the    '  data    of    experience '    must    in    every 
individual  case  be  carefully  examined,  because 
the  value  of  these   motives   alone    determines 
whether  or  not  the  distinctions  made  by  them 
have  any  real  significance. 


IDEALISM  199 

Among  these  '  data  of  experience,'  the  ideas 
first  of  all  call  for  an  important  and  penetrating 
analysis.     These  seem  to  be  the  elements  of  our 
immediate  experience,  which  once  for  all  must 
be   accepted    as    given.      From   the    ideas    we 
naturally   distinguish    '  willing  '    and    '  feeling,' 
as    processes    which    involve    a    spontaneous 
activity.     Examined  more  closely,  however,  our 
whole  inner  being  seems  to  have   this  double 
nature:   "There  is  no  voluntary  nor  ideational 
process  which  is  not   at  the  same   time  both 
active  and  passive."     The  w411  can  always  be 
made  the  real  centre  of  those  relations  by  virtue 
of  which  an  ego  separates  itself  fi'om   a  non- 
ego.     The  motive  for  this  lies  in  the  constancy 
with  which  the  will   is   represented  to   us   as 
present   in    consciousness.      The   feelings    and 
sensations    in    states    of    tension    and    excite- 
ment,  which   are  characteristic  expressions  of 
the   activity    of  will,    are    distinguished   by   a 
great  constancy,  and  offer,  by  the  gradation  of 
their  intensity  and  quality,  a  standard  by  which 
the  objective  results  of  any  activity  of  the  will 
may  be  measured.     But  this  special  relation  of 
the  will   to   the    subject    is    only  a   secondary 
process  of  knowledge,  which  changes  nothing 


200     PHILOSOPHY   OF  THE   PRESENT 

of  the  original  unity  of  all  '  data  of  experi- 
ence.' In  reality,  subject  and  object  remain 
inseparably  bound  together.  The  separation 
spoken  of,  just  as  every  other,  can  therefore 
lead  only  to  diiferent  thought-determinations 
of  one  and  the  same  real  fact,  not  by  itself  to 
different  facts.  Hence  the  problem  of  episte- 
mology  is  not  to  create  objective  reality  out  of 
elements  which  in  themselves  are  not  as  yet 
objective,  but  rather  the  only  problem  capable 
of  solution,  namely,  that  of  preserving  objective 
reality  v^herever  it  is  present,  and  of  deciding 
the  question  of  its  existence  wherever  there  is 
any  doubt. 

If  we  distinguish  now  in  any  given  '  object 
of  idea,'  between  an  idea,  on  the  one  hand, 
which  is  referred  to  the  subject,  and,  on  the 
other,  an  object  that  must  be  conceptually 
determined  as  free  as  possible  from  contra- 
diction, then  it  follows  that  everything  which 
belongs  to  the  subject  can  be  immediately 
experienced,  is  given  intuitively.  On  the  other 
hand,  the  world  of  objects,  which  out  of  regard 
for  a  consistent  presentation  must  do  without 
many  attributes  assigned  to  the  subject — as,  for 
example,  sense-qualities — is  consequently  given 


IDEALISM  201 

to  us  only  conceptually.  Even  if,  however, 
the  mere  being  of  objects,  the  character  of 
objectivity  as  such,  may  be  found  given  in  the 
'  data  of  experience,'  nevertheless  the  nature 
of  the  objects,  owing  to  the  corrections  which 
are  necessarily  made  in  scientific  knowledge, 
is  to  be  considered  only  as  conceptual  and 
belonging  to  so-called  mediate  experience.  If 
we  set  apart  the  *  data  of  experience '  relating 
to  the  subject  for  treatment  in  a  scientific 
psychology  and  entrust  natural  science  with  the 
task  of  examining  the  objects,  then,  according  to 
what  has  been  said,  the  world  of  the  psycholo- 
gist is  perceptual  and  immediately  given,  while, 
on  the  contrary,  the  world  of  the  investigator 
in  natural  science  is  conceptual  and  mediately 
given. 

How  far,  in  the  conceptual  working  over  of 
experience,  one  can  and  may  depart  from  it 
cannot  be  stated  concretely  off-hand.  But 
among  the  principles  which  govern  our  think- 
ing, we  know  one  w^hich  has  the  possibility 
in  itself  of  transcending  a  given  content  of 
experience.  This  principle  is  that  of  the  con- 
nection of  our  ideas  according  to  cause  and 
effect.     Since  the  content  of  our  experience  is 


202     PHILOSOPHY   OF  THE   PRESENT 

always  limited,  the  universally  valid  application 
of  the  principles  of  cause  and  eifect  must  of 
necessity  demand  a  transcending  of  given  em- 
pirical bounds,  since  we  have  to  seek  outside 
of  real  experience  for  the  cause  and  effect 
appertaining  to  certain  beginnings  and  termini 
within  our  experience.  Cause  and  effect,  how- 
ever, stand  in  a  necessary  conceptual  relation 
only  when  they  are  conceived  as  members  of 
one  and  the  same  whole.  From  this  the  idea 
can  be  developed  that  because  of  the  assump- 
tion of  such  a  whole,  any  change  in  one 
member  must  be  bound  up  with  a  correspond- 
ing change  in  the  other.  Therefore,  the  idea  of 
an  unlimited  progress,  to  which  the  application 
of  that  principle  forces  us,  will  at  the  same 
time  carry  with  it  the  further  idea  of  a  totality 
of  all  being,  in  which  all  progress  is  to  be 
conceived  as  completed. 

If  we  understand  by  transcendence,  a  know- 
ledge which  leads  out  beyond  the  limits  of  any 
given  experience,  then  there  are,  as  Wimdt 
shows,  using  mathematics  as  an  example,  two 
kinds  of  transcendence — a  quantitative  and  a 
qualitative.  A  quantitative  transcendence  is 
present,   for  example,   when    the  given  space- 


IDEALISM  203 

idea  is  extended  out  beyond  the  limits  empiri- 
cally established.  Such  a  transcendence  has 
the  character  of  real  experience,  because  in 
this  process  the  contents  of  what  is  given  are 
carried  over  into  the  realm  beyond  the  limits 
of  experience.  On  the  other  hand,  we  have 
a  qualitative  transcendence  when  one  passes 
from  a  distinctive  experience,  as,  for  example, 
from  the  data  given  in  consciousness,  to  quali- 
tatively different  ones,  thereby  introducing  an 
imaginary  transcendence.  In  this  manner,  the 
former  procedure  results  in  the  construction  of 
a  reality  not  given  in  experience ;  the  latter, 
however,  in  nothing  more  than  a  possibility  of 
thought.  Where  we  have  to  do  with  such 
things  as  space,  time,  and  the  number  of 
objects,  a  transcendence  of  the  mathematical 
kind  encounters  no  real  difficulties.  Qualita- 
tive transcendence,  however,  can  at  best  yield 
only  lasting  hypotheses,  which,  however,  serve 
as  a  supplement  in  making  of  experience  a 
consistent  unity.  Progression  into  the  tran- 
scendent, which  in  the  science  of  mathematics 
is  of  mere  formal  significance,  has  to  do  in 
metaphysics  not  only  with  the  form,  but  also 
with  the  content  of  experience. 


204     PHILOSOPHY   OF  THE   PRESENT 

Metaphysical  problems  are  three  in  number 
— a  cosmological,  a  psychological,  and  an  on- 
tological  problem.  Transcendence  leads  in 
cosmology  to  the  idea  of  an  absolute,  indi- 
visible unity,  and  to  the  idea  of  an  infinite 
totality  of  external  experience.  This  same 
twofold  progression  we  must  carry  through 
in  psychological  transcendence  with  regard  to 
inner  experience,  and  in  ontological  transcend- 
ence with  regard  to  the  totality  of  knowledge. 
In  the  field  of  cosmology,  the  ideas  of  infinite 
space  and  infinite  time  arise  in  the  form  of  a 
quantitative  transcendence  ;  while  the  ideas  of 
unlimited  matter  and  eternal  causality  appear  in 
the  form  of  a  qualitative  transcendence.  The 
concept  of  a  quantitatively  endless  universe 
divides  into  two  concepts  which  are  necessarily 
related:  namely,  the  idea  of  endless  progress, 
and  the  idea  of  an  infinite  totality.  The  final 
unity  of  outward  experience  finds  its  expression 
in  the  concept  of  the  atom.  Empirical  science, 
however,  knows  only  relative  atoms.  The  idea 
of  a  final  absolutely  indivisible  element  of 
matter  demands  absolute  singleness,  which  one 
can  only  reach  in  this  field  when  one  limits 
one's  self  to  a  merely  formal  idea,  to  a  material 


IDEALISM  205 

point.  This,  to  be  sure,  reduces  matter  itself 
to  a  mere  '  thing  of  thought.'  Furthermore,  in 
regard  to  the  totality  of  the  world- contents  and 
world-phenomena,  our  thought  wavers  between 
an  unlimited  and  a  limited  or  circumscribed 
transcendence. 

The  psychological  problem  leads  likewise  to 
the  ideas  of  an  individual  unity  and  a  universal 
totality.  In  this  case,  however,  the  quantita- 
tive and  qualitative  transcendence  cannot  be 
separated  from  each  other.  "  The  mental  must 
have  some  quality."  Therefore  the  psycho- 
logical concepts  become  lasting  hypotheses, 
which,  apart  from  the  satisfaction  that  oui* 
reason,  owing  to  its  love  of  unity,  finds  in  their 
formation,  have  in  addition  a  practical  signifi- 
cance, because  the  questions  which  refer  to  the 
final  conditions  of  our  own  being  have  a  dis- 
proportionately greater  value  for  us  than  cosmo- 
logical  considerations.  All  subjective  conditions 
can  be  referred  back  to  two  diametrically 
opposite  states,  activity  and  passivity.  All 
feelings  in  particular  bear  this  character,  and 
with  them,  and  at  the  same  time  because  of 
them,  ideas  and  acts  of  will.  Withal,  activity 
and    passivity    are    reciprocal    processes,     for 


206     PHILOSOPHY    OF  THE   PRESENT 

passivity  itself  is  repressed  activity,  and  both 
are  experienced  by  us  successively  or  simul- 
taneously. Still  we  always  conceive  activity 
as  something  more  immediately  characteristic 
of  our  ego  than  passivity,  because  we  refer  the 
latter  to  objects  which  affect  us,  and  which 
thereby  hamper  us  and  our  activity.  If  we 
designate  as  our  will  that  pure  activity  which  is 
characteristic  of  the  ego  in  contrast  to  the 
objects  affecting  it,  then  we  can  say  :  "  There 
is  absolutely  nothing  outside  of  man,  nor  in  him, 
which  he  can  call  fully  and  wholly  his  own, 
except  his  will."  Thus  there  remains,  as  the 
goal  of  a  transcendent  process  aiming  to  arrive 
at  a  psychical  unity,  the  pure  will. 

On  the  other  side,  empirical  relations  of 
mental  unities  reveal  themselves  to  us  in  the 
form  of  ever  more  comprehensive  communities 
of  will.  The  final  term  of  this  series  can  be 
nothing  other  than  a  collective  human  will, 
which  unites  all  human  nature  in  the  conscious 
performance  of  definite  will-purposes.  Now 
the  idea  of  such  a  community  is  not  merely 
a  theoretical  construction ;  it  is  at  the  same 
time  a  practical  ideal.  It  is  not  to  be  doubted 
"  that  if  any  meaning,  intelligible  to  our  rational 


IDEALISM  207 

minds,  is  to  be  given  to  the  whole  course  of 
human  history,  it  can  only  be  found  in  the 
development  of  the  ideal  of  humanity.  For 
this,  to  be  sure,  the  empirical  evolution  of  the 
totality  of  mind  offers  only  incomplete  begin- 
nings, but  nevertheless  beginnings  from  which, 
on  the  one  hand,  the  progress  of  our  theoreti- 
cal rational  knowledge  can  emanate,  and  to 
which,  on  the  other  hand,  all  of  our  practical 
humanitarian  efforts  must  ultimately  refer," 

From  this  point,  the  approach  to  the  onto- 
logical  ideas  opens  before  us.  For  the  realisa- 
tion of  this  ideal  of  humanity  demands  at  once 
an  adequate  basis  in  some  comprehensive  onto- 
logical  idea.  But  the  real  point  of  departure 
for  the  treatment  of  the  ontological  problem  lies 
in  the  fact  "  that  the  original  '  object  of  idea ' 
is  divisible  into  its  two  parts,  the  object  and 
the  idea,  to  be  kept  separate  from  each  other, 
and  yet  belonging  together."  As  a  result  of  this 
unity  of  the  'object  of  idea,'  reflection  is  directed 
from  the  beginning  toward  a  subsequent  ab- 
rogation of  the  separation  which  was  effected 
by  it.  For  this  reason,  the  attempt  is  made  to 
unite  the  cosmological  and  psychological  ideas 
of  unity.    Such  a  proceeding  is  permissible  only 


208     PHILOSOPHY   OF  THE   PRESENT 

on  the  07ie  condition  that  the  already  completed 
partial  transcendences  lead  out  beyond  them- 
selves, "  whether  it  be  that  they  demand  the 
postulate  of  an  absolute  being  diiferent  from 
both  contents  of  experience,  or  that  the  one 
process  merges  into  the  other,  so  that  the  re- 
sultant furnishes  the  idea  of  unity  which  is 
common  to  both  series."  Only  the  second  of 
these  possibilities  seems  to  Wundt  a  real  solution 
of  the  ontological  problem.  The  first  would 
yield  an  idea  wholly  indefinite  as  to  content 
and  form,  with  which  one  could  do  nothing. 
Consequently  the  world  must  be  conceived  by 
us  either  as  a  material  or  a  spiritual  unity. 
Now  all  idea  of  objects  rests  upon  an  eff'ect 
which  the  will  experiences ;  the  will  is  passive 
when  it  is  acted  upon,  and  it  is  active  when 
this  passive  condition  stimulates  it  to  ideational 
activity.  But  the  thing  which  limits  the  ego 
is  in  itself  unknown.  We  can  only  conclude 
from  our  own  experience  that  whatever  occasions 
passivity  must  in  itself  be  active.  Now  since 
there  is  absolutely  no  other  activity  known  to 
us  excepting  that  of  our  wills,  we  can,  in  every 
case,  refer  our  own  passivity  only  to  another 
will,  and  can  trace  back  all  phenomena  accord- 


IDEALISM  209 

ingly  to  a  reciprocal  action  of  different  wills. 
From  the  reciprocal  determination  of  the  in- 
dividual wills  there  emerges  in  consequence  the 
idea.  Hence  the  world  can  be  conceived  as 
the  totality  of  will  activity,  which  through  its 
reciprocal  determination — i.e.  the  ideational 
activity — arranges  itself  in  an  evolution  series 
of  will-unities  of  different  compass. 

The  universal  ontological  idea  of  an  absolute 
totality  was  foreshadowed  in  the  reference  to 
the  practical  ideal  of  humanity.  Since  this 
presupposes  a  completed  spiritual  unity  of  man- 
kind, an  adequate  basis  for  it  can  in  turn  be 
conceived  of  only  as  a  unit.  There  is  no  ob- 
stacle to  extending  this  last  world-ground  beyond 
the  measure  demanded  by  these  results,  and 
regarding  it  as  infinite  and  thereby  subordina- 
ting to  it  the  idea  of  the  moral  human  ideal  as 
something  only  relatively  infinite.  By  reason 
of  this,  to  be  sure,  the  idea  of  an  absolute 
world-ground  is  indeterminable.  If  we  identify 
it  with  the  idea  of  God,  then  metaphysics  is  not 
in  position  to  endow  it  with  any  concrete  con- 
tent. This  gap  can  only  be  filled  by  religious 
faith,  when  it  takes  the  content  of  its  idea  of 
God  from  the  moral  ideal.     God  is  therefore 

o 


210     PHILOSOPHY    OF   THE    PRESENT 

conceived  of  as  the  World-will,  but  cosmic 
evolution  is  to  be  thought  of  as  the  unfolding 
of  the  divine  will  and  activity.  To  be  sure,  all 
rational  ideas  are  indemonstrable,  but,  as  history 
teaches,  they  are  of  an  empirical  universal 
validity.  Since  philosophy  seeks  to  trace  them 
back  to  the  generally  valid  nature  of  reason,  it 
discloses  the  genuine  kernel  of  those  ideas,  and 
proves  them  in  themselves  to  be  necessary. 
"  To  accomplish  more  is  neither  in  its  purpose 
nor  in  its  power.  In  particular  it  must  re- 
frain entirely  from  showing,  in  addition  to  that 
necessity  of  the  idea,  the  necessity  of  a  reality 
corresponding  to  the  idea." 

When  we  compare  the  metaphysics  here 
briefly  presented,  with  the  corresponding  teach- 
ing of  a  Fechner,  Lotze,  or  von  Hartmann,  the 
great  difi'erences  in  methodology  and  content 
cannot  escape  us.  Here  experience  and  the 
laws  of  rational  thought  are  the  only  guiding 
stars,  the  only  foundation,  and  the  only  aids  to 
investigation.  Experience  supplies  the  facts, 
the  empirical  sciences  the  provisional  results  of 
a  systematic  examination  of  these  facts,  and 
metaphysics  starts  from  these  results  in  order 
to  carry  them  further  and  perfect  them  from  a 


IDEALISM  211 

logical  point  of  view.  In  all  this,  JVundt  ab- 
stains from  all  fantastic  analogies,  all  purely 
dialectic  treatment  and  interpretation  of  scien- 
tific ideas,  all  independent  encroachment  upon 
the  facts  worked  out  by  the  separate  disciplines. 
Philosophy  with  him  limits  itself  primarily  to  a 
presentation  of  the  presuppositions  which  form 
the  foundation  of  the  sciences,  and  to  a  syste- 
matic correlation  and  final  summary  of  their 
results.  His  philosophy  is  at  the  same  time 
free  from  that  ontology  in  which  realities  are 
made  to  correspond  without  further  ado  to 
concepts  dialectically  deduced,  and  in  which 
the  logically  necessary  continuity  of  our  know- 
ledge is  confused  with  a  necessity  of  being  and 
occurrence. 

This  explains  that  wise  reserve  which  causes 
Wundt  in  his  metaphysics  to  avoid  all  super- 
fluous or  baseless  speculations  and  to  renounce 
all  specious  reasoning  which  does  not  agree  with 
strictly  scientific  method.  In  his  reverence  for 
facts  and  for  the  sciences  which  deal  with  facts, 
he  is  not  excelled  by  any  positivist.  Although 
in  his  specific  labours — such,  for  example,  as 
those  in  the  field  of  psychology — he  exhibits 
an  inclination  toward  the  large  comprehensive 


212     PHILOSOPHY   OF  THE   PRESENT 

things,  nevertheless  he  has  lost  neither  his 
interest  in,  nor  his  appreciation  for  the  small 
and  modest  advances  v^^hich  are  made  in  ordi- 
nary research  in  the  field  of  empirical  knowledge. 
And  yet,  at  the  same  time,  Idealism,  with  its 
transcendent  realities  of  spiritual  life,  receives  at 
his  hands  a  complete  and  undiminished  vindica- 
tion. Will  and  Idea  are  the  ultimate  elements 
of  all  reality ;  spiritual  communities  are  the  final 
goal  of  all  evolution ;  while  in  the  establishing 
of  this  goal,  and  in  making  the  assumption  of 
a  divine  being  which  vouches  for  its  realisation 
and  makes  it  possible,  ethical  motives  have 
been  of  essential  moment. 

But  although  TFundfs  philosophical  system 
is  so  grandly  planned  and  so  rich  in  original 
applications,  although  he  has  turned  to  account 
most  completely  and  carefully  the  inheritance 
of  the  modern  special  sciences,  and  although 
he  has  appreciated  most  fully  the  value  of  a 
philosophy  directed  toward  the  sum  total  of 
a  unified  world-theory,  nevertheless  his  system 
forces  upon  us  certain  questions,  a  few  of  which 
we  must  now  consider. 

Idealism,  as  we  have  seen,  is  characterised 
in  general  by  the  fact  that  it  uses  self-know- 


IDEALISM  213 

ledge,  the  essence  of  the  knowing  mind,  as 
the  key  with  which  to  unlock  the  world-secret. 
Although  this  principle  in  itself  may  arouse 
opposition,  we  must  not  stop  here  to  establish 
its  validity,  depending  as  it  does  upon  some- 
what involved  arguments,  incapable  of  brief 
formulation.  In  the  general  critique  of  Idealism 
at  the  close  of  this  section,  we  shall  make  some 
statements  with  reference  to  it.  But  in  this 
connection  we  wish  simply  to  raise  the  question, 
whether  Wundt,  with  his  belief  that  the  will 
expresses  our  being  most  exactly,  and  that  the 
world,  therefore,  consists  of  will-units,  has  dis- 
covered the  most  probable  solution  of  the 
world-riddle  among  all  theories  of  qualitative 
transcendence.  There  are  certain  critical  con- 
siderations which,  as  it  seems  to  us,  make  the 
affirmation  of  this  question  doubtful. 

First,  let  us  point  out  that  our  study  of 
mental  life  has  revealed  to  us  a  large  number 
of  elementary  contents  none  of  which  can  be 
traced  back  to  other  contents,  any  more  than 
all  can  be  considered  manifolds  of  a  single 
elementary  phenomenon.  Red  cannot  be  reduced 
to  blue,  heat  to  cold,  pleasure  to  pain  ;  nor  does 
the    claim   that  they    are   all    combinations   of 


214     PHILOSOPHY   OF  THE   PRESENT 

simpler  homogeneous  elements  rest  upon  any 
better  ground.  A  metaphysics,  therefore,  which 
in  connection  with  scientific  psychology  seeks 
to  establish  the  nature  of  the  soul,  has  no 
occasion  for  positing  an  ultimate  element  of 
all  soul  life,  following,  for  instance,  the  example 
of  natural  philosophy.  We  are  of  the  opinion, 
therefore,  that  on  this  point  there  is  no  paral- 
lelism of  method  between  the  cosmological  and 
psychological  problems,  and  that  the  essence 
of  individual  personality  on  its  mental  side 
cannot  be  grasped  when  we  try  to  discover  or 
assume  such  a  problematical  unity.  The  pro- 
blem of  the  psychic  ego,  as  experience  reveals 
it  to  us,  and  as  scientific  psychology  elaborates 
it  with  all  the  aids  of  detailed  research,  is  rather 
the  problem  of  the  unified  connection  of  the  co- 
existence and  succession  of  a  gi'eat  manifold  of 
elementary  processes  difi'ering  among  themselves. 
There  exists,  therefore,  so  far  as  we  can  see, 
no  necessity  for  considering  one  element  as 
more  fundamental  than  another. 

The  difficulty  of  the  position  becomes  more 
apparent  as  soon  as  we  make  clear  to  ourselves 
the  result  of  Wundt's  attempt  at  transcendence 
in   the   matter  of  a  final   psychic  unity.     For 


IDEALISM  215 

the  chief  difficulty  with  his  theory  of  individual 
activity  of  the  will  lies  in  the  fact  that  it 
does  not  explain  the  empirical  manifoldness  of 
psychic  processes.  The  activity  of  every  will-in- 
itself,  he  says,  is  pure  volition,  but  through  the 
reciprocal  action  of  different  wills,  it  becomes 
real  or  ideational  volition.  Just  how  from  the 
reciprocal  action  of  pure  wills,  ideas  may  arise 
it  is  difficult  to  see,  and  up  to  this  time  scientific 
psychological  analysis  has  not  made  the  assump- 
tion probable,  nor  has  it  made  clear  how  such 
pure  activity  of  will  taken  alone  by  itself  could 
exist  anyway.  When,  in  general,  we  charac- 
terise our  inner  states  as  an  opposition  of  activity 
and  passivity,  then  we  have,  by  the  use  of  two 
abstract  concepts,  whose  applicability  reaches 
out  far  beyond  the  psychic  sphere,  defined  them 
from  one  point  of  view  only,  and  we  must 
not  forget  that  our  mental  life  shows  other 
sides,  which  can  likewise  through  abstraction 
be  made  objects  of  special  consideration  and 
be  made  generally  applicable  by  corresponding 
generalisation.  It  seems  to  us  that  by  no 
logical  procedure  can  we  pass  from  such 
an  abstraction  to  the  demand  for  an  actus 
pur  us  which  would  be  "  the  inmost  being  of  the 


216     PHILOSOPHY   OF  THE   PRESENT 

individual  subject,"  and  indeed  of  all  things  in 
general. 

To  be  sure,  it  is  really  to  further  my  under- 
standing and  evaluation  of  myself,  that  I  regard 
myself  not  simply  as  a  link  in  a  chain  of 
mechanical  events,  but  as  self-active,  having 
power  to  influence  the  course  of  events,  hinder- 
ing or  helping,  hastening  or  retarding,  increasing 
or  diminishing.  Moreover,  my  share  in  the 
world  of  events  depends  upon  my  talents,  upon 
my  whole  past  and  my  whole  course  of  develop- 
ment, all  of  which,  as  compared  with  the  casual 
grounds  determining  my  actions,  take  precedence 
and  can  assert  their  authority.  But  the  activity 
which  I  develop  by  reason  of  these  conditions 
results  from  an  innumerable  and  quite  incalcul- 
able variety  of  factors.  I  am  a  cause  of  changes 
in  the  world,  not  as  pure  will,  but  as  an  inde- 
terminable multiplicity  of  capacities  for  action, 
each  of  which  has  its  own  law  and  history. 
Here,  then,  we  are  once  more  led  to  look  upon 
the  individual  as  an  independent  complex  of 
conditions,  no  matter  how  complicated,  and  for 
that  reason  to  regard  unity  in  multiplicity  as 
the  real  problem  of  the  psychic  ego. 

Finally,  let  us  point  out  in   Wicndfs  meta- 


IDEALISM  217 

physics  a  difficulty  in  regard  to  the  oft-mentioned 
problem  of  reality.  The  point  of  departure  for 
investigation  in  epistemology  is  the  idea  that 
our  immediate  experiences — that  is  to  say,  the 
'  data  of  experience  ' — are  simply  a  given  reality 
which,  in  spite  of  all  the  determinations  of 
thought  practised  upon  it,  cannot  be  set  aside, 
divided,  or  otherwise  changed.  Therefore,  let 
scientific  and  psychological  reflection  speak,  if 
it  will,  of  an  object  and  of  subjective  conditions 
— as  a  matter  of  fact  both  are  inseparably 
connected  with  each  other.  For  that  reason, 
the  problem  of  epistemology  is  not  to  create 
objective  reality,  but  rather  to  preserve  it  where 
it  is  present,  and  to  come  to  a  decision  in 
doubtful  cases.  Therefore,  all  reflection  should 
from  the  beginning  be  directed  to  the  elimina- 
tion of  the  division  into  object  and  subject 
which  is  practised  upon  the  original  unity  of 
the  '  object  of  idea.'  Therein  lies  the  real 
point  of  departure  for  the  treatment  of  the 
ontological  problem. 

One  asks  himself  involuntarily  after  the  above 
discussion  of  Wundt,  What  then  exactly  is 
reality?  Positive  and  metaphysical  tendencies 
clearly  conflict  with  each  other  here.     It  corre- 


218     PHILOSOPHY   OF  THE   PRESENT 

sponds  to  MacKs  standpoint,  when  the  reality  of 
the  original  experience  is  emphasised,  and  only 
a  secondary  significance  is  given  to  the  thought- 
determinations.  But  in  that  case  every  meta- 
physics, especially  a  metaphysical  transcendence, 
would  have  to  be  excluded,  or  entrusted  with 
the  merely  negative  task  of  unmasking  all 
realities  created  by  thought  as  mere  shams,  as 
more  or  less  purposive  expedients  and  the  like. 
On  the  other  hand,  Wundt  is  evidently  endea- 
vouring, in  opposition  to  Mach,  to  seek  reality, 
and  is  not  willing  to  stop  with  the  original 
actuality  of  the  '  object  of  idea.'  The  doctrine 
of  the  units  of  will,  standing  in  reciprocal 
relation  to  one  another,  can  in  no  way  be 
regarded  as  simply  a  renewal  of  that  which  the 
data  of  experience  in  themselves  are  and  signify 
prior  to  all  reflection.  It  is,  therefore,  not  quite 
clear  in  Wundt  just  what  relation  the  reality, 
unreservedly  granted  to  experience,  to  '  objects 
of  idea,'  has  to  the  reality  of  objects  of  thought, 
or  thought-things,  which  is  established  by  the 
rational  working  over  of  the  facts  of  experience. 
It  cannot  be  that  there  are  two  such  realities 
existing  side  by  side,  in  so  far  as  they  relate  to 
the  same  empirical  matter  of  fact.     Either  only 


IDEALISM  219 

that  which  is  empirically  found  in  experience  is 
real — if  so,  then  plainly  all  metaphysical  creation 
and  aspiration  are  futile ;  or,  our  thought  has 
the  power  to  posit  and  to  determine  realities — 
if  so,  then  experience,  even  if  it  is  the  point  of 
departure  and  guide  to  research,  is  in  itself 
unreal.  In  any  case,  it  becomes  apparent  that 
it  is  again  the  problem  of  reality  that  deserves 
a  penetrating  study,  before  we  shall  be  able, 
after  the  manner  of  idealistic  metaphysics  work- 
ing in  connection  with  the  existing  reality 
of  consciousness,  and  in  connection  with  the 
real  sciences,  to  establish  the  true  nature  of  the 
world. 

The  metaphysics  of  Wundt  is  certainly  to  be 
regarded  as  the  most  imposing,  most  systemati- 
cally matured  form  of  Idealism  of  the  present 
time,  and  conforms  most  nearly  in  method  and 
content  to  scientific  demands.  His  System  der 
Philosojphie,  with  its  pure  and  natural  style,  is 
therefore  to  be  most  highly  recommended  for 
study  to  those  who  wish  to  obtain  a  deeper 
insight  into  the  nature  and  tendency  of  modern 
philosophy.  One's  esteem  and  admiration  for 
this  work  and  its  author  are  not  diminished  by 
one's   many  doubts   about   the    correctness   or 


220     PHILOSOPHY   OF  THE   PRESENT 

probability  of  this  or  that  assertion  or  hypothesis, 
no  matter  how  fundamental  these  may  be. 
Should  only  Kantians  be  able  to  esteem  and 
recognise  a  Kant,  or  Herbartians  a  Herhart,  in 
his  greatness  and  significance  %  Contact  with 
the  special  sciences  in  their  totality,  which  is 
characteristic  of  the  development  and  peculiarity 
of  the  philosophy  of  the  present,  has  reached,  at 
least  in  Germany,  its  greatest  scope  and  inti- 
macy in  Wundt.  In  this  respect,  only  Comte 
and  Spencer  can  be  really  compared  with  him. 
But  the  former  is  not  to  be  considered  in  this 
discussion,  since  he  belongs  to  an  earlier  period, 
and  Spencer,  guided  as  he  was  by  a  one-sided 
scheme  of  philosophical  disciplines  in  which  the 
mental  sciences  did  not  come  into  their  rights, 
performed  a  corresponding  service  only  in  bio- 
logy and  sociology.  Eduard  von  Hartmann, 
however,  who  might  come  into  consideration  in 
this  connection,  never  himself  engaged  in  re- 
search in  the  sphere  of  the  special  sciences,  and 
so  lacks  that  close  relation  to  them  which  in 
Wwndt  meets  us  at  every  step,  and  which 
betrays  not  only  the  man  who  knows,  but  the 
independent  seeker  and  discriminating  scholar. 
Therefore,  he  seems  to  us  to  deserve  most  of  all 


IDEALISM  221 

the  title  of  "  a  modern  Leibniz,"  for  to  him  as 
to  the  earlier  philosopher  no  human  knowledge 
is  foreign,  and  he,  like  Leibniz,  strives  after  a 
theory  of  the  world  which  shall  give  full  weight 
to  the  claims  of  both  the  formal  and  the  real 
sciences.  Wundt  also  arrives  at  a  monado-logi- 
cal  system,  although,  to  be  sure,  he  substitutes 
units  of  will  for  units  of  perception,  and  has 
changed  a  scale  of  monads  quietly  resting  side 
by  side  into  an  actual  community  and  reciprocal 
determination  of  creative  beings. 

Aristotle  placed  the  dianoetic  virtue,  directed 
to  insight  and  knowledge,  above  the  ethical, 
devoted  to  action  and  behaviour.  Later,  Sjnnoza 
found  in  the  intellectual  love  of  God,  which  is 
the  epitome  of  all  wisdom,  and  in  adequate 
knowledge,  which  rightly  interprets  and  utilises 
the  phenomena  of  the  world,  the  content  and 
basis  for  an  existence  worthy  of  mankind,  and 
for  a  "  human  freedom  "  unaffected  by  all  the 
sad  and  confusing  influences  of  blind  passions. 
Similarly,  Wundt  in  his  ethics  has  characterised 
the  creation  of  spiritual  goods  and  values  as 
the  highest  task  of  the  aspiring  will.  In  so 
doing,  he  goes  beyond  the  purely  personal  ac- 
tivity of  intellect  satisfying  to  each  individual 


222     PHILOSOPHY    OF   THE   PRESENT 

as  such,  and  arrives  at  an  objective  teleological 
conception  which  presupposes  the  community 
and  is  planned  to  meet  its  demands.  Here,  as 
everywhere  else,  he  has  endeavoured  to  empha- 
sise the  social  forces  of  the  state,  of  society, 
and  of  humanity  as  of  surpassing  significance 
in  comparison  with  the  doings  and  dealings, 
the  hopes  and  wishes,  of  the  individual.  In 
this  very  point  Wundt  echoes  the  traditions  of 
the  post-Kantian  Idealism  of  a  Hegel,  and,  we 
may  venture  to  add,  he  has  in  high  measure 
justified  this  ideal. 

5.  GENERAL   CRITIQUE   OF   IDEALISM 

Concerning  Idealism  in  general,  it  remains 
to  present  the  following  considerations.  Ideal- 
ism tends  to  the  view  that  a  knowledge  of  the 
mental  is,  by  virtue  of  inner  experience,  easier, 
safer,  and  more  profound  than  a  knowledge  of 
the  outer  w^orld  through  the  medium  of  so-called 
outward  experience.  According  to  Kanfs  op- 
position of  outer  and  inner  sense,  both  are 
equally  easy  or  difficult,  possible  or  impossible. 
The  inner  being  of  the  mind  could  be  as  little 
known,  he   taught,  as  that  of  things    outside 


IDEALISM  223 

ourselves.  In  both  cases  we  have  to  do  with 
phenomena  in  which  factors  of  our  knowing, 
perceiving,  and  thinking  mind  are  always  in 
some  way  present.  Just  how  the  ego  and  the 
non-ego  are  independent  of  these  factors  is  not 
determinable.  But  Schojyenhauer  believed  that 
he  had  an  entirely  diiferent  and  more  immediate 
way  of  approach  to  his  own  inner  being  than 
he  had  to  the  outer  world.  The  latter  can  be 
known  only  through  the  medium  of  the  idea, 
but  we  know  ourselves  as  willing  immediately 
by  an  act  of  pure  intuition.  Similarly  Beneke 
declared  that  our  inner  experience  is  absolutely 
and  completely  trustworthy  ;  we  experience  our- 
selves as  we  are.  According  to  him,  then,  the 
opposition  of  phenomenon  and  thing-in-itself 
has  no  significance. 

Some  modern  psychologists,  and  among  them 
Wundt,  hold  similar  views.  Wundt  character- 
ises consciousness  as  the  sum-total  of  what  we 
experience,  and  sets  psychology  the  task  of 
comprehending  psychical  processes  as  they  are. 
In  regard  to  content,  consciousness  coincides 
exactly  with  mental  facts.  To  experience  a 
psychic  state,  and  to  have  a  consciousness  of  it, 
are  therefore  the  same  thing.     Psychology  will 


224     PHILOSOPHY   OF   THE   PRESENT 

be  diverted  from  its  real  task,  if  that  which  is 
given  in  consciousness  is  conceived  as  nothing 
more  than  a  phenomenal  expression  of  a  being 
different  from  this  expression.  Similar  also  is 
the  view  of  Brentano,  another  influential  psy- 
chologist of  the  present.  He  ascribes  to  inner 
perception,  when  directed  toward  psychic  phe- 
nomena, a  trustworthiness  which  is  lacking  to 
outer  perception  when  directed  to  physical 
phenomena.  But  this  trustworthiness  belongs 
to  inner  perception  for  the  reason  that  it  coin- 
cides with  its  object.  Therefore,  to  perceive  a 
psychic  process  and  to  have  it  are  again  one 
and  the  same  thing.  In  striking  contrast  to 
this  prevalent  view,  we  read  in  Nietzsche,  "  I 
hold  firmly  also  to  the  phenomenal  character 
of  the  inner  world :  all  that  is  known  to  us  is 
first  completely  arranged,  simplified,  schematised, 
and  interpreted." 

The  fact  is  that  this  view  must  be  consider- 
ably restricted,  if  we  wish  to  present  the  true 
facts.  First  of  all,  it  is  clear  that  the  alleged 
superiority  of  our  knowledge  of  the  psychical  is 
true  only  when  the  knowing  subject  and  the 
object  of  knowledge  belong  to  the  same  in- 
dividual.    Only  a  subject.  A,  who  is  sad  over 


IDEALISM  225 

some  disappointment  or  other  unhappy  event,  can 
say  of  his  experiences  that  they  are  absolutely 
as  he  conceives  them  or  as  he  knows  them. 
To  every  other  individual  this  statement  is 
completely  denied — that  is  to  say,  in  so  far  as 
the  psychic  processes  of  the  other  are  concerned. 
If  the  one  who  knows  and  the  phenomenon 
known  are  not  of  the  same  subject,  then  the 
one  has  no  immediate  knowledge  of  the  psychic 
processes  of  the  other,  but,  as  is  generally 
understood,  only  a  mediate  knowledge  obtained 
by  the  interpretation  of  expressions,  words,  and 
the  like.  Since  psychology  is  not  based,  and 
cannot  be  based,  upon  the  consciousness  of  the 
psychologist  alone,  therefore,  it  is  often  able  to 
apprehend  that  which  is  '  given '  as  a  mere 
phenomenon  of  an  existence  which  is  difierent 
from  it.  Now  this  is  true  in  so  far  as  the 
mental  life  of  others  is  nothing  else  than  a 
form  of  being  different  from  the  perception  or 
opinion  of  myself,  the  psychologist.  Scientific 
psychology  makes  no  essential  difference  be- 
tween the  mental  life  of  the  knowing  subject  and 
that  of  his  fellow-man  ;  it  is  indeed  justly  proud 
of  that  participation  or  community  in  its  work 

and  research,  by  virtue  of  which  the  mental 

p 


226     PHILOSOPHY   OF  THE   PRESENT 

life  of  others  is  not  very  differently  valued  from 
that  which  is  found  in  the  psychologist's  own 
consciousness. 

Furthermore,  this  claim  concerning  the  self- 
certainty  of  inner  experience  can  have  reference 
only  to  the  experiences  immediately  present. 
Every  psychic  phenomenon  of  the  past  is  known 
only  by  means  of  memories  or  other  representa- 
tive acts.  That  I  stood  yesterday  in  this  place, 
spoke,  observed,  and  thought — of  these  facts  I 
have  no  immediate  knowledge ;  that  is  to  say, 
the  contents  of  consciousness  at  that  time  are 
not  the  present  ones.  Now  psychology  has  no 
scruples  in  making  use  of  such  remembered 
psychic  phenomena,  of  which  it  is  evident  that 
the  coincidence  of  the  object  and  the  know- 
ledge of  it  cannot  be  affirmed.  In  every 
collection  of  observations  extending  over  a 
certain  period  of  time,  in  every  statement  of 
general  uniform  relations,  in  every  formation 
of  class-concepts  reaching  out  beyond  the  single 
phenomenon  just  experienced,  in  every  metho- 
dically conducted  research,  earlier  experiences 
are  taken  with  present  ones  without  thought 
of  any  fundamental  differences,  and  are  treated 
as   of  equal  value.      A  psychology  which   did 


IDEALISM  227 

not  proceed  in  this  manner  would  soon  end  in 
ridiculous  self-limitation.  For  the  scope  of  the 
contents  which  may  be  experienced  in  an  act 
of  consciousness  is  exceptionally  small.  Scien- 
tific psychology  is,  therefore,  compelled  to  go 
far  beyond  the  circle  of  immediate  experience, 
if  it  wishes  to  gain  a  knowledge  of  psychic  life 
which  shall  be  at  all  complete. 

But  even  in  the  case  of  experiences  im- 
mediately present,  the  unity  of  consciousness 
with  its  object  cannot  be  asserted  without 
restrictions.  For  example,  facts  such  as  just- 
observable  sensations  and  just-observable  differ- 
ences between  sensations  indicate  that  there 
are  sensations  and  differences  of  sensations 
which  we  do  not  notice,  of  which  we  know 
nothing.  If  we  let  a  visual  impression  of  a 
somewhat  complex  nature  act  upon  the  eye  of 
an  attentive  observer  for  a  period  of  time  not 
of  sufficient  length  to  mark  all  of  its  peculiari- 
ties, then  the  observer  is  unable  to  give  an 
account  of  all  that  he  has  seen.  A  good 
example  of  this  is  that  of  letters  thus  dis- 
played ;  the  observer  can  tell  their  number,  to 
be  sui-e,  and  even  name  a  few  of  them  according 
to  then-  phonetic  nature,  but  he  has  no  idea 


228     PHILOSOPHY   OF  THE   PRESENT 

of  their  colour.  Since  it  is  evident  that  he  has 
seen  all  the  letters  coloured,  his  consciousness, 
which  is  able  to  give  no  account  of  their  colour- 
content,  must  certainly  be  called  inadequate.  In 
the  face  of  this  fact,  if  one  should  persist  in  the 
view  that  the  psychical  processes  are  identical 
with  that  which  is  given  in  consciousness,  then 
one  would  arrive  at  the  absurd  conclusion,  that 
under  certain  circumstances  visual  sensations 
are  present  which  have  no  quality,  are  neither 
white  nor  black,  red  nor  green,  &c. 

These  facts,  which  have  been  established  by 
experimental  investigation  of  mental  life,  could 
easily  be  multiplied.  The  examples  given  will 
suffice,  however,  to  show  to  what  extent  the 
assertion,  that  the  psychic  is  what  we  meet  with 
in  consciousness,  needs  limitation  and  modifi- 
cation. Nor  is  it  difficult  to  explain  how  this 
comes  about.  Consciousness,  inner  perception, 
self- observation,  are,  according  to  the  views  of 
modern  psychology,  to  be  traced  back  to  the 
combining  of  earlier  experience  with  new 
psychic  excitations.  This  uniting  process  has 
been  called,  since  the  time  of  Herhart,  aj^jier- 
ception.  To  perceive  a  psychic  process,  to 
have  a  consciousness  of  it,  and  to  apperceive 


IDEALISM  229 

it,  are  accordingly  synonymous  expressions  or 
equivalent  concepts.  We  cannot  ascertain 
immediately  what  sort  of  a  process  it  would 
be  if  it  were  not  apperceived — that  is,  if  no 
earlier  experiences,  voluntarily  or  involuntarily, 
spontaneously  or  on  demand,  came  forward  to 
meet  it  and  prepare  a  welcome  for  it.  This 
can  be  learned  only  indirectly  by  the  aid  of 
special  scientific  research.  It  is  evident,  then, 
that  psychic  phenomena  are  not  as  we  experi- 
ence or  know  them,  because  apperception  in  an 
a  ]priori  incalculable  form  modifies  them,  or, 
as  Nietzsche  says,  "  simplifies  "  and  "  arranges  " 
them. 

From  all  these  considerations,  it  follows  that 
psychology  as  a  science  is  not  in  its  broad 
scope  a  knowledge  of  what  is  given  in  con- 
sciousness. The  establishing  of  facts,  the 
knowledge  of  their  uniformity,  the  explanatory 
theories,  indicate  on  every  side  the  insufficiency 
of  consciousness.  It  is  precisely  this  that  we 
have  in  mind  when  we  say  that  self-perception 
or  self-observation  is  neither  the  richest  nor 
the  purest  source  of  psychological  knowledge, 
and  that  it  needs  supplementing  and  critical 
sifting.     How  far  psychologists  may  or  should 


230     PHILOSOPHY   OF  THE   PRESENT 

deviate  from  original  experience  cannot  be 
determined  a  priori.  Perhaps  the  qualitative 
existence  of  separate  phenomena,  such  as  red, 
pleasure,  &c.,  is  something  unchangeable, 
independent  of  apperception.  If  we  survey, 
however,  the  development  of  modern  psycho- 
logy, we  discover,  even  in  the  field  of  simple 
qualities,  progress  in  analysis,  which  can  only 
be  understood  as  progress  in  scientific  know- 
ledge. How,  then,  can  one  hope  to  establish 
limits  universally  valid,  and  not  simply  pro- 
visional, within  which  consciousness  or  inner 
perception,  mediates  an  adequate  knowledge 
of  the  psychic  phenomena  to  be  observed? 
Rather  must  we  reckon  with  the  possibility 
that  these  phenomena  are  qualitatively  different 
from  the  form  in  which  they  present  themselves 
to  us  in  consciousness.  The  materialist  gives 
expression  to  this  possibility,  when  he  calls  our 
psychic  life  a  brain  function  concerning  which 
inner  perception  tells  us  nothing.  Meta- 
physicians, again,  like  Ilerhart  and  Leihniz, 
Spinoza  and  Wundt,  have  substituted  for 
phenomena  of  consciousness  psychic  realities 
which  differ  essentially  from  them.  In  par- 
ticular,   a    qualitative    transcendence,  such    as 


IDEALISM  231 

Wundt  undertakes  in  his  treatment  of  the 
psychological  problem,  conld  only  be  justified 
on  principle  from  the  standpoint  here  taken. 

Clearly,  inner  perception,  as  to  its  claim 
to  trustworthiness,  is  in  a  bad  way.  In  the 
first  place,  the  mere  *  being  given  '  is  as  such 
neither  certain  nor  uncertain,  neither  reliable 
nor  unreliable/  If  we  judge  on  the  basis  of 
our  '  data  of  experience,'  if  we  announce  what  is 
found  in  consciousness,  such  testimony  must 
always  show  by  research,  and  in  the  face  of  it, 
what  our  final  judgment  shall  be  concerning  it. 
Of  course  psychology,  as  an  empirical  science, 
everywhere  depends  upon  this  testimony,  but 
if  it  proceeds  cautiously,  it  never  accepts  this 
testimony  as  pure  and  unconditionally  valid 
knowledge  without  proof.  The  experimental 
method  has  shown,  among  other  things,  that 
we  may  question  the  testimony  of  some  ob- 
servers, without  questioning  their  subjective 
reliability  or  their  honesty.  Under  exactly 
identical  conditions  of  observation,  the  con- 
clusions of  one  investigator  may  be  meagre 
and  incomplete,  or  wavering  and  contradic- 
tory ;  while  those  of  another  may  be  rich  and 

^  Compare  pp.  48  and  49. 


232     PHILOSOPHY   OF  THE   PRESENT 

complete,  reliable  and  consistent.  When  we 
take  such  distinctions  into  account,  and  give 
preference  to  the  conclusions  of  the  second 
observer,  in  so  far  as  it  is  not  practicable  to 
determine  more  closely  the  individual  nature  of 
the  former,  it  means  clearly  nothing  else  than 
that  we  doubt  the  validity  of  the  evidence 
from  inner  perception  as  such.  The  best  pos- 
sible observers  are  not  always  reliable.  Their 
reports  change  according  to  mood  and  disposi- 
tion, practice  and  fatigue,  interest  and  prepara- 
tion. Even  in  very  simple  matters,  such  as  the 
comparison  of  sense  impressions,  how  uncertain 
are  the  judgments  of  the  observers !  Only  in 
very  rough  determinations,  when  we  are  not 
seeking  final  and  decisive  results,  is  inner 
perception  a  wholly  safe  guide. 

Since  self-perception  is  of  scientific  value 
only  when  properly  reproduced,  characterised, 
and  described,  so  the  testimony  as  to  what 
is  experienced  forms  the  immediate  foundation 
of  psychological  research.  Now,  there  exists 
not  only  a  disparity  between  the  subjective 
certainty  of  the  person  giving  testimony  about 
his  inner  states  and  processes,  and  his  objective 
reliability,  which  is  ascertainable   by  an  exact 


IDEALISM  233 

control  of  his  conclusions  through  experimental 
proof,  but  furthermore,  the  relation  between  his 
experience  and  his  testimony  is  not  simple  and 
immediate.  The  arbitrary  symbols  of  speech 
used  in  description  have  no  similarity  with  the 
conscious  contents  described.  They  are  fre- 
quently insufficient  to  make  possible  an  entirely 
fitting  report ;  they  may  be  inadequate,  and 
there  often  cling  to  them  different  meanings, 
which  cause  misunderstanding  or  uncertainty  in 
the  interpretation  of  what  is  meant.  Those 
contents  which  attract  the  attention  are  made 
unduly  prominent ;  while  that  which  goes  on 
in  the  background  of  consciousness  is  generally 
omitted  in  the  testimony  of  the  experiencing  sub- 
ject. Psychological  knowledge  and  preconceived 
opinions,  the  desire  to  find  and  report  as  much 
as  possible  in  the  experiment,  have  a  determin- 
ing influence  on  the  testimony  of  the  subject. 

It  is  necessary,  therefore,  that  psychological 
method  shall  be  rather  complicated  and  refined, 
in  order  that  it  may  avoid  the  pitfalls  so 
dangerous  to  the  unskilled,  and  that  it  may 
disclose  the  psychical  in  its  real  nature  and 
uniformity.  It  is  for  this  reason  that  the 
experimenter  collects   observations  and  strikes 


234     PHILOSOPHY   OF  THE   PRESENT 

averages,  and  uses  unexpected  methods  not 
known  to  the  observer ;  it  is  for  this  reason  that 
he  struggles  against  the  influences  of  expecta- 
tion and  surprise,  which  as  experience  teaches 
modify  our  consciousness  of  psychic  phenomena. 
All  this  would  be  to  no  purpose,  if  every  act  of 
inner  perception  were  absolutely  evident  and 
infallible,  if  the  host  of  constant  and  accidental 
factors  in  such  observations  were  not  able  to 
bring  disaster  and  failure.  Modern  psychology, 
which  aims  to  become  a  science  having  the 
same  general  validity  as  natural  science,  ap- 
proximates to  this  goal  because  it  divests  inner 
as  well  as  outer  perception  of  a  supposedly 
self-evident  trustworthiness.  The  true  task 
of  psychology,  as  of  every  real  science,  is 
knowledge,  which  is  on  the  one  hand  under 
the  law  of  accuracy — that  is,  agreement  with 
facts,  and  on  the  other  hand  under  the  law  of 
truth — that  is,  freedom  from  contradiction  in  our 
thoughts.  Neither  accuracy  nor  truth,  however, 
is  assured  in  simple  experience  nor  in  the 
mere  fact  of  being  given  in  consciousness. 

It  might  indeed  be  well,  with  the  aid  of 
modern  psychological  science,  to  revive  Kanfs 
doctrine  of  the  inner  sense  (now,  of  course,  old- 


IDEALISM  235 

fashioned  and  inadequate  as  to  its  form),  which 
presents  to  us  only  phenomena,  not  the  ego- 
in-itself.  The  complete  knowledge  of  psychic 
reality  forms,  then,  the  ideal  goal  of  psychologi- 
cal science — a  goal,  to  be  sure,  lying  in  infinity, 
exactly  as  the  complete  knowledge  of  physical 
reality  forms  such  a  goal  for  natural  science. 

We  can  thereby  judge  whether  Idealism  has 
a  right  to  determine  total  reality  after  the 
analogy  of  the  supposedly  better  known  mental 
life.  The  immediate  and  undiscriminated  ex- 
perience, however,  which  fills  our  consciousness 
previous  to  all  reflection,  is  neither  physical  nor 
psychical,  and  nothing  real  at  all,  although,  to 
be  sure,  it  suggests  both  realities,  and  forms  the 
point  of  departure  and  material  for  the  investi- 
gation of  both.  Not  with  regard  to  the  unity 
of  immediate  experience,  but  in  answer  to  the 
demand  for  a  unified  world-theory,  metaphysics 
will  have  to  pursue  the  paths  of  natural  science 
and  of  psychology,  and  bring  these  into  connec- 
tion with  one  another  through  the  numerous 
reciprocal  relations  yielded  by  these  disciplines. 
Whether  such  a  metaphysics  will  have  an 
idealistic  character,  however,  cannot  of  course 
be  finally  determined  in  this  connection. 


VI 

CONCLUSION 

We  have  presented  the  four  main  schools  of 
philosophy  in  Germany  at  the  present  time — 
Positivism,  Materialism,  Naturalism,  and  Ideal- 
ism— and  have  allowed  them  to  give  an  account 
of  themselves  through  a  few  typical  represen- 
tatives. Of  these.  Positivism  and  Idealism 
have  been  considered  more  in  detail.  These 
two  schools,  moreover,  occupy  the  foreground 
of  the  present  philosophical  movement,  and  are 
on  good  terms  with  each  other  so  long  and  in 
so  far  as  the  anti-metaphysical  tendency  of 
Positivism  is  left  out  of  the  question.  Both 
are,  and  seek  to  be,  scientific  philosophy,  which 
stands  fundamentally  opposed  to  arbitrary  specu- 
lation rooted  in  free  pure  thinking  alone. 

Such,  indeed,  in  our  opinion,  will  be  the 
philosophy  of  the  future.  Only  such  a 
philosophy  will  be  able  to  satisfy  the  demands 
which  we  have  sketched  in  our  Introduction, 

236 


CONCLUSION  237 

and  be  able  to  extend  the  light  of  knowledge 
and  to  increase  the  power  of  its  rays,  so  as  to 
dispel  the  darkness  of  ignorance.  Only  such  a 
philosophy  is  secure  from  the  danger  of  becom- 
ing an  ignis  fatum  or  a  careless  torch-bearer 
which  shall  lead  us  upon  the  shoals.  Such  a 
philosophy  is  not  promoted  by  servile  adherence 
to  authorities  and  leaders  of  schools,  but  only 
by  subjecting  every  brilliant  fancy,  no  matter 
how  happy  it  may  appear,  to  strict  investigation 
and  independent  thought.  I  have  not,  there- 
fore, considered  it  my  task  to  determine  and  fix 
the  opinion  of  my  readers,  but  to  make  a  survey 
of  the  present  lively  and  noteworthy  activity  in 
philosophical  fields,  and  in  this  way  to  encourage 
independent  judgment  and  selection. 

In  general,  the  course  of  development  of 
German  philosophy  reveals  the  gradual  unfold- 
ing of  two  fundamentally  opposite  views. 
Originally,  with  Leibniz  and  his  school,  the 
belief  prevailed  that  reality,  the  essence  of  all 
things,  could  only  be  comprehended  and 
determined  by  the  aid  of  reason  or  of  thought, 
while  experience  is  merely  of  subordinate 
significance.  Sense-perception  can  give  us  no 
adequate   knowledge  of  the  world  as  it  really 


238     PHILOSOPHY   OF   THE   PRESENT 

is,  and  beyond  the  region  of  its    applicability 
thought  alone  can  give  us  information.     God's 
existence  and  nature,  as  well  as  the  view  that 
the   world  is  made   up  of  monads  which   are 
furnished   with   the  faculty  of  perception,    are 
deduced  by  Leibniz  by  an  essentially  conceptual 
method,  by  means  of  ontological  speculations. 
In  this  he  believed  firmly  that  the  freedom  from 
contradiction  in  a  concept  or  judgment   is  in 
itself  sufficient  to  guarantee  existence  or  reality 
to    the    conceptual    content.     Possibility    and 
reality  differ  from  each  other  only  as  two  ideas 
of  which  the  one  is   more  general,   the  other 
more    specific,    much    as    the    ideas    "living 
being"  and  "man."     Thus  it  is  only  necessary 
to  add  the  attribute  of  reality  to  a  concept  in 
order  to  endow  its  content  with  existence.     But 
this  attribute  can  be  given  at  any  time  as  soon 
as  freedom  from  contradiction  in  the  concept 
allows  it.     In  this  w^ay,  metaphysics   becomes 
an  activity  of  pure  thought,  a  sister  science  to 
mathematics.     In  its  a  iwiori  realm  it  is  not 
disturbed  by  the  claims  and  encroachments  of 
experience,  and  the  distinction  of  "formal"  and 
"  real"  is  set  aside. 

Such  a  trust  in  the  power  of  reason  inspired 


CONCLUSION  239 

even  the  philosophers  of  ancient  and  mediaeval 
times.       It   was   not   the    Eleatics   alone   who 
indulged  in   conceptual   reflections   and   repu- 
diated the  senses  as  deceptive  and  inadequate. 
Other  philosophers  of  a  wholly  different  school, 
such  as  the  founders  of  the  atomic  theory,  de- 
pended ultimately  upon  thought  in  their  attempt 
to  explain  the  structure   and  functions  of  the 
world.  Democritus  expressly  characterised  sense- 
perception  as  obscure  knowledge,  and  in  opposi- 
tion to   it   lauded   the  results   gained   by  the 
understanding  as  true  knowledge.     It  remained 
for  the  later  philosophers,  who  were  no  longer 
sufficiently  interested  in  the  theory,  to  obscure  by 
their  inconsequence  the  real  facts,  which  indicate 
clearly  the  close  relation  between  metaphysics 
and  rationalism.     When,  for  example,  in  the 
eighteenth  century,  Lamettrie,  one  of  the  leading 
representatives  of  those  who  held  materialistic 
conceptions  of  the  universe,  declared :  Le  sens 
.  .  .  voild  mes  philosophes,  and  held  the  psychic 
life  to  be  a  function  of  the  brain,  this  was  a 
plain  contradiction.     The   senses  certainly   do 
not  teach  us  this  theory,  if  it  is  a  theory.     So 
almost  all  philosophers,  up  to  the  beginning  of 
the  eighteenth  century,  have  given  the  highest 


240     PHILOSOPHY   OF  THE   PRESENT 

place  to  thought,  and  have  recognised  that  a 
metaphysics,  or  the  discovery  of  realities  which 
do  not  coincide  with  "  what  is  given  in  ex- 
perience," is  achievable  only  on  rationalistic 
lines  by  the  aid  of  thought. 

Even  the  more  modern  natural  science  of  a 
Galileo  and  Neiotoii  shared  this  view.  When 
they  stripped  the  outer  world  of  colours,  tones, 
pressures,  &c. — in  short,  of  sense  qualities  in 
general — and  gave  to  bodies  only  the  attributes 
of  space  and  time  and  dynamic  attributes,  they 
made  of  outward  reality  a  world  no  longer 
immediately  given  in  experience  but  compre- 
hensible only  in  thought.  Matter  and  its 
atoms,  energy  and  the  chemical  elements,  ether 
and  the  vibrations  of  the  air,  are  all  '  things  of 
thought,'  not  elements  of  what  is  experienced. 
So  we  see  that  their  view  also  rests  upon  the 
rationalistic  presupposition  that  in  all  matters 
of  knowledge,  reason  has  the  final  word,  and 
that  we  must  think  of  a  real  world  beyond  the 
bounds  of  our  perception,  of  our  experience. 
Even  if  the  natural  scientists  managed  as  a  rule 
to  avoid  pure  a  imori  construction,  such  as  that 
of  Leibniz,  nevertheless,  in  their  acceptance  of 
real  things  of  thought,  they  were,  like  him,  filled 


CONCLUSION  241 

with  a  sense  of  the  superiority  of  the  under- 
standing over  mere  sense-perception. 

But  at  the  present  time  a  quite  opposite 
conception  has  arisen  and  obtained  a  relatively 
wide  acceptance.  According  to  this,  the  im- 
mediate experience  of  the  knowing  individual 
is  his  only  reality,  and  the  activity  of  thought 
is  reduced  to  a  more  or  less  pui*posive  auxiliary 
function,  having  a  certain  "  economic  "  value  in 
making  '  what  is  given '  intelligible.  Every 
concept  has  its  significance  only  in  so  far  as 
it  serves  this  purpose :  it  is  not  an  indication 
of  reality.  Atom,  mass,  energy,  are  figures, 
symbols,  and  signs,  which  can  be  used  in  so 
far  as  they  represent  reality  to  us,  and  in  so  far 
as  they  make  reality  more  easily  understood ; 
but  to  attribute  existence  to  them,  and  to 
substitute  for  the  visible  world  of  sense  a  real 
world  of  this  kind,  is  a  naive  unwarranted  pro- 
cedure, and  indeed  has  been  a  hindrance  to  the 
progress  of  science.  Science  is  nothing  more 
than  a  simple  complete  picture  of  experience,  of 
which  one  need  only  ask  what  outlines  and 
shadings  are  necessary  and  suificient  to  make 
the  picture  a  true  reproduction.  We  have  had 
a  good  illustration  of  this  view  in  the  case  of 

Q 


242     PHILOSOPHY   OP  THE   PRESENT 

Mach,  but  we  find  also  that  philosophers  like 
Avenarius  and  Wundt  incline  to  it  also.  With 
the  latter  we  have  seen  the  influence  of  this 
standpoint  become  a  criterion  for  the  evaluation 
of  the  'data  of  experience,'  'the  objects  of 
idea.'  We  have  found  that,  as  a  result,  a  certain 
inconsistency  appeared  in  his  arguments.^ 

Leibniz  attributed  to  all  thought,  in  so  far 
as  it  takes  place  without  contradiction,  a  real 
significance,  an  objective  validity.  According 
to  this  modern  doctrine,  on  the  contrary,  all 
thought  is  merely  formal.  In  both  cases  the 
difl'erence  between  mathematics  and  meta- 
physics ceases  to  exist,  but  in  the  first  case 
mathematics  becomes  metaphysics,  while  in  the 
second,  vice  versa,  metaphysics  becomes  mathe- 
matics. There,  figures  and  space  forms  have 
become  significant  attributes  of  reality,  or  at 
ledist  jphenomena  bene,  that  is,  realiter  fundata ; 
here,  all  realities  have  become  concepts,  symbols, 
numbers,  among  which  no  higher  law  rules  than 
the  elegance  and  certainty  of  mathematical 
operations.  There,  all  that  is  purely  formal 
ceases ;  here,  all  that  is  real  vanishes. 

This   second   conception   of  philosophy  does 

^  Compare  p.  218  f. 


CONCLUSION  243 

not  follow  immediately  upon  the  other.  Kant 
with  his  illustrious  work  stands  most  conspicu- 
ously between  them.  According  to  him,  thought 
has  a  real  significance  only  together  with  and  in 
experience,  and  there  is,  therefore,  in  this  sense 
only  an  empirical  reality.  Beyond  experience, 
thought  can  accomplish  nothing  further,  except 
to  set  up  the  absolutely  empty  and  indefinite 
concept  of  the  thing-in-itself,  a  wholly  unknow- 
able reality,  which  is  useful  as  a  limiting  idea 
to  curb  the  presumption  of  sense-perception. 
As  a  matter  of  fact,  perception  is  and  remains 
a  necessary  ingredient  of  all  knowledge  of 
reality,  but  we  must  realise  that  this  limitation 
is  actual  and  not  grounded  in  reality  itself.  If, 
for  instance,  there  were  an  intellectual  intuition 
by  which  thought  could  gain  immediate  access 
to  the  world,  then  a  knowledge  of  things-in- 
themselves  would  be  possible.  But  this  is 
denied  to  us  because  of  a  lack  in  our  mental 
make-up,  because  of  the  organisation  of  our 
knowing  mind. 

In  this  way  Kant  sought  to  do  justice  to  the 
claims  of  both  experience  and  thought.  To 
pure  thought,  which  Leibniz  had  entrusted 
with  such  noteworthy  powers,  nothing  remained 


244     PHILOSOPHY   OF  THE   PRESENT 

but  the  recognition  of  the  thing-in-itself.  On 
the  other  hand,  however,  Kant  was  far  from 
recognising  immediate  experience,  or  sense- 
perception,  as  a  pure  reality ;  he  insisted  rather 
that  all  thought-determination  which  had  to  do 
with  experience  belonged  necessarily  to  empirical 
reality.  The  known  and  the  knowable  world 
are  composed  of  both  factors.  Then  Hegel, 
with  this  as  a  basis,  undertook  the  construction 
of  a  grand  system  of  empirical  reality,  by  show- 
ing the  rational  in  all  that  is  real,  and  the  real 
in  all  that  is  rational.  In  his  panlogism  all 
phenomena  of  the  empirically-given  world  had 
found  a  place ;  in  his  panempiricism  all  cate- 
gories and  laws  of  thought  had  received  their 
coi-relate  in  reality.  The  method  of  thought 
movement  was  at  the  same  time  recognised  as 
the  real  process  of  development,  the  necessity  of 
an  advance  from  concept  to  concept  became  a 
real  necessity  of  transition  from  stage  to  stage. 
Thus  in  principle,  reason  and  experience  became 
of  equal  scope  and  of  equal  value.  Pure  being 
became  just  as  much  an  empty  limiting  concept 
as  pure  thought.  In  principle  the  old  struggle 
between  rationalism  and  empiricism  seemed 
thereby  to  have   been   terminated ;  in  reality, 


CONCLUSION  245 

however,  the  line  which  separates  formal 
thought  and  thought  which  posits  and  defines 
the  real  was  only  once  more  wiped  out.  An  a 
jjriori  scheme,  which  called  itself  the  dialectic 
method,  although  indeed  it  was  handled  with 
great  skill,  served  as  an  all-too-willing  tool  by 
means  of  which  to  stamp  reality  with  the  mai*k 
of  reason. 

In  the  belief  that  reality  is  richer  and  con- 
tains something  more  than  our  thinking,  which 
generalises  so  easily  and  classifies  so  mechani- 
cally, we  find  the  cause  of  the  gradual  rise 
of  modern  empiricism.  Schleierniacher,  and 
Schelling  in  his  positive  philosophy,  admit  that 
definite  limits  are  set  to  our  constructive  think- 
ing. Personality  and  individuality  are  not 
capable  of  conceptual  derivation ;  they  remain 
a  secret  which  must  be  experienced.  The 
dialectic  process  halts  in  the  presence  of  such 
final  facts.  To  this  view  of  Schleiermacher  we 
find  a  parallel  in  the  later  doctrine  of  Schelling, 
according  to  which  our  thinking  can  show  only 
that  which  is  possible  but  not  that  which  is 
real.  All  construction,  therefore,  leads  only  to  a 
negative  philosophy,  which  waives  the  question 
as  to  whether  there  is  a  reality  coiTesponding  to 


246     PHILOSOPHY   OF  THE   PRESENT 

its  deductions.  It  can  only  say,  if  there  is  a 
reality  it  must  and  will  take  this  form ;  but  it 
is  unable  to  prove  existence.  Thus  the  new 
standpoint  appears,  which  limits  thought  to 
the  portrayal  of  given  experience  and  which 
recognises  experience  as  an  absolute  reality 
to  which  no  other  can  be  opposed.  So  one 
extreme  replaces  the  other. 

In  our  opinion  we  have  in  this  way  merely 
exchanged  one  untenable  position  for  another. 
Certain  it  is  that  thought  which  follows  solely 
its  own  laws,  the  laws  of  formal  logic,  is  not 
forthwith  to  be  recognised  as  able  to  establish 
and  determine  realities,  or  to  be  considered  as 
objectively  valid  thought.  But  it  is  equally 
certain  that  immediate  experience,  in  its  un- 
purified,  untested  actuahty,  is  not  the  reality 
with  which  we  have  to  abide  once  for  all. 
Even  though  a  final  theory  concerning  the 
existence  and  nature  of  reality  still  lies  far 
afield,  nevertheless  the  real  sciences  may  make 
the  approach  to  this  goal  a  part  of  their  pro- 
gramme and  their  work.  But  the  task  of 
investigating  how  far  and  with  what  right 
thought-things  shall  be  considered  valid  as 
realities  will  be  the  chief  problem  of  a  theory  of 


CONCLUSION  247 

knowledge  which  will  oppose  a  naive  meta- 
physics on  the  one  hand  and  a  radical  antimeta- 
physical  tendency  on  the  other.  A  renewal  and 
revival  of  Bationalism  is  of  conrse  involved  in 
this,  in  so  far  as  we  grant  to  thought  the  ability 
and  authority  to  establish  and  determine 
realities. 

In  spite  of  its  frequent  reappearances,  it  is 
generally  believed  to-day  that  rationalism  has 
in  principle  been  disposed  of  by  Kcuit  and  the 
positivists.  Concepts  without  perceptions  are 
empty,  taught  the  Konigsberg  scholar.  But 
with  his  elastic  idea  of  possible  experience 
whose  scope  extends  far  beyond  that  of  the  real, 
Kant  won  for  his  theory  of  knowledge  the 
assumption  of  thinkable  realities  to  which  in 
perception  no  real  facts  correspond.  Of  living 
beings  on  another  planet,  we  plainly  have  no 
real  experience ;  but  if  certain  conditions  of 
observation  were  fulfilled,  we  could  gain  a 
knowledge  of  them  as  well  as  of  those  who 
surround  us.  They  belong,  therefore,  to  the 
realm  of  possible  experience,  and  it  is  easy  to 
see  that,  M'ith  the  help  of  this  concept,  an  open- 
ing is  made  for  a  certain  kind  of  rationalism. 
The  real  opponent  of  rationahsm  is  therefore 


248     PHILOSOPHY   OF  THE   PRESENT 

not  Kant,  of  whose  inclination  in  this  direction 
other  instances  could  be  cited,  but  rather 
Positivism,  like  that  oi  Mach,  which  sees  in  the 
reality  of  immediate  experience  all  the  objectivity 
of  real  scientific  knowledge.  The  new  rational- 
ism cannot  therefore  avoid  a  direct  conflict  with 
this  school,  whose  position  we  may  call  the 
stand])oint  of  reality. 

In  the  struggle  against  this  standpoint  the 
neo-rationalism  can  fall  back  upon  two  incon- 
testible  facts.  These  are  the  affirmation  and 
determination  of  the  mental  life  of  others,  and 
of  historical  reality.  The  mental  life  of  others, 
and  historical  personages  and  events,  are 
supersensuous  values  entirely  outside  of  ex- 
perience. If  the  concept  of  possible  experience 
has  any  distinct  meaning  at  all,  it  must  here 
find  its  limits.  Psychology  and  every  branch 
of  historical  science  completely  lose  their 
meaning  if  we  interpret  these  facts  in  the 
spirit  of  the  standpoint  of  reality.  They  neces- 
sarily lead  out  beyond  this  standpoint  and 
demand  a  more  positive  evaluation  of  thought 
and  its  results.  The  mental  life  of  others  is 
thinkable  and  can  be  constructed,  but  it  can 
never  become   the  content   of  my  experience. 


CONCLUSION  249 

In  the  same  way  historical  reality  can  be 
constructed  from  reports  and  other  evidence,  and 
can  therefore  be  established  in  and  by  thought ; 
but  as  surely  as  time  does  not  turn  backward, 
so  surely  can  historical  reality  never  become  an 
object  of  perception  or  of  immediate  experience. 
A  theoiy  of  knowledge  which  sets  out  to 
understand  the  presuppositions  of  the  special 
sciences  and  not  to  master  and  mould  them, 
will  have  to  keep  these  facts  in  mind. 

With  this  the  new  rationalism  at  once  clears 
the  way  for  metaphysics  as  a  science,  and  for 
an  inductive  completion  of  real  scientific  know- 
ledge. In  the  sixth  decade  of  the  nineteenth 
century,  philosophy,  in  order  to  free  itself  from 
a  metaphysics  which  had  led  it  astray,  raised  the 
cry  :  Back  to  Kant !  But  after  Kant,  followed 
Fichte,  and  then  Schelling  and  Hegel.  It  was 
thought,  therefore,  that  neo-Fichteanism  must 
follow  neo-Kantianism,  and  at  present  voices 
are  loud  in  demanding  a  neo-Schellingism  and 
a  neo-Hegelianism.  But,  on  the  contrary,  the 
opinion  might  just  as  well  be  held  that  it  is  a 
question  of  returning  to  still  older  views ;  we 
ought  to  go  back  to  the  pre-Kantian  philoso- 
phers, and  take  up  the  traditions  of  the  great 


250     PHILOSOPHY   OF  THE   PRESENT 

metaphysicians  of  the  seventeenth  century, 
Descartes,  Spinoza,  and  Leibniz.  Cleansed  by 
a  critical  purgatory,  and  supported  by  the 
modern  special  sciences,  we  should  again  enter 
upon  the  golden  age  of  ideas.  But  of  course 
the  naivete  of  those  speculations  is  for  ever 
past.  If  they  are  revived  now,  we  must  win 
our  right  to  them.  The  whole  development  of 
the  BerJceley-Hume-Kant  philosophy  down  to 
modern  Positivism  must  be  surmounted  in  order 
that  metaphysics  may  celebrate  its  resurrection 
in  and  above  the  sciences  of  reality. 

We  have  no  wish  to  ignore  or  set  aside  the 
incisive  and  indeed  just  critique  of  the  old 
metaphysics.  We  must  rather  adopt  it  and 
transcend  it.  Its  well-grounded  motives,  its 
relative  truth,  should  be  taken  over  into  the 
new  standpoint ;  while  at  the  same  time  the 
absolute  significance  of  the  critique  must  be 
questioned.  With  full  consciousness  of  the 
infinite  goal  of  science  and  the  temporal  limits  of 
our  existence  ;  in  careful  employment  of  thought 
dedicated  to  attainable  tasks,  we  must  venture 
out  again  into  those  waters  of  which  Kant 
so  impressively  warned  us,  since  banks  of  mist 
and  icebergs  may  be  mistaken  for  new  lands. 


CONCLUSION  251 

The  gate  of  metaphysics  does  not  open  to 
him  who  seeks  to  surprise  the  garrison  by 
"insight,"  "intellectual  intuition,"  and  other 
mysticism  ;  but  only  to  him  who  in  open, 
honourable  struggle  seizes  and  holds  the  cause- 
way. Sj)i)iOza  once  said  :  A  passion  can  only 
be  overcome  by  a  passion.  So  we  may  say : 
A  philosophy  will  only  give  way  to  a  philosophy. 

In  the  "pathological  interlude"  of  philo- 
sophical anarchy  which  at  present  still  seems 
to  prevail,  a  glimpse  of  a  possible  fruitful  unison 
of  philosophical  efforts  and  results  inspires  our 
hope  and  awakens  our  strength.  A  new  realm 
is  already  rising  slowly  but  surely  from  the 
receding  ocean  of  the  future.  We  have  sought 
to  picture  its  preparation  in  these  pages.  But 
on  the  threshold  of  this  philosophy  of  the 
future  stands  the  jjroUem  of  reality. 


INDEX 


Absolute  Philosophy,  26  f., 

76,  149  f.,  162 
iEsthetics,  experimental,  148 
Agnosticism,  33,  144 
Antinomies,  72 
Apperception,  228 
Aristophanes,  136 
Aristotle,  19,  196,  221 
Art,  71,  129 
Atom,  241 
Avenarius,  35,  242 

Bacon,  Francis,  31 

Being,  Lotze's  theory  of,  164; 

absolute,    170;    primordial, 

63  ff. 
Beneke,  223 
Bergraann,  Julius,  145 
Bernouilli,  C,  A.,  115  note 
Body,  91,  109  ;  soul  and  bodv, 

157  f. 
—  and  mind,  93,  157 
Bosanquet,  Bernard,  161  note 
Brain,  92,  95,  103 
Braun,  O.,  175 
Brentano,  Franz,  35,  224 
Bruno,  127 
Biichner,  L.,  82  ff.,  89,  97,  102 

Causality,  73  f. 
Certainty,  criterion  of,  48  ff. 
Christianity,  110,  120,  132 
Chwolson,  96  note 
Cohen,  H.,  34 


Commandment, twelfth,  96  note 

Common,  Th.,  114  note 

Conite,  29  ff.,  61 

Consciousness,  65,  67  f.,  75, 
90f.,95,  102f.,223ff.;  Fech- 
ner's  theory  of,  153  ff. ;  Hart- 
mann's  theory  of,  185  ff. 

Coupland,  W.  C,  175  note 

Corte.t,  103 

Creightoii,  .J.  E.,  194  note 

Cynics,  19 

D'Alembert,  27  f. 
Dar\vin,  124 
Deduction,  14,  1 10 
Democritus,  19,  239 
Descartes,  78,  250 
Dialectic,  62 
Drews,  A.,  116,  175 
Dualism,  87,  93 
Diiring,  Eugen,  59  ff. 

Earth,  soul  of,  151  f.,  159  f. 
Economy,  mental,  60 
Eisler,  Rudolf,  193 
Eleatics,  239 
Empiricism,  244  f. 
Energy,  94,  100  f.,  104,  240  f. 
Epiciireans,  20 
E|iistemology,  14,  16,  217 
Erhardt,  143 
Ether,  89,  135,  240 
Eucken,  R.,  145  ff. 
Eyolution,  33,  124 


253 


254     PHILOSOPHY    OF   THE   PRESENT 


Experience,  11,  41  f.,  56,  201, 
235,  241,  243 

Falckexberg,  Richard,  161 
Fatalism,  126 

Fechner,  141  f.,  147  ff.,  210 
Feuerbach,  61,  108  tf. 
Fichte,  J.  G.,  146,  181,  249 
Force,  33,  82  f.,  99 

Galileo,  240 
Gellert,  4 
Goethe,  11,  97 
Gottsched,  4 
Gulliver,  J.  H.,  149 

Haeckel,  3,  4,  83  flf.,  93  ff. 
Hamilton,  Elizabeth,  161  note 
Hartmann,  Ed\s-ard  von,  143, 

147,  161,  174  ff.,  210,  220 
Hegel,  4,  11,  12,  26,  56,  149, 

162,    177  f.,    188,   222,   244, 

249 
Herbart,  76,  149, 164, 174,  220, 

228,  230 
Honigswald,  Richard,  36  note 
Hume,  20,  31,  34,  250 
Huxley,  33 

Idealism,    18  ff.,  58,    135  ff. ; 
critique  of,  222  ff.,  236 

—  objective,  145 
Immanent  Philosophy,  34,  68, 

193 
Individuality,  110  f. 
Induction,  10,  14,  32,  143 
Inductive    metaphysics.      See 

Metaphysics 
Intuition,  140 

—  intellectual,  243,  251 

Jones,  E.  C.,  161  note 
Judaism,  120 


Kant,  9,  11,  34,  73,  77,  97, 
117,  138,  140  f.,  143,  176, 
179  f.,  220,  222,  234,  243  f., 
247  ff. 

Kaufmann,  Max,  35 

Konig,  E.,  193 

Knowledge,  43,  53,  56 

Kunze,  J.  E.,  147 

Lamettrie,  20,  239 

Lange,  F.  A.,  34,  97  f.,  98 

Lasswitz,  K.,  147 

Leibniz,  138  f.,  157,  171,  178, 

195,   221,   230,   237  f.,   240, 

242  f.,  250 
Levy,  Dr.  O.,  1 14  note 
Lichtenberger,  115 
Liebmann,  Otto,  34 
Life, conduct  of,  60, 70  f .,  118  f., 

130 
Logic,  14,  16,  136 
Lotze,  147,  157,  160  ff.,  210 
Ludovici,  A.  M.,  115  note 

Mach,  35  ft".,  68,  137,  173,  218, 

242,  248 
Marty,  Anton,  35 
Masters,  morals  of  the,  119, 125 
Materialism,  19  ff.,  78  ff.,  98  ff. 
Mathematics,  136,  140 
Matter,  33,  39  f.,  65,  82,  87,  89, 

99,  104 
McCabe,  Joseph,  84  note 
Metaphysics,  40  f.,  141 
—  Inductive,   16,    143,    159, 

189' 
Mill,  J.  S.,  82 
Mind,  82  f.,  94,  96 
Moleschott,  Jacob,  80  ff. 
Monadologv,  138,  221 
Monism,  81,  87  f.,  89,  94,  96  f. 
Morality,  125 

Natorp,  Paul,  34 


INDEX 


255 


Naturalism,  19  ff.,  107  ff. 
Nature,  laws  of,  66  f.,  107 
Neo-Kantiauism,  34 

—  Rationalism,  248  f. 
Newton,  27,  240 
Nietzsche,   3,   4,   67,    97,  108, 

113,  114  fF.,  224,  229 

—  Mrs.  Fcirster,  114  note,  115 
Nihilism,  117 

Number,  determinate,  62,  72  f. ; 
law  of,  74 

Ohm's  Law,  46 

Ontology,  Wundt's  theory  of, 

207  f. 
Overbeck,  Franz,  115,  132 

Panlogism,  244 

Pantheism,  88 

Parallelism,  psychophysical,  93, 
103 

Paulsen,  97 

Pfleiderer,  Edmund,  160 

Philosophy,  its  present  posi- 
tion, 1  ft'.  ;  relation  to  special 
sciences,  8 

—  Absolute,  26  f.,  76  ;  schools 
of,  8 ;  task  of,  35 ;  Wundt's 
division  of,  196 

—  Immanent,  34,  68 
Phenomenalism,  139 
Planck,  Max,  47  note 
Plato,  19,  127,  137  f.,  189 
Poetry,  98,  129 
Positivism,  8,  18  f.,  19  ff.,  26  ff., 

137,  193,  236 
Psyche,  92 

Psychical,  definition  of,  53,  55 
Psvchological     method,     101, 

225  ff.,  229  f.,  233 
Psychoplasm,  92,  94 

Rationalism,  247 
Realism,  193 


Realism,  transcendental,  179 
Reality,  21,  68,  164  f.,  217  f., 

238,  251 ;  Lotze's  theory  of, 

162  f. 
Relations,    Lotze's    theory   of, 

166  ff. 
Religion,  28,  70,  96,  113 
Richter,  R.,  115 
Riehl,  34,  115 
Rousseau,  20,  107,  125  f. 

Samuels,  H.  B.,  115  note 
Schelling,   4,   26,   149,   177  f., 

188,  245,  249 
Schiller,  118 
Schleierniacher,  245 
Schopenhauer,  3,  4,  61,  76,  97, 

114,  117,  141,  172,  175,  177, 

182,  188,  192,  223 
Schubert-Soldern,  Richard  von, 

35 
Schuppe,  W.,  35 
Schmitt,  Kaspar,  110  ff. 
Scholasticism,  71 
Schools  of  philosophv,  8,  18 
Science,  13  ff.,  38,  71,  195  f.  ; 

Mach's  view,  36  ff. ;  relation 

to  philosophy,  8 
Sensations,  44  f.,  49  ff.,  104  f. 
Sense-perception,  86 
Skeptics,  20 
Slaves,  morals  of,  119  f.,  124, 

125 
Sociology,  30 
Soul,  79,  91,  93  ;  of  the  earth, 

152  ft". ;  Fechner's  theory,  157 
Soul-cells,  90,  95 
Space,  62 
Spencer,  33,  220 
Spinoza,  87,  94,  181,  221,  230, 

250  f. 
Spirit,  87,  94 
Spiritualism,  81 
Stirner,  110  ft" 


256     PHILOSOPHY   OF  THE   PRESENT 


Stoics,  20 

Substance,  problem  of,  85,  89 

Superman,  121  f. 

Theology,  71 
Thing-in-itself,  81,  86,  179  ff., 

244 
Thomas,  E.  C,  98  note 
Thought,  44, 54, 197  ;  economy 

of,  37 
TiUe,  A.,  114  note. 
Time,  62 

Titchener,  E.  B.,  194  note 
Touch,  sense  of,  68 
Transcendence,    98 ;    Wundt's 

theory  of,  202  ff. 
Treitschke,  2 
Turgot,  27  ff. 

Unconscious,  67,  95, 177  ff. 


Values,  116  f. 
Vitalism,  88 
Vogt,  Karl,  80 
Voltaire,  125 

Wagner,  Richard,  114,  129 

—  Rudolf,  79 
Washburn,  M.  F.,  194 
Wernecke,  H.,  158  note 
Will,  89;  Wundt's  theory  of, 

199,     206  ft'. ;      Hartmann's 

theory  of,  174 
Williams,  C.  M.,  36  note 
Wolff,  4,  9,  11 
World -cycle,  123,  126 
Wundt,  93,    143,    147,  193  ff., 

230  f.,  242 

ZlEGLER,  Th.,  115 

Zimmern,  H.,  114  note 


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